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This thesis examines the specific criminogenic relationship between the state and 
corporation, and the state and civil society in the case of Trafigura’s dumping of toxic 
waste in Abidjan, Ivory Coast in August 2006. Research undertaken in London and 
Abidjan reveals that the impunity that was enjoyed by the Ivory Coast state and 
Trafigura for this state-corporate crime was underpinned by the power of the 
corporation and by failures of both domestic and international civil society 
organisations that might have been expected to have labelled and challenged the crimes. 
Moreover, the thesis reveals that in the case of this particular example of state-corporate 
crime, civil society as an agency of censure and sanction played a distinctly 
retrogressive role. Here, in fact, state crime facilitated organised crime’s insertion into 
civil society through a process I define as ‘the commodification of victimhood’ and, as a 
result, ensured that impunity was virtually guaranteed for corporation and government. 
The thesis also examines the failure of international and domestic legal measures to 
sanction the perpetrators. The thesis argues that a criminal state can act as a nexus for 
crimes by all three sectors of society, facilitating crime by actors in the state, the market 
and third spheres of society. Gramsci’s notion of civil society as an arena of struggle 
provides a theoretical framework to assist in understanding the complex relationships 
between civil society, the Ivorian state and Trafigura. The findings presented here 
suggest that scholars of state corporate crime should adopt a more cautionary approach 
to civil society’s capacity to label, censure and sanction than that suggested by Green 











Have you built your ship of death, O have you?  
O build your ship of death, for you will need it. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
In the dead of night of Saturday, 19
th
 August 2006 over one hundred gallons of toxic 
waste was dumped in sites around the coastal city of Abidjan, Ivory Coast. The next 
morning residents woke to a foul stench and many soon started to develop serious 
health problems. The source of the smell and the sickness was unknown and panic soon 
spread throughout the city. Rumours started to circulate that a large ship had brought 
waste to the city and that this was the source of the sickness. This ‘ship of death’, as it 
was to become known locally, departed swiftly with the assistance of the port 
authorities leaving locals unprepared to deal with the aftermath: 16 people dead and 
hundreds of thousands poisoned (UNHRC 2009). 
The offending tanker ship, the Probo Koala, had been chartered by Trafigura – a large 
transnational commodities trader. The waste was the by-product of a widely banned 
chemical process undertaken by Trafigura and designed to produce cheap marketable oil 
from an even cheaper ‘unsellable’ oil product. The process was banned in Europe 
because of the hazardous nature of the waste. The company was well aware of this fact, 
as was revealed by leaked emails between the CEO and some of the commodities 
traders in London.
1
 Trafigura had tried to offload the waste earlier in the journey, in 
Amsterdam and Lagos, but without success. The corporation ultimately engaged a 
company called Société Tommy (Tommy) to dump the waste in Abidjan. Since the 
dumping, the corporation has deployed a wide range of measures to deny, neutralise and 
cover-up its involvement in the poisoning and to date has encountered no significant 
sanction for its actions in Abidjan.  
In 2007, the Ivorian government “locked up without charge Trafigura executives for 
five months until the firm agreed, without admitting liability, to pay [US]$200m for a 
clean-up” (Leigh 2009a). This settlement immunised Trafigura from any prosecution by 
the Ivorian state (TCE 2009). The clean-up was apparently never completed (Tiembre et 
al 2009) and the money has reportedly since been squandered (Gonto 2010). Twelve 
hours after the payment, three Trafigura officials were freed from prison (NBC 2008). 
The lack of due legal process and the subsequent release of the captives after payment 
was made suggests that the detention of the Trafigura executives by the Ivorian state 
                                                 
1
 EMAIL From: NA; To: LC, JMN; CC: JL, JT, FA, AH, GS, CD; Sent: Tue Dec 28 2005 15:11; Subject: 
Re: More High Sulphur from PMI. 
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was more like a high level ‘shake down’, or kidnap for ransom, than a legitimate formal 
legal sanction. 
In 2008, Salomon Ugborugbo of Nigeria, director of Tommy, was arrested in Ivory 
Coast shortly after the incident (TCE 2009) and in October 2008 he received a 20-year 
sentence for ‘poisoning’. The prosecution had asked for a life sentence. Ivorian shipping 
agent Desire Kouao received a five-year sentence for ‘complicity’ in relation to the 
same charge (Reuters 2008). They were the only two people sentenced to jail for the 
dumping (NBC 2008; Leigh 2009; Greenpeace 2010). Five customs officials, the 
Abidjan port’s military commander and its maritime director were acquitted (NBC 
2008) and, although two directors were detained, no representatives from Trafigura 
were ever charged in Ivory Coast (Reuters 2008). 
In the Netherlands, Trafigura was fined €1 million in July 2010 for breaching Dutch 
criminal law (in relation to an environmental crime), European waste export 
environmental laws and of hiding the nature of the waste (Day 2010) but was acquitted 
on charges of forgery. The Probo Koala’s Ukrainian captain, Sergiy Chertov, received a 
five-month suspended sentence from the Dutch court for his role in the same violations 
(Times Live 2011). 
In the UK, 29,614 victims of the dumping sued Trafigura in a civil case known as Motto 
& Ors v Trafigura, the largest personal injury claim ever filed in England and Wales 
(Dunt 2009). However, in September 2009, Trafigura reached a settlement agreement 
which included payment to 30,000 victims and their families of about £1,000 each 
(Leigh 2009c; Moore 2009). This settlement precluded any legal sanction for 
wrongdoing by Trafigura, as it ensured that the dumping was not considered by a law 
court. Furthermore, it included a statement by both parties denying the liability of 
Trafigura for the dumping as well as a confidentiality agreement which swears the 
claimants’ lawyers to secrecy (see Chapter 8 for further discussion of this case). 
The deaths of 16 people and the injury of thousands of others (UNHRC 2009) as a 
result of the corporation’s actions did not attract to it significant legal, or other, 
sanctions in the UK (from where the dumping was directed), Ivory Coast (where the 
dumping took place) nor under any other jurisdiction – and it is argued that the 
company enjoyed some level of impunity. Borrowing from Green and Ward’s (2004)  
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and Ward’s (2004) formulation of deviance, impunity is defined for the purposes of this 
thesis as: “a failure to apply significant sanctions, from the point of view of the criminal 
actor, to violations of rules that are accepted as a standard of behaviour by a social 
audience”. 
The level of impunity apparently enjoyed by Trafigura, in light of such a harmful crime, 
is curious, and raises fundamental questions relating not only to the deviant/criminal 
role of the corporation but also relating to the role of the Ivory Coast state in facilitating 
Trafigura’s deviant practice, the nature of censure and sanction in cases of state-
corporate offending and the response of domestic and international civil society. This 
thesis sets out to understand the legal, social and political processes through which a 
well publicised crime by a powerful corporation attracts impunity and explores the 
extent to which civil society organisations contribute to the effective definition, censure 
and sanctioning of state-corporate crime. These questions are considered with specific 
reference to the 2006 dumping of toxic waste in Ivory Coast by the global trading 
company Trafigura. 
Two theoretical paradigms inform my analysis: state-corporate crime and the related 
concept of deviance, and Gramsci’s conception of civil society. The conceptual 
preference for a criminological rather than a legal understanding of crime and deviance 
is informed by two reasons: firstly, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to determine the 
criminal legal liability of any corporation as only courts of law have the competence to 
(legalistically speaking) determine whether any law has been broken or if a crime has 
actually been committed. Furthermore, even when convictions are secured they may be 
open to contestation by those convicted or from within the justice system itself. 
Schwendinger and Schwendinger (1970) argue that any definition of crime along 
strictly legal lines restricts criminological investigations by impelling criminologists to 
ignore social harms that are not defined as crime by law, and Schwendinger and 
Schwendinger (1970) suggest a redefinition of crime to include human rights violations. 
Their (re)definition implies that a normative judgement can be made by social audiences 
who then label the perpetrator as ‘criminal’, without reference to legal definitions 
employed by a criminal justice system. Secondly, while the law sets and enforces social 
norms – through enacting laws in parliament and meting out punishment in courts – 
legal systems are not well placed to deal with organisational crimes (Alvesalo and 
 
Page | 12  
Whyte 2007; Hillyard and Tombs 2007). National and international criminal justice 
systems are ill equipped to deal with crimes of transnational corporations as they tend to 
fall ‘between laws’ (Michalowski and Kramer 1987). For example; international 
criminal law applies, in practice, only to individuals
2
 and this thesis is concerned with 
organisational crimes. This deficiency in the law may not simply be an oversight and 
critical criminologists have long focused on “the power of privileged segments of 
society to define crime, and to support enforcement of laws in accord with their 
particular interests” (Friedrichs and Schwartz 2007). As a result, criminal law systems 
may avoid the prosecution of powerful organisations that perpetrate corporate and state-
corporate crime. Criminology does not suffer the same aversion to thinking along 
organisational lines and Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) argue that organisations should 
be considered as deviant actors for the purposes of criminological enquiry. 
While it is acknowledged that deviance is a theoretically loaded term, it is not the 
purpose of this thesis to revisit the theory of symbolic interactionism which underpins 
the concept. Instead, following Green and Ward’s (2004) and Ward’s (2004) 
formulation of deviance as a breach of a social norm or standard of behaviour that is 
accepted by a social audience, this thesis seeks to survey how human rights 
organisations act as a social audience to interpret acts as violating standards of 
behaviour and are disposed to apply sanctions to the actors. The relevant norms are, in 
the main, legal rules – international and domestic criminal, human rights and 
environmental law; but the norms of social morality as interpreted by domestic and 
international human rights and ‘green’ (or environmental) organisations are also duly 
considered. The relevant sanctions include criminal and civil legal punishments and 
censure by civil society organisations through open letters, press releases, campaigns 
and reports that may damage the corporation’s domestic and international reputation. 
Green and Ward’s (2004) modification of Kramer et al’s (2002) definition of state-
corporate crime requires a deviant act that violates a human right(s) as a result of an 
interaction between states and corporations. While the presence or absence of a deviant 
label does not, in itself, impact on the nature of the act (Sykes 1978) as “… deviance is 
not a quality of the act the person commits, but rather a consequence of the application 
by others of rules and sanctions to an ‘offender’” (Becker 1963: 9), the circumstances of 
the act are not wholly independent of the reaction. The reaction of civil society as a 
                                                 
2
 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17
th
 July 1998. 
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social audience will be determined by the character of such violations and Downes and 
Rock argue that: 
It is not simply the presence of deviance but its quality, scale and location which 
typically shape a reply … It is only when it is inexplicable, disordering, harmful 
or threatening that a gross reaction can take place. (Downes and Rock 2003: 
187) 
It would therefore be expected that the scale of the dumping in Ivory Coast, along with 
the subsequent deaths, injuries and widespread environmental damage, would prompt a 
‘gross reaction’ from social audiences. It is precisely the nature of this reaction that the 
present research sought to investigate.  
Breaches of social norms are often the focus of the media and civil society 
organisations. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and Greenpeace aim, 
respectively, “to protect individuals wherever justice, fairness, freedom and truth are 
denied”3 (Amnesty International), “investigate and expose human rights violations and 
hold abusers accountable”4 (Human Rights Watch) and “tackle power … by 
investigating, documenting and exposing the causes of environmental destruction”5 
(Greenpeace). In the absence of formal rules, or their enforcement, and in the absence of 
corresponding sanctions, breaches of informal rules may be censured and labelled as 
deviant by civil society organisations such as human rights and environmental NGOs or 
by investigative sections of the press. Gramsci’s conceptualisation of civil society 
provides a useful tool for understanding and assessing the potential and limits of human 
rights orientated grass-roots organisations in defending people against criminal actions 
of the state and international corporations. Gramsci (1971) describes civil society as a 
site of rebellion, where a counter-hegemonic struggle against the excesses of the state 
and the market takes place (this idea is developed in Chapter 4). This theoretical 
approach also leads to an understanding of the very real limitations and ambiguities of 
civil society in contributing to the effective definition, censure and sanctioning of large 
scale state-corporate crimes. 
The main studies of corporate deviance come under the overlapping subject headings of 
corporate crime and state-corporate crime. Corporate crime is committed by a 
                                                 
3
 http://www.amnesty.org.uk/content.asp?CategoryID=74 (accessed October 2011) 
4
 http://www.hrw.org/about (accessed October 2011) 
5
 http://www.greenpeace.org.uk/about (accessed October 2011) 
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corporation (or individual acting on behalf of the corporation) in furtherance of the 
organisation’s goals (Erman and Lundman 1978; Coffee 1980; Braithwaite 1989). State-
corporate crime is defined as deviant actions or omissions that cause human rights 
violations that result from a mutually reinforcing interaction between (1) policies and/or 
practices in pursuit of the goals of one or more institutions of political governance and 
(2) policies and/or practices in pursuit of the goals of one or more institutions of 
economic production and distribution (Kramer et al 2002, as modified by Green and 
Ward 2004). This thesis is primarily concerned with state-corporate crime and the data 
collected during the course of this research revealed the significance of the state’s 
interaction with the corporation in facilitating the crime and in ensuring impunity for the 
corporate perpetrator at a domestic legal level. 
A reliance on strict legal definitions of crime has often meant that impunity for 
powerful crimes has been implicitly constructed as a failure of the law and its criminal 
justice processes as well as a lack of political will on the part of the domestic state and 
the international community of states. Recognising the limitations of that conception, 
Green and Ward (2004) introduced the notion of civil society as a powerful source of 
censure and sanction for deviant state and corporate behaviour (see also, McCulloch and 
Pickering 2005). 
The decision in this thesis to concentrate on deviant behaviour, as opposed to behaviour 
recognised as criminal by the law, is a conscious one and the use of the term ‘deviance’ 
is complex and requires elaboration. 
Edwin Lemert (1951) first argued that deviance from informal and formal rules, and 
from social norms, was actually a function of society’s reaction to behaviour and the 
subsequent attachment of a deviant label to the actor. Following Lemert, Erikson (1962) 
wrote: “it is the audience which eventually determines whether or not an episode of 
behaviour or any class of episodes is labelled deviant” (Erikson 1962: 308). There is a 
weakness (or lack) of formal legal rules when it comes to crimes of corporations, 
especially when committed on a transnational level (and this is discussed further 
below). However, breaches of social norms often fall within the purview of civil society 
 organisations and the media. In the absence of formal rules and corresponding 
sanctions, breaches of informal rules can be censured and labelled as deviant by civil  
society organisations such as human rights and environmental NGOs or by members of  
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the press. Becker (1963) argues that rules are a manifestation of social norms held by 
the majority of a society, whether formal or informal, and the enforcement of ‘norms’ 
starts with a social audience bringing any breach to the attention of the public (Becker 
1963). When the formal norms of criminal law are not invoked, civil society can act as a 
social audience to bring wrongdoing to the public’s attention. Furthermore, Green and 
Ward (2004) argue that civil society can act as a social audience for the purposes of 
censuring and sanctioning deviant acts. 
Censure and Sanctions for Corporate Deviance 
This thesis critically engages with the impunity afforded one criminal corporate 
conglomerate, Trafigura, from the vantage point of both law and civil society and 
investigates the hypothesis that civil society could act as a censuring and sanctioning 
mechanism for the crime.  
A case study of the dumping by Trafigura provides the opportunity to empirically test 
the significance of civil society in imparting regulation in the form of sanctions that 
were absent from the legal justice systems of the jurisdiction where the crime was 
directed from (London) and the jurisdiction where it occurred, its harmful effects were 
felt and the victims are located (Abidjan, Ivory Coast). 
In reviewing the literature on corporate and state-corporate crime, it became clear that 
very little empirical research has been conducted into the mechanisms of impunity that 
operate around this class of criminality. This thesis sets out to investigate the reasons for 
the apparent failure to censure and punish Trafigura up to four years after the dumping 
and to explore in detail the workings embodied in the impunity process. Necessarily this 
involved an empirical study of the crime, the corporation, the Ivory Coast state, 
international NGOs and more particularly in light of Green and Ward’s work, that 
section of Ivory Coast civil society which might have played a significant role in 
applying censure and sanction. This thesis thus aspires to contribute, albeit in a modest 
way, to the growing literature on state-corporate criminality and to further the current 
understanding of the means by which powerful entities are able to avoid censure and 
punishment. 
The original aim of this research was to survey relevant civil society organisations in 
order to determine their capacity to apply sanctions. The data gathered in Ivory Coast 
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revealed that the ability of civil society organisations to resist the crime was severely 
limited by both internal and external factors and by the disproportionate power of the 
corporate entity. Furthermore, once fieldwork was underway, it became apparent that 
elements of civil society, or groups masquerading as members of civil society, were 
taking advantage of the general impunity afforded the corporation to exploit the victims 
of the dumping for financial gain, a crime that persists to this day. The implications of 
this discovery suggested a new emphasis in the direction of the research; civil society in 
Abidjan became a focus and a detailed study of the fundamental assumptions of the 
concept of civil society was required. 
In order to better understand civil society’s capacity to challenge impunity in cases of 
state-corporate crime, a Gramscian theoretical lens was applied to civil society actors in 
Abidjan and international NGOs in Europe. Gramsci’s theory of civil society as an 
‘arena of struggle’ (1971) provided a framework that illuminated paths to interpreting 
the data collected in London and on a field trip to Abidjan and in understanding the 
impunity afforded to Trafigura for the deviant act of dumping. A powerful 
counterbalance to struggles against impunity is denial, and Cohen’s (2003) theory is 
employed throughout this thesis to explain some of tactics deployed to counter 
sanctions and censure efforts by civil society actors. 
There have been a number of excellent literature reviews of corporate and state-
corporate crime (see for example, Kramer et al 2002 or Lasslett 2012b) and the 
following section, rather than repeating this work, will focus instead on the literature 
that concerns itself with an apparent freedom for state-corporate crime to take place 
without significant forms of social control. 
Controlling State-Corporate Crime 
The literature on state-corporate has grown apace in recent years (Tombs and Whyte 
2002; Kauzlarich et al 2003; Kramer and Michalowski 2005; Lasslett 2010b) but very  
few scholars have explicitly attempted to explain in detail the ways in which freedom 
from censure and punishment has been granted to corporations. Instead, empirical 
studies have largely been preoccupied with explaining the factors that resulted in the 
crimes. 
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The primary focus of the empirical literature on state-corporate crime has been on three 
catalysts for action. The theory predicts that a combination of motivations with 
opportunity coupled with a lack of social control can result in state-corporate crime. The 
motivations can be understood simplistically in terms of pressure and goal attainment. 
Opportunity concerns the availability and attractiveness of illegitimate means. The third 
category, ‘operationality of control’, is concerned with the prevention of crime but does 
not engage with sanctions for criminal behaviour and crimes are studied under this 
heading in terms of a failure of social control mechanisms. Three early state-corporate 
crime studies illustrate the point well. Kramer’s (1992) study of the Challenger space 
shuttle explosion outlined various failures of internal and external corporate and 
government controls which, had they been sufficiently robust, may have prevented the 
disaster. Similarly, Aulette and Michalowski (1993) point to a failure of local, regional 
and federal regulatory bodies in preventing a fire at the Imperial Food Products chicken 
processing plant in Hamlet, North Carolina. Matthews and Kauzlarich (2000) isolated 
the failure of the regulatory environment and a corporate culture of rule breaking in a 
study of the crash of ValuJet flight 592. It may not be surprising that control 
mechanisms were given peripheral treatment in light of Kramer’s optimistic claims in 
relation to external controls: 
Corporations … are subject to the criminal justice system, a wide variety of 
regulatory agencies, the media, labor unions, consumer and environmental 
groups, and public opinion. While these external controls are generally quite 
weak and ineffective, their sheer numbers guarantee at least a modest measure of 
oversight. (Kramer 1992: 234) 
However, ten years later, Kramer and his colleagues retreat a little from their reliance on 
formal mechanisms of social control for powerful crime and consider the fact that civil 
society actors could indeed be considered as agents of effective control: 
The theory of state-corporate crime suggests that formal social control is but 
one, and perhaps the least effective, way to control organizational crime and 
deviance. Real control must grow from social movements, grass-root activities, a 
truly aggressive and inquisitive media, and most important, open and democratic 
participation in the political process. (Kramer et al 2002: 279) 
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An important way to understand state-corporate crime is advanced by the integrated 
theoretical model of state-corporate crime (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998), which 
introduced six catalysts for action in the category of operationality of control on an 
institutional level of analysis: international reactions, political pressure, legal sanctions, 
media scrutiny, public opinion and social movements (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998). 
The former three could be considered to be within the purview of the state. But the latter 
three are of interest to the study of civil society’s capacity to act as agents of control: 
social movements, public opinion and media scrutiny are interrelated elements of civil 
society. Both social movements and the media contribute to public opinion in the 
struggle between civil society, the state and the market in formulating the dominant 
ideological hegemony. Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) outline how these control 
mechanisms could operate at an institutional level and give a cursory account of the 
potentialities of social control by civil society actors: 
… various forms of legal sanctions, both domestic and international, could be 
imposed by criminal justice or other governmental regulatory bodies. Domestic 
or international public opinion could pressure offending organisations, or citizen 
watchdog groups could exert social-control influence. (Kauzlarich and Kramer 
1998: 151) 
However, the model outlines these ‘social control mechanisms’ (Kauzlarich and Kramer 
1998: 151) in terms of the prevention of crime and does not theorise in terms of 
sanctions for criminal or deviant behaviour. Kauzlarich and Kramer argue for these 
mechanisms to be deployed to block state-corporate crime: 
A highly motivated organisation with easy access to illegal means of goal 
attainment may be blocked from committing an organizational crime by one or 
more of these social control mechanisms. (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998: 151) 
Despite the apparent relegation of civil society actors in the prevailing theories of state-
corporate crime to preventative measures only, there have been glimpses in the 
literature of the role of civil society in sanctioning corporate behaviour. Tombs and 
Whyte (2007) focus on the regulation of safety crimes and highlight the importance of 
domestic and international protest and social movements in enforcing safety crime 
regulations against corporations, and criticise ‘consensus’ and ‘capture’ theories of 
regulation for marginalising these groups. 
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Walker and Whyte (2005) examine the accountability of private military companies 
(PMCs) in light of international and domestic laws, and with respect to the market. The 
advantage to a government of employing PMCs for military operations includes the 
deflection of unwanted media coverage. It is easier to avoid scrutiny when PMC 
personnel are killed, rather than members of the military forces. This alludes to an 
avenue of censure open to civil society that governments are keen to close. Walker and 
Whyte conclude that market accountability may be the prime mechanism for corporate 
governance for PMCs which “will reduce public scrutiny and the observance of human 
rights and humanity to optional contract terms” (Walker and Whyte 2005: 687). Instead 
of providing significant sanction and censure, market accountability therefore only 
serves to drive deviance underground and out of reach of civil society organisations. 
Corporate crimes differ from the originally conceived white collar crimes (Sutherland 
1949) in that they are organisational in nature and are committed in furtherance of 
corporate rather than individual goals (Clinard 1983). Growing out of Sutherland’s 
work, state crime and state-corporate crime form a natural extension of the 
organisational significance of these forms of criminality (Matthews and Kauzlarich 
2007). The organisational nature of the corporation is a decisive factor in the impunity 
afforded to them by the criminal justice system. 
Impunity Afforded by the Law 
Despite a reliance on legal instruments to define and control corporate offending, and 
the fact that “managers and corporations commit far more violence than any serial killer 
or criminal organization” (Punch 2000: 243), corporations have been committing crime 
with impunity for many years. As early as 1977, Conklin found that “there is little 
evidence that there has ever been a real effort to control business crime through criminal 
sanctions” (Conklin 1977: 136). By the end of the 1970s, criminal prosecutions of 
corporations in US courts were common but sentences were lenient (Orland 1980). 
There are two divisive areas of criminology applied to corporations that, according to 
Matthews and Kauzlarich, “cut to the core of the field of criminology … the unit of 
analysis and definition of crime” (2007: 46). Thus it is that both the very 
conceptualisation of crime and the organisational nature of state-corporate crime 
contribute to problems associated with the control of such offending. 
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Both concerns can be summed up by the phrase actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, 
which means ‘the act is not guilty unless the mind too is guilty’. From this well-
established principle we get the two requisite legal elements of a crime: mens rea,
6
 the 
mental element of the crime, which must usually contemporaneously coincide with the 
actus reus, the offending act. The actus reus is generally uncontroversial because it is 
much more easily located in the physical world. Mens rea is a more troublesome 
concept for the study of state-corporate crime and can only usefully be ascribed to 
individuals, and not organisations: 
The primacy granted to notions of individual intent in criminal law, inscribed in 
the notion of mens rea (or ‘knowing mind’), essentially excludes organisations 
from the normal method of attributing criminal liability and makes it difficult to 
attribute the blame for individual acts or omissions in the context of 
organisations. (Alvesalo and Whyte 2007: 59) 
The construction of the mens rea test, devised by the common law judiciary, ensures an 
enduring focus on the individual by all levels of the criminal justice system: 
Investigators, prosecutors, judges and juries all struggle to ascribe liability to an 
organisational entity distinct from the intentions, actions and omissions of one or 
several concrete individuals. (Hillyard and Tombs 2007: 13) 
The legal concept of mens rea is a major factor in attributing impunity for serious harm 
to organisations. The first US case of a corporation being tried for murder (reckless 
homicide), the Ford Pinto case, was a failure of the US criminal justice system to 
appreciate the organisational nature of the crime and Punch argues that, “companies 
then get away with ‘murder’ because the law and the courts are not geared to 
organizational deviance and corporate violence” (Punch 2000: 243). In the UK, a case 
against P&O for the Herald of Free Enterprise incident failed for similar reasons: “the 
judgement pointed to the difficulty in identifying a ‘corporate mind’ to explain the 
collapse of the case” (Punch 2000: 249). 
The second heavily debated concept within criminology is the definition of crime. The 
study by Alvesalo and Whyte (2007) on safety crime reveals the connections between 
principles of criminal law and how crime is understood: 
                                                 
6
 Crimes can also be couched in terms of omissions, or failures to act. 
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The fundamental precepts upon which criminal law is based have an important 
role in providing a conceptual framework for how safety crimes are widely 
perceived and understood. (Alvesalo and Whyte 2007: 59) 
A brief analysis of the debate reveals two potential reasons for corporate criminal 
impunity. The corporate wrongdoing may not be against any law (and therefore not 
within the study of criminology when defined in the narrowest sense). Alternatively, the 
act has been criminalised but the organisational nature of the crime allows the deviant 
actor to escape prosecution (as well as escaping the scrutiny of traditional criminology 
which focuses on individual ‘street crime’). Therefore, harms caused by corporations 
have tended to be left out of the criminal law altogether and even if crimes are on the 
statute books or in the common-law precedents, they are neither properly investigated 
(Alvesalo and Whyte 2007) nor enforced (Tombs and Hillyard 2004).  
Alternative theories for impunity have been put forward, and Punch outlines four main 
reasons for corporate impunity under the law: (1) difficulty linking decision-making 
processes to harmful consequences, (2) the preoccupation of the law with individuals, 
(3) the professionalism of the corporate executives and their legal team gives them 
ability to convince judges and juries of their point of view, and (4) the power of 
corporation (in terms of money and legal expertise) to negotiate; by bamboozling courts 
with huge amounts of information and the corporation’s position of power in any plea-
bargaining negotiation – put more plainly, “organizational clout enables corporations to 
evade sanctioning for their organizational deviance” (Punch 2000: 273). 
Many aspects of the toxic waste transport and dumping analysed by this thesis could be  
considered to be violations of law – whether administrative (document forgery), 
environmental (including violation of Regulation 5 of the Marpol Convention and 
Articles 6 and 13 of the Basel Convention; see Chapter 5 for more details) or criminal 
(for example, the UK’s Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007). A 
further possible explanation for the impunity afforded to Trafigura lies in the 
international nature of the corporation and the transnational nature of the state-corporate 
crime, directed from London and committed in Ivory Coast. As already mentioned, 
Michalowski and Kramer (1987) argue that transnational corporations engage in crime 
that falls in ‘the space between laws’. The criminal legal system deploys various tactics 
to avoid the prosecution of transnational corporate harms and state crime. These can be  
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explained by the legal fiction of jurisdiction, an aspect of the international law principle 
of sovereignty (Lauterpacht 2011). Dutch prosecutors refused to investigate the crime as 
it lacked jurisdiction to pursue Trafigura for a crime committed in Africa (Greenpeace 
2011). International criminal law, similar to treatment of crime by most domestic legal 
systems, only recognises the criminal liability of individuals, and corporations cannot be 
tried or sanctioned by the International Criminal Court (ICC) (Bantekas and Nash 
2007). Former Ivorian president, Laurent Gbagbo, does not enjoy the same ‘technical’ 
immunity and has been transferred to the ICC, The Hague, Netherlands, for crimes 
against humanity committed between 28
th
 November 2010 and May 2011 in many of 
the same neighbourhoods of Abidjan that experienced the toxic dumping as well as in 
the west of Ivory Coast.
7
 
Critical criminologists have focused on “the power of privileged segments of society to 
define crime, and to support enforcement of laws in accord with their particular 
interests” (Friedrichs and Schwartz 2007). This has frustrated attempts to understand 
state-corporate crime in terms of state defined criminal law: 
… corporate crime and state crime are obvious, heterogeneous categories of 
offence that remain largely marginal to dominant legal, policy, enforcement, and 
indeed academic, agendas, while at the same time creating widespread harm, not 
least amongst already relatively disadvantaged and powerless peoples. (Hillyard 
and Tombs 2007: 12) 
The constraints of criminal law has led state crime scholars to question a reliance on law 
to define its parameters of study as to do so restricts its field of scientific inquiry (Sellin 
1938). Widening of the definition of state crime, as Schwendinger and Schwendinger 
(1970) so controversially did in the early 1970s, has been derided as a ‘moral crusade’ 
by Cohen (1993). But despite the criticism, criminologists continue to theorise ways in 
which to scientifically embark on what can equally be understood as a ‘noble’ crusade. 
In Beyond Criminology, Hillyard et al (2004) proposed that criminologists move away 
from the study of crime altogether to a study of ‘social harm’ or zemiology. The ‘social 
harm’ approach is not adopted here, but it implies the abandonment of the neutral 
objectivity of the researcher who may act as an advocate for victims (Friedrichs and 
                                                 
7
 Warrant Of Arrest For Laurent Koudou Gbagbo, No. ICC-02/11, 23
rd
 November 2011. 
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Schwartz 2007). The fallacy of a purely objective approach is discussed further in 
Chapter 2. 
A Capitalist Explanation of Impunity 
In 1949 Sutherland bemoaned the fact that: 
The crimes of the lower class are handled by policemen, prosecutors, and 
judges, with penal sanctions in the form of fines, imprisonment, and death. The 
crimes of the upper class either result in no official action at all, or result in suits 
for damages in civil courts, or are handled by inspectors, and by administrative 
boards or commissions, with penal sanctions in the form of warnings, orders to 
cease and desist, occasionally the loss of a licence, and only in extreme cases by 
fines or prison sentences. (Sutherland 1949: 17) 
Conklin (1977) echoed Sunderland’s view of the role of the class system and noted that 
corporations were treated with leniency in the rare event of a conviction. The literature 
reveals that little has changed in the decades following this claim. 
Academic sources reveal two particular features of capitalist society which heavily 
influence corporate crime and the freedom from censure it tends to enjoy. Firstly, 
capital accumulation acts as a driver of crime: “capitalism provides the major incentives 
for organizations to use illegitimate means to achieve profit” (Kauzlarich and Kramer 
1998: 146). And secondly, it promotes impunity for the main actors in the market 
sector. Punch (1996) argues that fraud, for example, attracts stronger sanctions than  
corporate crime; one of the reason’s being that it is “deemed to threaten the effective 
functioning of capitalism” (Alvesalo and Whyte 2007: 59). Therefore, it is not simply a 
matter of the goals that are promoted by the capitalist economic system, i.e. the 
requirement for profit maximisation, which drives state-corporate crime; it is the 
institutional relationship between corporations and the state, designed to protect the 
market, which plays a central role in ensuring that corporations are not unnecessarily 
constrained by law or other forms of regulatory control: 
Obviously, state-corporate crime is driven by financial interests; however, it is 
also sustained by key political dynamics serving to resist criminal definitions 
that would otherwise designate its actions as wrong and unethical. As a result, 
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state-corporate crime persists because it is afforded impunity against 
prosecution. (Welch 2009: 352) 
Impunity is in this sense embodied in the law even before the enforcement stage. Box 
(1987) argues that the ability of large corporations both to affect regulations and to 
evade the law may produce higher levels of small-business crime. This raises an 
interesting issue as initiatives by government to assuage calls for the control of 
corporate crime tend actually to be directed at low level offenders. Enforcement 
agencies tend to take the path of least resistance and balk at the idea of a ‘complex’ 
legal defence by tenacious barristers paid for by large firms with deep pockets (Croall 
1989). 
But it is not just at the legislation stage that corporations can influence the law. The 
state, to survive in a globalised capitalist system, cannot afford to discourage companies 
from investing. This clearly applies to Ivory Coast, and as can be seen in Chapter 3 the 
state went to great lengths to create an attractive atmosphere for foreign corporate 
investment. Chambliss puts it this way: 
The accumulation of capital determines a nation’s power, wealth, and survival 
today, as it did 300 years ago. The state must provide a climate and a set of 
international relations that facilitate this accumulation if it is to succeed. State 
officials will be judged in accordance with their ability to create these 
conditions. (Chambliss 1988: 202) 
It is correct to say that “the deal between corporations and States is as old as business 
itself” (Rosemann 2005: 86) and Rosemann (2005) recounts Elizabeth Tudor’s grant of 
legal immunity to Francis Drake during his explorations on The Golden Hind in 1580, 
the monarch being the largest shareholder in the expedition. Lenning and Brightman’s 
(2009) study of Nigeria demonstrates the collusion between government and 
international corporations in the precipitation of crime, and the authors argue that: 
Western-based oil companies such as Mobil-Exxon, Chevron, Texaco and Shell 
Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) have flocked to Nigeria, creating 
very volatile relationships between the government that profits from their 
presence and impoverished citizens, millions of whom live on less than $1 US a 
day. (Lenning and Brightman 2009: 39) 
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Whyte, in similar vein, argues that capitalist regimes have had detrimental effects on 
African civil society: 
The rampant march of neo-liberalism has inflicted a crippling anti-protection 
trade regime upon many African states. It has encouraged, through strategies of 
privatization, the fragmentation of civil society and has created a breeding 
ground for civil conflict and state repression. (Whyte 2003: 598) 
The decision to explore civil society as a mechanism for sanctions is based on the 
apparent failure of legal definitions of crime to provide sanction to corporations. Green 
and Ward’s work concerns the organisational nature of crime, and understands the 
futility of employing strict legal definitions that limit arenas of inquiry. Furthermore, 
the role of civil society is taken from the periphery and centrally located as a key 
analytical concept in the sanctioning and censure of state-corporate crime actors. This 
presents an attractive theory to understanding the mechanics of state-corporate crime 
and the possibilities of controlling it. 
Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 introduces and explains the nature of the research paradigm employed. Then, 
the process of choosing a relevant case study and its corresponding protocol is 
described. The chapter also explains how the empirical data was collected, including 
justifications for the choice of methodology and sources. This methodology orientated 
chapter includes a description of the challenges associated with undertaking research in 
Ivory Coast and analysing the resulting data. 
Chapter 3 provides a very brief description of the context in which the research was 
conducted and explains the establishment and evolution of the state of Ivory Coast. The 
discussion will also include an economic and political history of Ivory Coast: outlining 
the creation of a laissez-faire economy and providing an overview of the turbulent 
history of the political structure of the state. 
Chapter 4 introduces a Gramscian theoretical framework, employed to analyse the data 
collected in the field as well as primary documents and reports. Gramsci’s articulation 
of civil society provides a useful tool for understanding and assessing the potential of 
human rights orientated grass-roots organisations in defending people against criminal  
 
Page | 26  
actions of the state and international corporations. It also assists in understanding the 
very real limitations and ambiguities of civil society in sanctioning large scale state-
corporate crimes. 
Chapter 5 details the criminal narrative of Trafigura’s dumping. It begins with the 
corporation’s creation of the toxic waste and tracks the decision-making along the 
waste’s journey to Ivory Coast and is primarily based on data drawn from a range of 
primary and secondary sources (including leaked documents released by Wikileaks). 
The link between this chapter and the one which follows is provided by the involvement 
of the Ivory Coast government. This West African state acted as a nexus in initiating the 
dumping crime and acting as a go-between with respect to the market and civil society 
sectors. 
Chapter 6 employs Lasslett’s (2012) relational paradigm of resistance to gauge the 
capacity of domestic NGOs in Ivory Coast to resist state-corporate crime – and 
specifically the dumping as explored in Chapter 5. The analysis is based on interviews 
with a representative sample of the civil society sector in Ivory Coast concerned with 
human rights. 
Chapter 7 provides an analysis of the interaction between the Ivory Coast state and 
criminal organisations masquerading as local civil society organisations. Using primary 
data from the author’s field trip to Ivory Coast, the chapter discusses the  
‘commodification of victimhood’ and investigates how Trafigura’s payoff to the 
government was used to organise criminogenic civil society NGOs; that is, victims 
organisations were created at the behest of the President of Ivory Coast without 
requisite care and due diligence as to their legitimacy to act in the best interests of 
victims. The chapter will further investigate why ‘genuine’ NGOs stood by while the 
state assisted, by way of a corrupt judiciary and lack of enforcement intervention, in the 
embezzlement of victims’ funds. 
Chapter 8 provides an overview of the international reaction of global civil society to 
the crimes of Trafigura and the Ivorian state. This will involve a discussion of the 
international press’ and international NGOs’ treatment of the crimes. The chapter will 
discuss how the laws of the UK assisted, by way of a ‘super-injunction’, with an 
attempted corporate cover-up of the primary crime. Civil society’s exposure of the  
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cover-up using the online tools of Twitter and Wikileaks is also discussed. The Motto & 
Ors v Trafigura civil class action is examined to determine its contribution to the 
censuring or sanctioning of Trafigura. The chapter will conclude with a discussion of 
how corporate power engages the legal system to overcome or debilitate the potential of 
international civil society to resist and control state crime. 
Chapter 9 presents the findings of the research and demonstrates that a new and worthy 
contribution to knowledge has been presented by the thesis, and outlines the modest 
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Chapter 2 – Researching Impunity and State-Corporate Crime in Ivory Coast 
Introduction 
The fieldwork for this thesis was conducted in London, UK and Abidjan, Ivory Coast 
during the summer and autumn of 2010. A second field trip to Abidjan was cancelled 
due to the onset of civil conflict over the contested elections at the end of that year. 
Empirical work in Ivory Coast was essential, if arduous, in order to properly understand 
the impact of the dumping incident on its victims and in turn the impact of the victims’ 
movement on the perpetrator. The research in Abidjan was, however, to prove 
revelatory. Not only was the growth in victims organisations stemming from the 
dumping wholly unexpected (at least 120 such organisations were identified in the 
course of the research) but more confronting was the penetrating role of organised crime 
and government in the country’s civil society sector. These facts would play a powerful 
role in explaining the nature and extent of impunity enjoyed by Trafigura. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the objective of this research was to understand the role of 
Ivory Coast civil society organisations in resisting, sanctioning and censuring the 
perpetrators of state-corporate crime. These crimes, when committed on a large scale, 
have the potential to cause widespread social harms and violations of human rights. 
Corporate organisations and states are widely involved in carrying out these deviant 
acts, often with a high degree of impunity. Welch (2009) argues that the persistence of 
state-corporate crime lies in its immunisation from prosecution. However, while few 
state-corporate crimes result in a criminal prosecution in the courts, Green and Ward 
(2004) propose that “the potential arises for civil society to impose informal sanctions 
(at the very least) on those agencies that are criminally responsible for so much human 
suffering and environmental degradation” (Green and Ward 2004: 51). This research 
project ultimately aimed to explore this potential in the specific case of Ivory Coast and 
the crime of toxic dumping; was civil society’s potential realised in the sense that Green 
and Ward suggest, and what was the character of civil society’s response? These 
objectives provided the basis for the choice of research methodology employed. 
The theoretical lens being applied to the research is explained in detail elsewhere (in 
Chapter 4). For the purposes of choosing appropriate methods for the collection and 
analysis of data, a Gramscian notion of civil society, embodying the concept’s 
fundamental contradictions, provided the most valuable framework from within which 
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to investigate the potential for civil society to influence, challenge and censure 
perpetrators of state-corporate crime. 
Research questions are always limited by, “the particular ontological and 
epistemological perspectives that frame the research” (Mason 2006: 13). It is prudent 
that researchers should, at the outset, express any philosophical and theoretical 
assumptions “about the nature of knowledge (epistemology), and the nature of ways of 
studying phenomena (methodology)” (Rowlands 2005: 83). Of the two major research 
paradigms – quantitative and qualitative – the study of complex, multi-faceted state-
corporate crime lends itself to a qualitative study.  
The qualitative, or interpretivist, approach maintains that “the epistemological and 
ontological assumptions that the world and reality are interpreted by people in the 
context of historical and social practices … [and] … experience of the world is 
subjective” (Rowlands 2005: 83). This paradigm is underpinned by a recognition, “that 
people socially and symbolically construct their own organisational realities” (Berger 
and Luckman 1967) and in consequence we can study those realities through interview 
and observational methodologies. The flexibility of the qualitative paradigm also makes 
it particularly well suited to the study of large complex crimes with international 
dimensions on multiple levels of analysis. 
Lasslett has argued that much of pre-existing scholarship on crimes of the powerful has 
been “dominated by an orthodoxy whose scientific method restricts the depths with 
which the crimes of the powerful can be plumbed” (Lasslett 2010b: 16). By this he is 
referring to the fallacy of objectivity. While the principal, but readily challenged, 
objection to a qualitative analysis is the inherent bias the researcher brings to data 
collection and analysis, Tombs and Whyte have argued that this ‘bias’ has real 
advantages for the research process: “… adopting a partisan objectivity often allows the 
researcher to recognise, and communicate to an audience, what hitherto was obscured or 
mystified” (2002: 231). Research will always entail researcher bias, which may be 
unavoidable, and “a lack of objectivity is a feature of all forms of research” (Tombs and 
Whyte 2002: 229). Researcher bias is best challenged by openly problematising the 
effects of this lack of objectivity and seeking mitigation (Lasslett 2010b); or as Tombs 
and Whyte argue, this problem may be largely overcome when researchers, “recognise, 
describe, and are open about the perspective from which their research commitments,  
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questions, and modes of analysis and dissemination originate” (Tombs and Whyte 2002: 
230). In the present study, negative views of Trafigura and the Ivory Coast state did 
indeed colour my understanding of the research I was to conduct, both because of the 
crime and the subsequent cover up (in respect of the corporation) and the Ivory Coast 
state’s long history of authoritarianism and corruption. As with Lasslett, this recognition 
allowed me to approach data collection, and those I was studying, with a critical but 
open mind. I was acutely conscious of the necessity to preserve the integrity of the data 
if it was to be useful in the process of delivering justice to those who had become 
victims of the toxic waste dumping. My view of the state was not helped by an 
unpleasant experience at a checkpoint on Pont General de Gualle late on a Saturday 
night. I was given the choice of a trip to the local station or a 20,000 CFA fine (about 
€30), at gunpoint. I took the ‘fine’, and put it down to field trip expenses.  
Data was collated using qualitative methods and was analysed through triangulation. 
Using mixed sources to triangulate and corroborate data suggests an integrated 
framework, in which method and data combine to account for a “specific part of ‘the 
picture’, or to provide views of ‘the picture’ from specified angles” (Mason 2006: 19, 
20). While triangulation is the predominant argument for a mixed source approach, 
Mason (2006) looks beyond it from the standpoint of two ‘basic premises’, both of 
which are adopted in the current study: 
social experience and lived realities are multi-dimensional … [and that] … 
social (and multi-dimensional) lives are lived, experienced and enacted 
simultaneously on macro and micro scales. (Mason 2006: 10, 12) 
Data collection for the study pertained to each of the three levels of analysis outlined by 
Kramer (1992) in his seminal work on state-corporate crime (which can readily be 
accommodated within Mason’s macro and micro scales). Kramer’s integrated model is 
not applied in a strict sense here as the levels of analysis (individual, organisational and 
institutional) regularly intersect and it was thus considered more useful to present them 
as such. The model has proven to work well for case studies of organisations that are 
naturally contained within a national boundary (see Kramer’s (1992) article on the space  
shuttle Challenger explosion, for example) but how useful is it in the analysis of a large 
transnational corporation, with multiple organisational entities, branches and arms 
making up the whole, distributed across corporate offices in over 40 countries? While  
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agreeing that these integrated models “remain extremely useful analytical topographies” 
(Lasslett 2010), a case study that relies on this model alone tends to lose analytical 
value by trying to accommodate the multiple layers of analysis within the rather 
delimited categories of the model. 
Choosing Research Methods 
Of Yin’s five major research methods for social sciences – survey, archival analysis, 
experiment, history and case study – only the flexible qualitatively-orientated case study 
was considered suitable for this study. The rationale for this decision relies on the fact 
that “… the case study’s unique strength is its ability to deal with a variety of evidence 
– documents, artefacts, interviews, and observations – beyond what might be available 
in a conventional historical study” (Yin 2009: 11). 
A case study naturally fits with research that employs multiple triangulated sources, 
because the data derives largely from “documents, interviews, observation, and 
secondary analysis [of quantitative data]” (Schramm 1971: 12). Yin (2009) provides a 
useful, ‘twofold’, technical definition of case studies for social science, summarised as: 
(1) an empirical study that investigates contemporary phenomena in depth and in 
context, which (2) relies on triangulation of multiple sources of evidence. 
The information sought from research into any case of large-scale, multinational, state-
corporate crime is wide ranging and complex and it therefore lends itself to the case 
study method, which “… can afford to consider a large number of details, so as to 
consider their possible relation to a decision or a pattern of events” (Schramm 1971: 3). 
Selecting a Case to Study 
Stake argues that a “case study is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to 
be studied” (Stake 2005: 443). At the planning stage of this project, serious 
consideration was given to the problems that may be associated with the selection of a 
case study. With state-corporate crime, access is always the major difficulty. Why 
would an organisation, whose actions have been deemed criminal or deviant by the 
researcher, allow that same researcher easy access to its personnel and its 
documentation of internal communications? The same question may be asked of states, 
which are “likely to be even more tightly sealed from outside scrutiny where the aim is 
to investigate actual or possible illegality” (Tombs and Whyte 2002). Access to 
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information on internal decision making in large organisations was vital for this 
particular project, and indeed any case study, as “… the essence of a case study … is 
that it tries to illuminate a decision or a set of decisions: why they were taken, how they 
were implemented, and with what result” (Schramm 1971: 6). Leaked internal 
documents and emails between Trafigura employees (including the CEO, traders, 
subsidiaries and the captain of the chartered Probo Koala) allowed for greater insight 
into the crime than would normally be expected. Timing is also crucial when choosing a 
case to study, as to arrive too early will narrow the amount of information available 
(leaked documents, court documents, governmental reports, etc.) but it was also 
necessary to avoid researching a case “… too late, when the early history has 
mellowed” (Schramm 1971: 8). The field trip for this case study was undertaken four 
years after the dumping and arriving any sooner would have meant that some of the 
most important data that the study unearthed might have been missed. Three months 
before the field trip, for example, compensation won in the United Kingdom for Ivory 
Coast victims was extorted by one of the victims organisations (Cheikna 2011). This 
development and the interviews it prompted were to be critical in the articulation of the 
organisational crime conceptual analysis that would contribute to my overall 
understanding of civil society in Abidjan. 
The events of August 2006 in Abidjan, Ivory Coast act as a focal point or fulcrum for 
the case study. The main players involved in the event, most significantly Trafigura and 
the state of Ivory Coast, are examined to provide both context and detail to the analysis 
which follows. The apparent impunity enjoyed by Trafigura and the Ivorian state since 
the dumping is evidenced by the distinct lack of legal reaction or censure from the 
Ivorian state, foreign states or the international community (including NGOs). 
The case study aims to shed light on this phenomenon by studying in depth the 
mechanisms through which impunity was both nurtured and propagated. The anatomy 
of the dumping incident – from the organisational decisions that led to it, through to the 
multiple consequences which reverberated from it – will be explored through interviews  
and documentary sources. In addition, data was also gathered to assess the potential for 
civil society to sanction and censure this type of crime through interviews in both 
London and on the field trip to Ivory Coast. 
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Researching in the Ivory Coast: the Case Study Protocol 
In order to inform the issues surrounding the event and to triangulate the primary data it 
was necessary to consult a variety of corroborating sources and these included: official 
documentation in the form of official and unofficial reports, journalistic accounts, 
internet-based resources, internal organisational artefacts, supplementary interviews, 
leaked data and personal observations. The following section deals with the strengths 
and weaknesses for each of these sources. 
Reports from the UN (UNHRC 2009), WHO (2006), Ivory Coast
8
 and Dutch 
governments (Hulshof 2006), NGOs (for example, Greenpeace 2009, 2010), and 
Trafigura (for example, Minton 2006) have proven invaluable in creating a picture of 
the event and its context. Data available on the dumping and its consequences took both 
official and unofficial forms and some were leaked (for example, the BBC legal defence 
to libel released by Wikileaks). 
In order to mitigate bias, journalistic sources were restricted to mainstream media 
outlets and wire services. The British media have treated the subject with particular 
caution, due to the current libel laws and their aggressive application in the UK. As a 
result of this, many news reports were retracted from news media archives but are 
available elsewhere, through ‘megaleak’ sites and internet archiving sites.9 The issue of 
libel laws in the UK and their effect on civil society’s ability to censure crime is 
examined elsewhere, in Chapter 8. The media of Norway, Finland, Germany and the 
Netherlands does not suffer the same level of restriction and reports by journalists at the 
Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation (NRK), Helsingin Sanomat, Der Spiegel and de 
Volkskrant have proved invaluable. International news wire services also provided a 
wealth of information relating to the dumping as well as updates on various aspects of 
the situation in Abidjan in general, the most important being Agence France-Presse 
(AFP), Associated Press (AP) and Reuters. 
Governmental, corporate and NGO websites provided information from the point of 
view of the websites’ producers, and should be taken in that context and corroborated 
where possible. The reports of reputable organisations such as Greenpeace, Human 
Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International (Amnesty) were also useful. Some 
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 The report of the National Commission of Inquiry on the Toxic Waste in the District of Abidjan at page 
41. 
9
 For example: scribd.com, informationclearinghouse.info, wikileaks.org. 
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internet resources have insufficient information on which to judge their reliability 
(Zhang 2001) and great caution was taken to ensure the accuracy and validity of the 
sources that were to inform the analysis. Social media (Twitter, blogs and forums) are 
subjective sources but information can be gleaned from trends observed within this 
media and these online tools were particularly interesting from the point of view of 
censure by civil society (see Chapter 8 for further discussion of the impact of new forms 
of social media). Blogs by well-known or institutionally reliable authors (e.g. George 
Monbiot and the BBC’s ‘tweeter’ in Ivory Coast) were also used. Search engines and 
even the notoriously unreliable Wikipedia were used as a first port of call only, for 
identifying quotes and historical facts but all information used in the thesis was verified 
by more reliable sources. 
Data collection presents certain problems in Ivory Coast. Publicly available official 
information is sparse and there is no tradition of detailed record keeping akin to that of 
the British archives. Access to available official archives is granted by the Ivorian 
Ministry of the Interior and only upon application and full disclosure of information 
sought (Welch 1982). Nor has the internet yet been developed as a reliable and 
widespread source of public information. This absence of official records and a limited 
public domain meant fieldwork was essential to secure data. 
Artefacts collected from participants on the fieldtrip included business cards, a victims 
organisation membership card, informational videos, brochures and posters. These 
items were not taken as sources of information so their accuracy was not a major 
concern. They were treated as raw data and helped enrich analysis. For example, to 
illustrate the competitive nature of Ivorian NGOs vying for recognition as the original 
and official victims organisation with some spending much of their time, energy and 
resources producing self-aggrandising legitimating promotional material. 
Interviews and Direct Observation 
Interviews conducted to collect data for this study took three forms: informant, informal 
and focused. 
‘Informant’ interviews were conducted in London and Abidjan in order to gain 
information, opinions and details of who to speak with when recruiting participants for 
the study (for example, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) mission in 
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Ivory Coast, NGOs and journalists in London and Ivory Coast, and law professors at the 
University of Cocody, Abidjan).  
‘Informal’ interviews were conducted with groups of people the researcher fortuitously 
encountered. These interviews tended to be a little like informal focus groups with 
members of the public and victims of state-corporate crime. Interviews with victims in 
public spaces always attracted significant interest from other victims within the group, 
leading to what can only be described as ‘hectic’ information-gathering exercises. One 
way to manage these encounters was via the use of video recording so that film of the 
interviews could be played back later in the peace and quiet of the researcher’s study 
and subsequently be reinterpreted and analysed. 
Most of the substantive interviews
10
 were conducted during the autumn 2010 field trip. 
The focused interviews conducted were semi-structured. A set of questions, informed 
by the literature review and theoretical considerations, provided consistency across the 
interviews as well as presenting the opportunity to identify cross-sectional themes. By 
employing core questions across all NGO interviews an attempt was made to minimise 
bias and introduce consistency around the theme of organisational structure and 
function, and any responses to the dumping crime. In order to explore organisational 
particularities, in addition to the basic, core questions which were asked of all 
organisations, questions relating to the specific operations of individual NGOs were 
also asked. For example, when the issue of membership cards for members was raised, 
the issue was further explored with ad hoc questions. The fee attached to membership 
bought nothing for the victims but it lent a veneer of legitimacy (on the part of those 
running NGOs) to the NGO. Given that there was no discernible reason for victims to 
be members of these organisations (see Chapter 7) the very fact of the fee raised 
questions as to their role. 
Data collected from individuals provides information about both the individual 
(behaviour, attitudes, perceptions) and the organisation (how and why it functions) (Yin 
2009). It was particularly important in this study to bear this distinction in mind given 
that the case study question concerned organisational practice. Any distinctly individual 
behaviour, attitudes or perceptions needed to be identified as such and filtered out if 
appropriate; for example, one interviewee explained how another NGO did not have 
                                                 
10
 See Appendix A for full questionnaire. 
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political ties, but when pressed on the matter it was revealed that this was an opinion 




The formal interviews were digitally-recorded, face-to-face interviews, and some were 
followed up by telephone or email to clarify details. Interviews were between 30 to 120 
minutes in length and in some cases questionnaires were sent before meetings (if 
requested), or as a follow up. The interviews were primarily conducted at the private 
offices of the selected NGOs and victims organisations, and one interview was 
conducted at an event run by a victims organisation. These interviews were (in the 
main) conducted during work hours at participants’ place of work in order to minimise 
disruption. Personal observations were also recorded at interviews and around their 
location. For example, UN police were observed at one victims organisation and a 
group of victims were observed and interviewed spontaneously when found waiting 
outside another. 
Field procedures included the presentation of ‘credentials’, namely a King’s College 
London (King’s) business card (sometimes accompanied with a King’s student card) 
and King’s letters as set out below. Documentation from King’s was used to give 
credence to the research when needed and helped inflate the standing of the researcher 
in the eyes of the participant. 
Access to sites and subjects was, generally, relatively easy with one or two exceptions – 
such as the NGO, Action pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme (APDH), which 
required a written request for meeting. Most organisations were happy to set up an 
interview with one or two days’ notice and some were in fact conducted within hours of 
being organised by telephone. Aside from a visit to one quasi non-governmental human 
rights organisation, no government sources were directly recruited for interview. This 
decision was based on security issues, as detailed below. 
The interviews were conducted in French. The researcher has some comprehension of 
French but given the complexities and sensitivities raised by the topic it was felt 
necessary to employ the services of a translator, who also acted as a facilitator. Very 
few subjects were confident enough to conduct the interview wholly in English. I 
approached the director of the English Department at the University of Cocody 
                                                 
11
 Interview, Abidjan, September 2010 (MIDH 2010). 
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(Abidjan) who recommended a PhD student from the English Department to interpret 
during interviews for a modest fee. The interviews were also recorded which provided a 
means of validating the interpreter’s translations once back in London. It was therefore 
possible to verify the quality of the translations given during interview. The interpreter 
was provided with a copy of the questions in English in advance, thereby increasing the 
confidence that at least the questions asked of the subjects were accurate, even if the 
translation of their answers was not. To ensure validity of the data collected by 
interview there was mutual agreement (with the interpreter) on definitions of words in 
questions, and any variability of translation was borne out in the analysis of the 
interview recording. The interpreter proved particularly valuable in explaining local 
culture and customs that might impact on the interview process in Ivory Coast. 
However, it became apparent early on in the field trip that the translator was not 
translating precisely. Concerned that this lack of precision would introduce inaccuracy 
into the study by the translator was for some time considered a problem. It was only 
when the recordings were played back and translated in London that it was recognised 
that the potential problem was in fact a bonus. The interpreter translated correctly but 
added valuable context to the data gathered. My translator added, expanded and defined 
the local idiom in his translations to me – all based on his cultural insights and from his 
own knowledge and experience of the crime and four years of aftermath. Instead of 
distorting the interview, he enriched it without compromising the perceptions of those 
he was translating. In the process of translation the translator therefore also contributed 
to an understanding of local context. Time was spent with a local family (introduced 
through contact in London) in the deprived neighbourhood of Yopougon and these 
visits gave valuable (if fleeting) insights into the culture and world outlook of the local 
population. 
The use of a translator was also useful in securing local trust and perspectives. On one 
level this assisted in overcoming some of the misgivings held toward the researcher, as 
the translator provided a degree of authentication, both for the researcher and the 
researched. The translator assisted the researcher in gaining the trust of the interviewed 
by introducing and vouching for the identity of the researcher and simultaneously 
assisting the researcher in finding suitable candidates for interviews.   
As the research included data collection on the government’s involvement with 
Trafigura’s criminal dumping, it was decided early on in the planning process to 
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maintain a low profile while in the jurisdiction. This decision was informed by 
information uncovered in preparatory research of the government’s human rights 
records, specifically the treatment of foreign journalists investigating government 
deviance, as described in Chapter 7. A small ‘non-tourist’ hotel was chosen, avoiding 
the large business and tourist establishments,
12
 and the researcher travelled on a tourist 
visa so as not to arouse unwanted attention from the government. Both these measures 
were taken to limit the researcher’s exposure to government and corporate intelligence. 
Other covert practices employed included the clandestine recording of one participant 
on the field trip, and this was considered necessary by the non-transparent and defensive 
measures deployed by the interviewee. The decision to make this recording was not 
taken lightly – especially in light of the large, muscular man standing in the corner of 
the room for the duration, whom I took to be a bodyguard. However, the practice may 
be necessary at times and Green and Ward (2012) argue that, “when overt routes to 
knowledge are denied and secrecy characterises the practices to be studied, clandestine 
methods may offer the only route to enlightenment” (Green and Ward 2012: 735). 
There is a long history of European involvement in West Africa, dating from the mid 
15
th
 century (Fyle 1981). From that point on there has been a strong French presence in 
Ivory Coast and attitudes to post-colonialism were taken into account. It was observed 
that participants were happier to be interviewed when informed by the facilitator that 
the researcher was not French. At times it was useful to say that the research was from a 
British university and at other times it was helpful to stress the researcher’s Irish origins 
– this latter ploy was especially helpful with French and American journalists. Concerns 
about undercover journalists who would quote participants without permission were 
assuaged by King’s branded PhD student business cards and by forms requiring 
signatures that had been designed to reach the standards of the researcher’s UK 
University Ethics Sub-committee. A translator/escort and the use of local taxis as 
transport helped to cement the image of a non-threatening academic. 
When investigating crimes of the powerful, taking an ‘ethical orientation’ approach 
(Scheper-Hughes 1992) makes the researcher directly accountable to the researched 
(Green and Ward 2011) and Marx reminds us that it’s necessary that we aim not just to 
interpret, but to change the world (Marx 1845). The researcher is particularly 
                                                 
12
 My translator was prompted to comment that I was probably the first person who had ever spent longer 
than four hours in the hotel. This may have explained the low rates charged. 
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susceptible to the morality of events under study, especially when in an ‘emergency 
zone’ where the researcher can be directly exposed to the struggle of people suffering 
from crime and conflict (Feldman 1995). By adopting a stance that shows “a 
commitment to justice and moral alignment with the victims of state violence and 
corruption, in pursuit of justice and change” (Green and Ward 2011), the researcher 
establishes a sense of accountability that may help facilitate access and trust amongst 
participants. On the basis of her work in Mozambique, Carolyn Nordstrom describes 
how research narratives often “… collide into contentious assemblages of partial truths, 
political fictions, personal foibles, military propaganda, and cultural lore” (Nordstrom 
1995: 140). By adopting an ethical approach, conflicting narratives can be triangulated 
to gain a more complete picture of crimes and resistance movements. At all times, 
displaying a sympathetic attitude to the participant organisations’ mission and ethos 
allowed for greater access, as shared beliefs fostered an atmosphere of openness. 
An application was made to and approved by the University’s Ethics Sub-committee. 
Ethical considerations included ensuring that the interview participants were giving 
freely informed consent to participate. Participants were presented with documentation 
that included an information sheet briefly outlining the project and a consent form that 
was in English but was translated to them by the interpreter prior to signing. Participants 
were informed that they were able to withdraw from the research verbally (directly to 
me) or by email/letter and that all relevant data would be deleted if requested/required, 
but none exercised this option. 
Personal information relating to interview subjects was held on password protected 
electronic file and is anonymised in this thesis. All information will be kept for up to 
two years, stored under lock and key on a password encrypted hard drive at the 
researcher’s home address. All processing of personal information related to the study 
has been in full compliance with the UK Data Protection Act (1998).  
Extra care was taken when informally interviewing victims to ensure that recounting the 
experience did not further traumatise them or put them at physical risk. The names of all 
direct victims have been withheld from the case study in order to protect their identity, 
privacy and security. At their request, some names of those interviewed at NGOs and 
victims organisations have been withheld. 
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NGOs were the primary subject of the field trip because they were seen to be at the 
vanguard of labelling and sanctioning deviant behaviour. Whereas in Europe, 
governments and NGOs, or similar civil society organisations, have a vast corporate-
style internet presence, this was not the case in Ivory Coast. While many NGOs stated 
that they “have a site that needs updating”,13 most are not readily available to the most 
popular search engines and if they are, contain little information. The internet was, 
however, to prove very useful, especially in the area of micro-blogging as discussed 
below. 
Choosing Participant NGOs and Victims Organisations 
For the analytical purposes required by this research, civil society in Abidjan has been 
divided into pre-existing human rights NGOs and the newly formed Trafigura victims 
organisations. 
The study population for the focused interviews was initially selected based on 
convenience of location and purposive sampling to include all relevant local human 
rights NGOs – that is, NGOs that should or would have investigated and reacted to the 
case being researched. Two field trips were originally considered, an exploratory one in 
September 2010 with an option to follow-up in January 2011, but civil war broke out 
soon after the first trip and the follow-up field trip became impossible. However, the 
information collected on the first trip provided enough data to draw meaningful 
conclusions from an analysis of that data and the contacts I developed in Abidjan 
continued to provide valuable information throughout the course of my research.
14
 
The UN in Ivory Coast provided a full list of local NGOs that they had compiled and 
this list was confirmed and corroborated by ‘informant’ interviews with the ICRC and 
journalists as well as informally at the end of some of the ‘focused’ interviews. 
Participants were then identified through their organisation’s literature and websites and 
from the UN list, and were approached and recruited by email, telephone or letter. It 
was important that individual participants recruited had relevant knowledge of their own 
organisation or the areas covered by this research. As such, participants were members 
of the organisation’s legal department, or in positions which required a clear overview 
of all the NGO’s activities. 
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 Interview, Abidjan, September 2010 (LIDHO 2010). 
14
 In particular, three international press correspondents and a number of Ivorian NGO heads. 
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In order to access the network of relevant NGOs in Ivory Coast, Twitter was employed 
to particularly good effect. A search with the ‘#abidjan’, ‘#ivorycoast’ and 
‘#cotedivoire’ hashtags15 was to uncover a BBC Correspondent based in Abidjan. This 
enabled contact and was followed by an invitation to his home for an informal fact-
finding meeting. This meeting directly led to interviews with journalists from Reuters, 
Associated Press and France24. These were exploratory interviews, primarily fact-
finding exercises to identify the relevant civil society players (presumed to be grass-
roots NGOs, or local chapters of international NGOs), and not designed to glean raw 
data. However, observations made by these journalists, their personal experience of the 
toxic dumping and their views on the personalities involved in the aftermath proved 
invaluable information. Similar interviews with staff at the Overseas Development 
Institute (ODI) (London), the UN and ICRC allowed me to identify ten human rights 
NGOs whose remit would cover the toxic waste events of 2006.  
The NGOs surveyed can be split into the following four categories: domestic human 
rights organisations – APDH, LIDHO, MIDH and FIDHOP;16 local chapters of 
international, regional and/or transnational organisations – Amnesty International, Ivory 
Coast (AI CI) and Club UA;
17
 international or regional networks of associations – 
RAIDH and WANEP;
18
 and other, less influential associations with human rights 
aspects to their stated mission – OFACI19 and Transparency Justice.20 These 
organisations as a group are representative of the relevant social audience for the 
violations of social norms by the state and by Trafigura. However, not all interviews 
were suitable for data analysis. AI CI did not engage with the incident, as they deferred 
to their parent organisation (the role of the International Secretariat of Amnesty 
International is considered in Chapter 8). RAIDH is an umbrella NGO, a federation of 
small human rights organisations and did not consider the dumping to be the kind of 
                                                 
15
 “The # symbol, called a ‘hashtag’, is used to mark keywords or topics in a Tweet. It was created 
organically by Twitter users as a way to categorize messages” – Official Twitter explanation, available at 
http://support.twitter.com/articles/49309-what-are-hashtags-symbols (accessed December 2011) 
16
 Action pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme (APDH), Ligue Ivoirienne des Droits de l’Homme 
(LIDHO), Mouvement Ivoirien des Droits Humains (MIDH) and La Fondation Ivoirienne pour les Droits 
de l’Homme et la Vie Politique (FIDHOP). 
17
 Amnesty International Côte d’Ivoire (AI CI) and Club Union Africaine Côte d’Ivoire (Club UA). 
18
 Regroupement des Acteurs Ivoiriens des Driots Humains (RAIDH), an umbrella organisation that 
includes as its members APDH, Club UA, MIDH, Organisation des Femmes Actives de Côte d’Ivoire 
(OFACI) and West African Network for Peacebuilding Côte d’Ivoire (WANEP) – established in 2003 by 
five NGOs, including Club UA. 
19
 Organisation des Femmes Actives de Côte d’Ivoire – focuses on the human rights of women. 
20
 Concerned primarily with justice system reform. 
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incident within its remit: “we leave it to our members to act”.21 Their membership 
includes APDH, MIDH and Club UA. WANEP are only concerned with peace 
building.
22
 OFACI did not consider the dumping specifically a women’s issue and 
therefore not within their remit.
23
 Transparency Justice are concerned with government 
transparency and, again, do not take on these type of cases. Chapter 6 therefore focuses 
primarily on the data collected from four organisations: APDH, MIDH, LIDHO and 
Club UA, identified as major ‘players’ in the human rights field in Ivory Coast at the 
salient time.
24
 A fifth notable human rights NGO, FIDHOP, is a newer organisation 
established in 2009,
25
 after the crime examined by this thesis. FIDHOP has not been 
involved with this crime on any level,
26
 despite the ongoing harmful effects of the 
dumping. The validity of the selection was confirmed by the participant organisations, 
thus triangulating and thereby legitimising the results of the selection process. 
According to APDH, “there are three major NGOs for the defence of human rights – 
LIDHO, MIDH and APDH”.27 MIDH stated that, “there are three major organisations 
that work in the defence of human rights, three major NGOs in Ivory Coast – MIDH, 
LIDHO and APDH”.28 Unsurprisingly, when asked, FIDHOP included themselves in 
the list; “there are five NGOs: LIDHO, MIDH, APDH, Club UA and FIDHOP. These 
are the serious ones.”29 Club UA see the main players in the field as LIDHO, MIDH, 
CEFCI
30
 and RAIDH. 
Apart from these ‘major’ NGOs, APDH reported that there are between 20 and 25 
specialised human rights NGOs fighting for the rights of women, children and the 
disabled. Club UA claimed they were “in permanent contact with about fifteen human 
rights NGOs”.31 However according to a range of journalists, the relevant literature, and 
my own observations, the participant NGOs form the core of the domestic human rights 
organisations in Ivory Coast and may therefore be seen to be representative of the social 
audience under study here. The ancillary NGOs, in terms of size and focus, were not 
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 Interview, Abidjan, September 2010 (RAIDH 2010). 
22
 Interview, Abidjan, September 2010 (WANEP 2010). 
23
 Interview, Abidjan, September 2010 (OFACI 2010). 
24
 Interview, Abidjan, September 2010 (Comité International de la Croix-Rouge 2010). 
25
 Interview, Abidjan, September 2010 (FIDHOP 2010). 
26
 Ibid.  
27
 Interview, Abidjan, September 2010 (APDH 2010). 
28
 Interview, Abidjan, September 2010 (MIDH 2010). 
29
 Interview, Abidjan, September 2010 (FIDHOP 2010). 
30
 Centre Feminin pour la Democratie et les Droits Humains en Côte d’Ivoire, an organisation focusing on 
women’s rights and established in 2003; source: website http://www.cefci.org/ 
31
 Interview, Abidjan, September 2010 (Club UA 2010). 
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chosen as participants and none have surfaced in the literature or media reports as 
having been involved with the dumping. 
Individuals at the participant NGOs were all well placed to answer the questions posed: 
the president of the national executive of APDH,
32





 and the vice-secretary general of Club UA.
35
 
However, while the NGOs interviewed were identified as the main human rights NGOs, 
only two reported that they were either ‘seized’ by the issue at that time or were 
involved in the foundation and organisation of victims organisations. As reported earlier 
120 of these victims organisations were established, either organically or with the 
assistance of local NGOs, and they in turn organised into (at least) four larger, 
‘umbrella’ federations. Upon hearing of these organisations, it was decided that they 
may be the civil society NGOs that this study should be concerned with and 
arrangements were made to interview them. 
This study is concerned with six victims organisations or federations: Union des 
Victimes des Déchets Toxiques d’Abidjan et Banlieue (UVDTAB), Fédération 
Nationale des Victimes des Déchets Toxiques de Côte d’Ivoire (FENAVIDET), Réseau 
National pour la Défense des Droits des Victimes des Déchets Toxiques 
(RENADVIDET), Coordination Nationale des Victimes des Déchets Toxiques de Côte 
d’Ivoire (CNVDT), Fédération des Associations de Victimes de Déchets Toxiques de 
Côte d’Ivoire (FAVIDET) and Victimes Unies contre les Catastrophes Humaines 
(VUCAH). 
Interviews were conducted with senior members of participant organisations including 
the founder president of UVDTAB, the president of CNVDT, the president of 
FAVIDET and the vice-president of FENAVIDET. Information regarding 
RENADVIDET and VUCAH (who were scheduled for interview during the aborted 
follow-up fieldtrip) was found instead in the reports of a range of journalists. Participant 
victims organisations were chosen with the help of local and international journalists, 
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 Interview, Abidjan, September 2010 (APDH 2010). 
33
 Interview, Abidjan, September 2010 (MIDH 2010). 
34
 Interview, Abidjan, September 2010 (LIDHO 2010). 
35
 Interview, Abidjan, September 2010 (Club UA 2010). 
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NGOs and by asking the organisations themselves. For example, CNVDT suggested 
that apart from UVDTAB, FAVIDET would be useful participants.
36
 
Access to these victims organisations was more difficult. The problems associated with 
accessing this type of organisation raised subjective suspicions in the researcher’s mind. 
The representatives of victims organisations were harder to meet than NGO 
representatives (taking weeks in some cases to respond and in others would only allow 
interviews with junior staff in the first instance), no recording was allowed at one, and 
was limited at another. These issues of restricted access raised questions about the 
nature of the organisations themselves. One of the four victims organisations 
approached for interview (CNVDT) was run by a former “high ranking”37 member of 
FESCI, reportedly a mafia-type student organisation (HRW 2008: 99). These 
organisations generally had security personnel on their premises or in the room during 
interview. This was observed at one NGO too (FIDHOP) but was much more 
pronounced at the victims organisations. An explanation by CNVDT for this security 
presence is discussed in Chapter 7. 
These victims organisations appeared to be extorting money from victims: exchanging 
promises of compensation from overseas or domestic civil damages cases, or from the 
government of Ivory Coast (although, no case or claim had been running). My research 
revealed that these victims organisations were offering an elaborate registration process 
for a fee and one group issued membership cards in an attempt to out-manoeuvre rival 
organisations in the ‘battleground’ for revenue or recognition. One organisation was 
keen to display an official government press certificate of authenticity to bolster claims 
of legitimacy; another simply ‘muscled in’ on victim-bound compensation, managing to 
convince an Ivorian court that he was the most ‘official’ victims organisation. 
Conclusion 
The objective of this research project is to understand the functioning of international 
and Ivorian civil society and responses to state-corporate crime. The methodology 
employed was necessarily informed by this objective and are described by this chapter. 
The events of August 2006 in Abidjan formed the core of a case study of crime and 
effect. The specific objective of the Trafigura case study was to understand the 
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 Interview, Abidjan, September 2010 (CNVDT-CI 2010). 
37
 Email correspondence with international press correspondent, November 2011. 
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company’s organisational decisions that resulted in state-corporate crime and the 
organisational processes that afforded NGOs the possibility to sanction and censure that 
crime. The impunity afforded to Trafigura in light of the evidence required explanation. 
As the research progressed, however, it became necessary to investigate and explain the 
continued and related deviance of the Ivory Coast state and Trafigura in compounding 
and extending the injuries of the victims. The results of the data collection and analysis, 
as will be seen, were unexpected but unsurprising. 
The pre-reading can only get you so far in an attempt to unravel the complexities of 
Abidjan, and of Ivory Coast. The crucial factor for the field trip for this research was the 
engagement with the local and expat community in Deux Plateaux, Yopougon and other 
areas of Abidjan. Each encounter added another price to the complex and murky puzzle. 
My translator was instrumental in this, showing me around and explaining his views of 
the realities of life in the city. Without a sense of context, it may not have been possible 
to realise that there was something fundamentally different about some of the victims 
organisations. 
The time spent on the ground in Ivory Coast and the associated informant and informal 
interviews was essential to forming a picture of the crime and its aftermath. A second 
field trip, which was frustrated by war, would have been invaluable to explore avenues 
of further research that were revealed in the data analysis. And, based on the 
experiences of this field trip, a second would have undoubtedly opened up some more. 
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Chapter 3 – The Ivorian ‘Miracle’: Cocoa, Oil and War 
Introduction 
Europeans flocked to Africa in the late 18
th century, following Livingston’s call to 
deliver the three C’s – Commerce, Christianity and Civilisation. However, the French 
may have had a different motivation. Following humiliation in the Franco-Prussian war, 
France’s armies were seeking to restore some of their former prestige. But there was an 
overarching fourth ‘C’ – Conquest (Packenham 2003). The Ivory Coast is so-called 
because ivory was the only commodity the locals had that could entice marauding 
Europeans to trade with them (Fage 1980), and ‘coast’ because that was all that was 
relevant from the point of view of the European marauders, due to an inaccessible 
hinterland. Subsequently colonised by the French, and with close ties to the former 
colonial power after independence, the Ivory Coast became a show-case for African 
capitalist development – a picture of the stability and economic success of “the French 
experiment in West Africa” (Newbury 1960: 112). However, this success was 
economically unsustainable and was – moreover – built upon an abuse of power from 
the outset. This chapter charts the economic history of the Ivory Coast, aims to give a 
contextual background to the subject of this thesis and investigates how the state 
became susceptible to large-scale state-corporate crime. 
Basic Information 
The de facto capital of Ivory Coast (also known as Côte d’Ivoire) is Abidjan. It is the 
largest city, site of the financial centre and government, and is home to most foreign 
embassies (BBC 2011). The flag of Ivory Coast, based on the French flag, displays 
three equal vertical bands of orange (on the hoist side), white, and green (similar the 
Irish flag but shorter and with the colours in reverse order). Orange symbolises the 
Savannah in the north, green the forest in the South and white symbolises peace and 
unity. There are two state-owned television and radio stations, no private television 
stations and few private radio stations (BBC 2011). However, as far as the extent that 
‘outside’ (non-government generated) information is available to the general public, 
satellite channels are available (for those able to afford it) as is the internet, but there are 
very few broadband subscribers (World Bank 2005). 
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Very little is known about prehistoric Ivory Coast but it is believed that there were 
settlements dating at least as far back as the Neolithic era (Chenorkian 1983). While in 
the past the coastal region – and potentially the whole territory – was likely to be 
sparsely populated (Fage 1980; Jones and Johnson 1980), today most of the population 
live along the coast, with the exception of Yamoussoukro, and 50% of the total 
population live in urbanisations (World Bank 2002). 
The population is estimated at about 20 million, 40% of whom are under 14 years old. 
This population estimate is up from 18 million three years earlier and population growth 
is currently at about 2.44% (UN 2011). Africa has a population of about 965 million and 
a growth rate of about 2.46% (UN 2011). Life expectancy (at birth) is 56 years, higher 
than the sub-Saharan Africa average of 46, and the median age is 19 years. Some 75% 
of the population are ‘indigenous Ivorians’ and about 20% of total population are 
migrant workers from Liberia, Burkina Faso (about 50%) and Guinea (Nation Master 
2011). Of these migrant workers, approximately 70% are Muslim. About 3% of the 
permanent population are originally from further afield – including some 130,000 
Lebanese and 14,000 French (1998 estimate); Lebanese migration to Ivory Coast had 
been ongoing in some form since the 1890s but really began in earnest during the 
prosperous 1920s (Bierwirth 1997; UN 2006). 
Table 1 – Predominant Ethnic Families and Groups in Ivory Coast 
Family (1998 est. %) 
Principal 
Group(s) 
Origin Current Region 
Akan (42%) The Baoulé Ghana Atlantic East 
Northern Mande (17%) The Malinké Guinea North 
Kru (or Krous) (11%) The Bete Liberia Atlantic West 
Voltaic (or Gur) (18%) Senoufo and Lobi Burkina Faso/Mali North 
Southern Mande (10%) The Yacouba  West 
[Sources: US DoS (2006: 1), Nation Master (2011), US DoS (2010: 1), Zolberg (1967), 
US CIA (2011)] 
The predominant ethnic groups arrived in Ivory Coast within the last 500 years: the Kru  
from Liberia and the Senoufo and Lobi from Burkina Faso and Mali around 1600. In the  
 





 centuries respectively, two groups (the Agni, southeast; and the Baoulé, 
central) from the Akan family (from Ghana) and the Malinké (from Guinea) 
invaded/migrated into the territory. Most ethnic populations (outside the cities) are 
concentrated in regions that correspond to adjacent, bordering origin territories and the 
largest ethnic group in the country is the Baoulé (Zolberg 1967) – see Table 1. 
French is the official language, and there are an estimated 60 native dialects – of which 
Dioula is the most widely spoken; illiteracy stands at about 50% and the average length 
of schooling is six years (UN 2006). In 2008, it was estimated that approximately 40% 
of the population were Muslim, 33% Christian and around 12% adhered to traditional 
belief systems. 
Ivory Coast is in West Africa (at approx 8 00N, 5 00W) and is just over 320,000 square 
kilometres, practically square in shape, and borders the North Atlantic Ocean (515 km) 
to the south, Ghana (668 km) on the east and Liberia (716 km) and Guinea (610 km) to 
the west. The northern border is shared by Mali (532 km) and Burkina Faso (584 km). 
The landscape is predominantly flat except for some mountains in the west, with the 
highest point Monts Nimbaat at 1,750 metres. 
History 
Pre-Independence 
History records that the Ivory Coast was visited by European ships as early as the 1460s 
but it wasn’t until 1637 that France landed missionaries at Assinie. Early contacts were 
limited mainly due to a notoriously inhospitable coastline and may also have been 
limited by settlers’ “fear of the inhabitants” (US DoS 2010). According to Fage, the first 
account of Ivory Coast comes from Villault de Bellefond, who after his visit in 1667 
remarked that, “its people ate Europeans, and wore less clothing than any other West 
Africans” (Fage 1980: 299). While most areas of West Africa involved colonial powers 
dealing with established local ‘authorities’, this was not the case of the coastal regions 
of Ivory Coast, “which also seems unique in that Europeans apparently neither saw nor  
were offered slaves there” (Fage 1980: 298). Fage argues that the lack of slave trading 
can be explained by a shortage of local kings which was a result of a sparse population,  
“and so with a lack of economic development and of trade organized to offer goods of 
interest to foreigners” (Fage 1980: 299). In 1843 and 1844, the French signed treaties 
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with the kings of the Grand Bassam and Assinie regions, placing their territories under a 
French protectorate, thus securing a monopoly for French traders along the coast. Naval 
bases and fortified ports were built at Assinie and Grand Bassam (Church 1967), but 
“they were not intended to serve as springboards for expansion inland” (Newbury 1969: 
253). The French did not get involved with local politics and by the 1860s these trading 
posts were poorly situated, weakly defended and commercially unhealthy. Ivory Coast 
became a French colony in 1893 (BBC 2011). Captain Binger, as first governor, 
negotiated boundaries with Liberia and the Gold Coast in the early 1890s and set about 
“the primary task of establishing law and order along the rivers and trade routes from 
the coastal ports to the interior” (Newbury 1960: 112). By 1900, the budget of French 
Western Africa was about 24 million francs per annum, and in Ivory Coast up to 50% of 
revenue went on administrative services while “social services, health and education 
received 4.5%” (Newbury 1960: 123). 
From 1904 Ivory Coast was ruled from Paris as part of the Federation of French West 
Africa (until the 1956 Overseas Reform Act) and by 1915, effective French control of 
the territory was achieved. The process, however, was not without conflict and was only 
secured following a ‘pacification’ period (Bierwirth 1997) which included a war with 
the Mandinka (from Ghana) and the Baoulé (a guerrilla war that continued until 1917). 
The French were considered experts at this type of pacification in the region at that 
time. E.D. Morel, the British journalist and anti-slavery campaigner, pointed to the 
French success in applying direct taxes without bloodshed in 1901; showing, “in her 
handling of native questions in the land of the true Negroes … the superiority of 
France’s methods” (Morel 1902: 201). The French employed the mantra: “On gouverne 
de loin, mais on ne peut, de loin, que se borner a gouverner” (Newbury 1960: 112), 
which translates as ‘we govern from afar, but from afar, we can only limit ourselves to 
govern’. This made sense at the time, where the colony was acting economically 
independent from France, with most imports coming from Britain and Germany  
(Newbury 1960). This attitude changed as France became more economically 
entrenched (see Economy section below). Haute Volta, another French colony, was  
absorbed by Ivory Coast in 1933 in a bid to save money, and by 1934 the French 
managed successful military recruiting – another indication of the ‘superiority’ of 
French methods (Arnett 1935). 
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During World War II, France’s Vichy regime maintained governance until 1943 when 
de Gaulle took control of all French West Africa. And right up to the end of WWII  
Ivorians were French ‘subjects’ without rights to citizenship or representation. The 
Ivorian Parti Democratique de la Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) came to power after the war, as 
soon as political parties became legal. They lost a series of elections between 1949 and 
1952, “but only because the French administration had tampered with the ballot” 
(Schachter 1961: 295). Some commentators argue that, from 1950, Ivory Coast became 
dominated by immigrants and “corrupt state leaders” (McMullin 2009: 84; Wannenburg 
2005). Entering politics was seen as a means to criminal ends: “by capturing power, 
political figures gain control of a lucrative clandestine economic network” (ICG 2004: 
4).  
1958 to 1989 
In October 1958, Guinea became the first independent French-African state. De Gaulle 
violently cut ties with Guinea when it refused to join a ‘French Community’ in the 
region. There was however a route to independence while still retaining close ties to 
France (Le Vine 1997) and this was seized upon by Ivory Coast in December 1958, 
when it became an autonomous republic within the French Community and then an 
independent (in the strict legal sense of the word) state on Sunday, 7
th
 August 1960. As 
with most other newly independent former French colonies, Ivory Coast adopted a 
‘French’ approach to its constitution and legal system. Le Vine argues that this was 
inevitable as, “schooled in the French political tradition and habituated to French legal 
and institutional norms and forms, the African leaders were not likely to reject the 
political culture in which they themselves had been nurtured” (Le Vine 1986: 84). 
Perhaps the most sought-after element of the French system was a provision which 
allowed for “strongly centralized leadership and control” (Le Vine 1997: 85) – very  
much suiting the style of the first president Félix Houphouët-Boigny and his successors. 
Houphouët-Boigny had been a member of the French parliament before taking control 
of the newly independent African colony. 
By 1960, the population of Ivory Coast was about 3.3 million (and growing at about 
3.5%, including 1% from immigration) – with about 180,000 people in Abidjan. Half of 
GDP derived from agricultural activities and coffee and cocoa exports accounted for 
about 30% of GDP. Close ties with France ensured that it was the biggest market for  
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both exports and imports. Houphouët-Boigny ruled with a repressive, kleptocratic 
government for 30 years before his regime began to unravel. In 1983, the capital of  
Ivory Coast was moved to the then small village of Yamoussoukro, which was 
Houphouët-Boigny’s home village. This was a bold statement of a self-important leader 
who would rule the country for 33 years, from independence in 1960 to his death in 
1993, the longest serving leader in Africa (BBC 2011). Houphouët-Boigny ruled by 
terror and was prone to claiming false plots against him in order to imprison and torture 
anyone that he felt was not totally loyal to him. He also presided over the bloody 
repression of two revolts (DF 2003). 
1990 to 1998 
In 1990, the government attempted to cut public service salaries but this was met with 
public uproar and “launched the biggest challenge to Houphouët-Boigny’s rule since 
independence” (van de Walle 1991: 404): 
In the streets themselves, popular resentment against the wealthy and the corrupt 
usually merged with anger over years of authoritarian rule. During an anti-
government demonstration in Abidjan in March 1990, protestors chanted 
“Houphouet, voleur! Houphouet, demissionnez! Houphoulet, corrompu!” 
(Harsch 1993: 44) 
Adiko Niamkey, general secretary of the general workers’ union (UGTCI), argued that 
the government should “repatriate the funds of those who have enriched themselves”, 
rather than tax salaries as recommended by the IMF (Harsch 1993: 44). This was the 
first sign of cracks in the government’s regime, and was precipitated by the economic  
situation. In 1990, the teachers’ union (Synares) demanded that “the immense fortunes 
illicitly acquired and stashed abroad should be brought back, and that personalities who 
obtained huge loans through state guarantees should be summoned to repay them as 
soon as possible” (Harsch 1993: 44). The riots were widespread and banks and shops 
were attacked as far north as the city of Bouaké (Harsch 1993). 
After Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 1993, Henri Konan Bédié (leader of the National 
Assembly) took over to serve the remainder of his term (as prescribed under the 
constitution). In the 1995 presidential elections, boycotted by opposition parties amid 
allegations of voter registration irregularities, Bédié won 96% of the vote. The 
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opposition parties did, however, participate in legislative elections later in 1995, which 
were again hampered by similar irregularities, and the PDCI retained control of the  
National Assembly which in 1998 issued constitutional amendments that further 
increased and centralised the power enshrined in the office of president. From 1960 to 
1999 the PDCI held both the presidency and a majority of seats in the National 
Assembly (African Elections Database 2010). 
1999 Coup and Aftermath 
On Christmas eve 1999, Ivory Coast experienced its first (‘bloodless’) military coup 
(US CIA 2011) ousting President Bédié (US DoS 2001). The coup is blamed, generally, 
on government corruption and incompetence. Retired Brigadier General Guéï formed a 
subsequent government and a new constitution was ratified in 2000 (US DoS 2010: 1), 
but this constitution still contained clauses which exacerbated national divisions 
between north and south, Christian and Muslim. 
Presidential elections in October 2000 sparked violence and accusations of irregularities 
(US DoS 2007: 1). The Supreme Court (as handpicked by Guéï) excluded the PDCI and 
one of two main opposition political parties, the Rally for Republicans (RDR), and 
western election monitors were subsequently withdrawn. Despite gaining fewer votes, 
Guéï declared himself the winner. Supporters of presidential candidate Laurent Gbagbo, 
of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) took to the streets – joined by police and army – 
forcing Guéï to flee. The Supreme Court then declared Gbagbo president, with 53% of 
the vote. The RDR then began to protest as their candidate, Alassane Ouattara, had not 
been allowed to run for office. The new government suppressed the protest; hundreds 
were killed in the ensuing violence until Ouattara recognised Gbagbo as president and 
called for peace. 
National Assembly elections in December 2000 were again dogged by violence and 
electoral irregularities, with most seats won by the FPI (about 40%) and PDCI (35%). 
Boycotted and violently disrupted by the RDR, turnout was about 33%. 
Both elections in 2000 attracted allegations of severe human rights abuses at the hands 
of the government and a mass grave at Yopougon, western Abidjan, remains shrouded 
in mystery (Seyni 2001). 
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In January 2001, there was another coup attempt that proved to be a relatively minor 
incident and successful local elections were held peacefully a couple of months later.  
The RDR won a comfortable majority, ahead of the PDCI and FPI. In 2002, Ivory Coast 
had its first provincial elections, which again attracted accusations of electoral 
irregularities and in August, President Gbagbo formed a ‘unity’ government which 
included the RDR (BBC 2011). 
In September 2002 exiled members of the military launched another coup attempt (US 
CIA 2011), which was said to include foreign fighters and support from the 
governments of Burkina Faso and Liberia (Gleditsch and Beardsley 2004: 380). This 
attempted coup evolved into a fully-fledged rebellion, splitting the country in two. The 
New Forces (NF) took control of the northernmost 60% of the country, while the 
government retained control of the populous southern territory. During the coup, 
General Guéï was killed and the government razed shantytowns, displacing about 
12,000 people. In October 2002, the government and NF signed a ceasefire to be 
monitored by French military forces. However, in late November of that year, a new 
front developed in the conflict in western Ivory Coast. In January 2003, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed 1,500 troops to assist the 
4,000 strong French force in patrolling the ‘zone of confidence’, a kind of 
buffer/demilitarised zone that divided the country in two along an east-west axis. 
Linas-Marcoussis Accord 
In January 2003, the UN-monitored Linas-Marcoussis Accord was proposed by France 
and agreed – paving the way for power sharing between the government and the NF. 
Seydou Diarra, as chosen by the international community, was appointed Prime 
Minister by Gbagbo (US CIA 2011). In July, the National Armed Forces of Ivory Coast 
(FANCI) and the NF military agreed to work towards the Linas-Marcoussis Accord and 
disarmament. 
The February 2004 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1528 approved  
the UN operation in Ivory Coast (ONUCI) which involved the deployment of 6,000 
troops, joining the French ‘Operation Unicorn’ force of 4,000. Deadlines and goals set 
by the 2004 Accra III Agreement – designed to implement Linas-Marcoussis – were not 
met by the parties and a deadlock had been reached. This was broken in November 2004  
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by the government when they launched bombing attacks on the north, including a raid 
on a French military installation – killing nine French soldiers. The French responded 
soon afterwards by destroying the Ivorian air force and taking over Abidjan (Nanga 
2005) in a reaction which served as a reminder of the presence of the former colonial 





The 2005 Pretoria Agreements, brokered by South African president Thabo Mbeki, 
formally brought peace and put the Linas-Marcoussis Accord back on track. In October 
2005, UNSC resolution 1633 extended the Linas-Marcoussis peace process for an 
additional 12 months and called for elections by the end of October 2006. In December 
2005, the Afican Union (AU) designated Charles Konan Banny (governor of the West 
African Central Bank) as prime minister. In 2006, realising that elections couldn’t take 
place in time to reach the agreements deadline, the UNSC passed resolution 1721 
extending the mandates of Gbagbo and Banny until October 2007. 
Ouagadougou Political Agreement 
In March 2007 Gbagbo and former NF leader Guillaume Soro signed the Ouagadougou 
Political Agreement in Burkina Faso. The agreement saw Soro become prime minister, 
mandated elections and the dismantling of the zone of confidence. By the end of 2008, 
about 90% of civil administration had returned to the north and some courts were back 
up, running and issuing birth certificates that were needed for voting in upcoming 
elections. Elections had been scheduled for November 2007 but were postponed to June 
2008 and did not actually take place until the end of 2010 (Bah 2010). 
Economy 
The Ivorian economy is based on a strong free market approach, and depends heavily on 
smallholder cash crop production – cocoa (with 40% of world supply, Ivory Coast is the 
largest producer in the world), coffee, pineapples, rubber and tropical woods. 
Agriculture employs about 70% of the population (International Labor Rights Forum, 
ILRF 2002). Another chief export is petroleum. This leaves the economy very sensitive 
                                                 
38
 United Nations Security Council resolution 1572, adopted unanimously on 15
th
 November 2004. 
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to commodity price fluctuation on the world market. The economy is also heavily 
influenced by the outside world, particularly by its former colonial power. Direct 
foreign investment accounts for about 45% of total capital in Ivorian firms and French 
investment accounts for 25% ownership of Ivorian companies and around 60% of all 
foreign investment capital. The stock of foreign direct investment was about US$5.7 
billion (28% of GDP) in 2007. France is the main investor; other significant investors 
are other EU member-states, Switzerland, Lebanon, China and India. The state is part of 
the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), which uses the CFA 
franc. The French Central Bank retains all international reserves of WAEMU states and 
maintains a fixed rate of 655.956 CFA to the euro (US DoS 2010: 1). 
Ivory Coast is an important source of oil and chocolate for France and the rest of 
Europe. The government have surrendered monetary policy to France and the majority 
of the population are at the mercy of the international commodities markets. Half of the 
country is foreign owned, a quarter by the French, and it is clear why commentators 
have labelled the Ivorian state as one “most often accused of elitist exploitation” 
(Clapham 1970: 8). By the 1970s Ivory Coast was widely renowned for its liberal  
economic policies and a policy based on free enterprise had “been consistently pursued 
since independence” (O’Connor 1972: 411). At that time Shaw and Grieve argued that 
Ivory Coast was an “emerging economic magnet … for the US and other capitalist 
states” (Shaw and Grieve 1978: 3). Bartlett noted that Ivory Coast had long been 
considered “one of Africa’s success stories” (Bartlett 1990: 330). The legal structure 
ensured that the economy was attractive to private investment, whether from domestic 
or foreign sources (O’Connor 1972). Tax rates remained modest and so did the size of 
government (Bartlett 1990). These incentives for private capital ensured that Ivory 
Coast became “one of the most prosperous nations in Africa” (Bartlett 1990: 330). 
Honohan argued that cash crops were key to this success: “Côte d’Ivoire enjoyed  
enviable economic growth and diversification after independence, helped by the 
introduction of new cash crops” (Honohan 1993: 52). But this dependence may also 
have been part of the problem as these exports had little added value and, furthermore, 
profits were “more likely to be repatriated to France thanks to guaranteed convertibility, 
particularly when they are illicit and/or untaxed” (van de Walle 1991: 394). 
Commentators with foresight (see for example, O’Connor 1972), described Abidjan as 
an ‘island of prosperity’ created for the comfort of Europeans and that the country was 
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trading future prosperity and independence for rapid growth in the short term 
(O’Connor 1972). 
So how did this ‘Ivorian miracle’ come about, and how was it shattered? Woods (2003) 
argues that the property rights regime was to blame. Land was freely (at next to no cost)  
available to locals and migrants alike. Whoever managed to produce something could 
lay claim to that land. However, declining incomes caused ethnic friction and as Woods 
explains, as “the over-exploited tropical forest approaches 100% depletion, ‘natives’ are 
more likely to resort to violence and discrimination against ‘outsiders’ to reclaim land” 
(Woods 2003: 463). 
Early Years 
At colonisation, the only export was ivory (Jones and Johnson 1980) and, “[a]part from 
some evidence as late as the 1820s it is generally accepted that the Ivory Coast slave 
trade ceased by 1800” (Jones and Johnson 1980: 33). For the European powers in West 
Africa, business interests were paramount from the outset. And aside from any military  
ambitions, the ultimate goal of conquest was to bring civilised trade and commerce to 
the region to burgeon the home-state economy. Along the coast at Benin, the Porto 
Novo protectorate agreement (1863), Mellacourie treaties (1865-6) and the treaties 
ceding Cotonou in 1868 and 1878 “were all initiated by mercantile pressure on French 
authorities on the coast” (Hargreaves 1960: 103). It is undoubtedly true that, pandering 
to merchants, the French government built strongholds along the Ivory Coast coastline 
to protect trade. In the early 1870s Verdier of la Rochelle was trading at Grand Bassam 
and Assinie and voiced opposition to the proposed exchange with the British of the 
enclave for the Gambia, citing the economic potential of Ivory Coast. He was ignored 
by the new Third Republic’s government but they soon became more sympathetic as  
French politics became more republican and increasingly controlled by business and 
professionals, of which representatives of African merchants formed “a tiny part” 
(Hargreaves 1960: 103). 
By 1900, the economy was doing well and E.D. Morel noted that “the Ivory Coast is 
self-supporting” (Morel 1902: 198) – a situation unique for comparable colonies at that 
time. Bierwirth notes that the 1920s “were euphoric times … a period that saw exports 
double in volume and quadruple in total value” (Bierwirth 1997: 325). Plantations were  
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established in the south in the 1920s and expanded in the 1930s, using forced labour 
(Hopkins 1976). Commodity prices were protected in the French market and Arnett 
notes that the “tariff preference of 1.80 francs per kilo on cocoa from the region, being 
of particular importance to Ivory Coast as exports rose from 16,000 tons in 1927 to 
31,000 tons in 1934 – when Ivory Coast showed a surplus” (Arnett 1935: 436). 
Post WWII 
Robinson (1951) argues that, post World War II, the extent of ‘western penetration’ in 
the Ivorian economy explained its success. A fifth of revenue from the eight French 
territories came from Ivory Coast in 1949, where political activity “of a more or less 
western variety is most marked” (Robinson 1951: 125). 
Cash-crops continued to dominate the economy after WWII, and “the major effect of 
cash crop agriculture (cocoa, coffee) and its accompanying economic nexus was to 
make for fairly sharp divisions between different parts of the country, which coincided 
with distinct culture circles because these cash crops were spatially localised” (Zolberg 
1967: 455). This led to “poorer and richer tribes” (Zolberg 1967: 455), a feature of 
colonial penetration, with ratios of 6:1 in income and 9:1 in proportion of children 
attending school between the richest and poorest areas of the country during the 1950s 
(Zolberg 1967).  
From independence, Houphouët-Boigny was keen to maintain ties with France. This 
was assured by pegging the Ivorian currency to the French franc “and even retaining 
French administrators in the government” (Bartlett 1990: 330). Segal noted that 
negotiations by Ivory Coast with the European Economic Community in the early 1960s 
were conducted with “little or no concern for the possible repercussions on the  
economies of the non-associated African states” (Segal 1964: 77). Here, again, we 
glimpse an attitude of ‘elitist exploitation’. The economy experienced a “remarkable 
high rate of economic growth following independence in 1960, which was exceptional 
as compared with the growth rates of the other West African countries” (Haraguchi 
1994: 79), and grew by an average of 8% GDP in the 1960s and 1970s (IFC 1985). But 
it must be noted that GDP may not be an accurate/suitable measure of the state’s wealth 
as many enterprises are under foreign ownership and there are no limits on the amount 
of finance expatriated by foreign or indigenous corporations. Despite a sharp fall in  
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coffee and cocoa prices in the 1970s – to which the economy is highly susceptible – 
growth remained strong in the late 1970s when compared to other (non-oil-producing) 
nations in the region (Honohan 1993). This allowed Ivory Coast to maintain an above 
average growth and by 1979 the country was the world’s leading cocoa producer. The 
‘Miracle Ivoirien’ continued through the 1970s and “[t]he main motivating factor of this 
miracle was rapid increases in cocoa and coffee production and export” (Haraguchi  
1994: 79). However, there was a ‘reversal in its fortunes’ at the end of the decade and 
troubled times lay ahead (IFC 1985). The reversal of fortune may not have been 
immediately apparent, and “[f]ortuitous events, like the discovery of oil … and the 
sharp appreciation of the US dollar in the early 1980s disguised the burgeoning crisis” 
(van de Walle 1991: 392).  
1980s 
In February 1980, World Bank President Robert McNamara launched the structural  
adjustment loans, or SALs (Easterly 2005). The main features of IMF and World Bank 
SALs during the 1980s and 1990s were fiscal adjustment, price setting and trade 
liberalisation (World Bank 1981a, 1981b) dictated by a general, “movement towards 
free markets and away from state intervention” (Easterly 2005: 3). In 1981, the IMF 
made its first SAL to Ivory Coast in the amount US$150 million; a second and third 
followed in 1983 and 1986, both in the amount US$250 million (Haraguchi 1994). 
From 1982, the World Bank made similar loans available to states that already had IMF 
loans which were “designed to tide countries over until their balance of payments 
positions can be strengthened by changes in the structures of their economies” (Hodd 
1987: 334).  
Some of the conditions attached to SALs included harmonising energy and agriculture 
with world prices and the removal of protections on national industries. These loans 
would prove disastrous for Ivory Coast. Bruce Bartlett argues that any problems 
resulting from the SALs were as a result of “state encroachment into the private sector” 
(Bartlett 1990: 331) – unconvincingly citing the building of a large cathedral. 
Throughout the 1980s government regulation of the economy remained modest by 
African standards and considerable privatisation had taken place (Bartlett 1990). By the 
end of the decade, Bartlett – incorrectly – argued that its economy “… is likely to  
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remain one of Africa’s brighter lights” (Bartlett 1990: 331); however, Ivory Coast and 
other states in the CFA zone “continued to live beyond their means and accumulate 
debt” (van de Walle 1991: 392). By the end of the 1980s, “[t]he cocoa boom in Ivory 
Coast was reaching its structural limits” and since independence 10 million hectares of 
tropical forest had been destroyed (Woods 2003: 648). The bright light was starting to 
burn itself out. The deficit increased to 16% of GDP and debt (of about 14 billion  
dollars) was about 160% of GNP (van de Walle 1991). And “with as many as half the 
banks bankrupt and over a quarter of all loans defaulted upon” (van de Walle 1991: 
392) the outlook was bleak. The Ivory Coast’s liberal and open economic policies that 
had proved so promising over the years were coming back to haunt the country, as the 
“signs of economic disequilibrium were more pronounced in the Zone’s richer countries 
which have more diversified economies and had had access to private capital” (van de 
Walle 1991: 392).  
In 1989, the Ivorian government succumbed to World Bank demands and reduced the 
guaranteed prices offered to farmers by 50%, saving the government a third of its 
budget but resulting in “the sacrifice of the equivalent amount of cash income of around 
500 thousand cocoa and coffee farmers” (Haraguchi 1994: 80) and local producers of 
cash crops suffered dramatically (van de Walle 1991). Cash crops had been generally 
bought up by the government, and this policy helped increase prices and output of 
coffee and cocoa by reducing taxes on farmers (Honohan 1993: 53). This guaranteed 
pricing system would have worked well in a market that is not susceptible to large price 
fluctuation, and did in fact work well for Ivory Coast for a few years – but world 
demand started to fall, precipitating a fall in cocoa prices throughout most of the 1980s 
(ILRF 2002), putting a severe burden on government coffers and pressure on CFA 
parity (Honohan 1993).  
On top of these woes, the oil crises of the 1970s were still being felt, the US dollar rose, 
industrialised countries continued, and increased, protectionism of their domestic 
industries and in 1983 the cocoa crop (by then still the largest in the world) was 
damaged by “extraordinarily wide-ranging and destructive bush-fires” (Derrick 1984: 
285) as a result of drought, which had the knock-on effect of causing power-cuts in the 
“great metropolis of Abidjan” (Derrick 1984: 285). By late 1980s growth had slowed 
and van de Walle argued that the “over-valuation of the franc is today in the process of  
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demolishing the production apparatus in these countries, resulting in a deep economic 
recession” (van de Walle 1991: 394). By the 1990s and the country started to run into 
severe debt problems (Bartlett 1990; Honohan 1993) and the state was “almost 
bankrupt” (Haraguchi 1994: 80). The population suffered from the recession too and the 
International Labor Rights Forum reports that from 1988 to 1995 the ‘incidence and 
intensity of poverty’ doubled from around 18% to around 36% (ILRF 2002). 
1990s 
In 1994, the value of the CFA was halved, “thereby signalling the demise of the Franco-
African preferential monetary and trading area known as la zone franc” (Martin 1995: 
1). The rate had remained unchanged since 1948 and a devaluation had been demanded 
by the World Bank and the IMF since the end of the 1980s (Haraguchi 1994). The 1994 
currency devaluation, as prescribed by the World Bank and IMF in order to make Ivory  
Coast’s exports more attractively priced, “significantly affected the poor as their savings 
and purchasing power dwindled overnight” (ILRF 2002: 8). The government too 
suffered as the devaluation increased the state’s debt burden (ILRF 2002). However, 
this devaluation and the contemporaneous structural adjustment measures, which 
allowed for increased aid flows, put – according to the IMF – “an end to the economic 
slump that had marred the Ivoirien economy for the previous eight years” (IMF 1996). 
The IMF had approved a SAL in the amount of US$183 million in 1995 to support 
economic reform, the main thrust of which was privatisation, reduction of price controls 
and non-tariff barriers and a scaling down of state intervention in the cocoa and coffee 
sectors (IMF 1995). The IMF praised the progress being made by the structural reforms: 
“the privatization program made great strides in 1995, and there was considerable 
liberalization of the regulatory framework governing economic activity” (IMF 1996). In 
1996, the IMF approved a third SAL for ‘enhanced’ structural adjustment which 
included a structural reform programme that called for “a major deepening and 
acceleration of structural reforms” (IMF 1996). 
Bolstered by especially high international commodity prices and the currency 
devaluation the economy grew by about 6% per annum from 1994 to 1998. But it 
became necessary for Paris Club debt rescheduling in 1994 and 1998 (Paris Club 2011) 
and similarly with the London Club in 1998 (IMF 2006). By 1997, Ivory Coast was 
added to the IMF-World Bank list of heavily indebted countries (IMF 2006). Despite 
this fact, the loans continued. 
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In March 1998 the IMF approved another loan “to address the unfinished reform 
agenda”, which resulted in complete liberalisation of both the coffee and cocoa markets 
and “the sale of the state-owned bank BIAO was finalized in January 2000” (IMF 
2000). 
2000s 
After the attempted coup of 1999, economic aid was disrupted. Aid from the EU 
resumed in 2001 and the IMF re-engaged then too. But again, in 2002, crisis led to the 
cessation of foreign aid and arrears on international loans started to build up for the 
government. Paris Club loans needed restructuring again in 2002 (IMF 2006). By the 
time the World Bank, IMF and the African Development Bank resumed lending in 2007 
per capita income continued to fall and had declined by about 15%. In 2009, the IMF 
lent Ivory Coast US$565 million (IMF 2011). In 2009 both the Paris Club and London 
Club debt needed to be rescheduled once again (Paris Club 2011; IMF 2009). 
Despite the apparent failure of the SAL project, the government continues to rely on an 
open economy and does not use tax, labour, environment, or health and safety laws to 
impede investment. In other words, the government may avoid enforcing the rule of law 
if in conflict with business interests. This is reflected in the illegal granting of a licence 
to Trafigura’s subsidiary (Puma Energy) and subcontractor (Tommy) in Ivory Coast as 
well as to the impunity afforded to the company when it contravened domestic 
environmental and criminal laws.  
Today 
While oil has recently become Ivory Coast’s number one export, the liberalised, 
inefficient and corrupt cocoa market is still important and accounts for 40% of exports 
and 20% of government revenue. Furthermore, the state exports (gross) about 115,000 
barrels of oil per day (2005 estimate) and sits on proven reserves of about 250 million 
barrels (US CIA 2011) – reserves that are estimated to last six years at that rate of 
extraction. 
GDP (purchasing power parity) is about US$38 billion. Public debt stands at about 65% 
of GDP and total exports stand at about US$10.25 billion. The state’s export partners 
are: the Netherlands (14%), France (11%), US (8%), Germany (7%), Nigeria (7%) and  
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Ghana 5.5%. Imports are valued at US$7 billion, with the main partners being Nigeria 
(21%), France (14%) and China (7%). External debt is estimated to be about US$11.5 
billion. 
Ivory Coast’s economy is predicted to grow 9% in 2012. It had shrunk about 6% in 
2011, because of the civil war, and the IMF is set to loan the state a further US$612 
million, which will ensure that the country continues to suffer from indebtedness 
(Reuters 2011). 
Conclusion 
The transition of Ivory Coast from colonial outpost to a post-colonial ‘economic  
magnet’ to capitalist states (Shaw and Grieve 1978) based on liberal economic policies 
dictated by Bretton Woods institutions has, it is argued here, created a state where the 
population is susceptible to state crime, state-corporate crime and suffering on a wide 
scale. The move towards an open, ‘globalised’ economy was purposively perused by the 
government. Ngoran Niamen, the then Ivorian Minister of Finance, argued in 1999 that 
“[g]lobalization is a fact. Globalization has been imposed on us. Globalization is 
marching on. The issue is how do we march with it or how will we be left behind” (IMF 
1999). 
The International Labor Rights Forum argues that Ivory Coast is a “perfect example of a 
country where the socioeconomic situation deteriorated with the arrival of the World  
Bank and IMF … [as Ivory Coast was] … a relatively stable country and possessed the 
largest economy in the West Africa Monetary Union, until it began engagement with 
the World Bank and IMF in 1989” (ILRF 2002: 1). The structural adjustment 
programmes dictated by the World Bank and the IMF recommended accelerated 
privatisation, a reduction in government spending, liberalisation of the agricultural 
sector and severe currency devaluation.  
The ‘ill-advised’ reforms resulted in the dismissal of around 10,000 public sector 
workers (Haraguchi 1994) and produced “devastating effects on the poor” (ILRF 2002: 
3) and the International Labor Rights Forum reports that the consequences of the SALs 
for Ivory Coast included, “high economic instability … increased agriculture poverty … 
widespread child labor practices … decline in the quality of education … decline in the 
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quality of the national health system … decrease in purchasing power of the poor … 
[and] … decrease in standard of living” (ILRF 2002: 2).  
As revealed in Chapter 1, some commentators argue that corporate and state-corporate 
crimes persist because the neoliberal system provides incentives to employ illegitimate 
means for profit (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998) and avoids sanctions which would 
threaten the effective functioning of the capitalist system (Punch 1996; Alvesalo and 
Whyte 2007). This chapter has outlined the historical and economic context in which 
the crime under study occurred, and draws out the prevailing economic policies of the 
state, setting the scene for the arrival of large international corporations to take 
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Chapter 4 – Civil Society as an Arena of Struggle 
Introduction 
This thesis in concerned with the role of civil society in sanctioning the deviance of the 
perpetrators of state-corporate crime. Inadequacies in the application of criminal law 
and state inaction to bring justice to victims of state and state-corporate crime (Tombs 
and Whyte 2003) have presented civil society with the role of labelling and sanctioning 
the crimes. The deviance of an act is determined not merely by illegality under the 
criminal law of a state or the international community but also (and predominantly) by 
reference to social harm (Hillyard et al 2004) and violations of human rights as 
recognised by a social audience (Green and Ward 2004). The failure of criminal justice 
systems to deter and sanction the states and (importantly for the purposes of this thesis) 
corporations opens the way for civil society to do so, and Parker argues that “[i]f the 
law itself fails to recognise and protect substantive and procedural rights, then business 
will doubly fail to do so” (Parker 2007: 4). 
Parker (2007) proposes that meta-regulatory law could recognise and empower 
corporate governance standards promoted by international NGOs and other non-state 
actors, and foresees a future where we could see, “international ‘networks’ of regulation 
in which state law, transnational voluntary codes, global civil society organisations and 
so on reinforce one another to regulate corporate conscience” (Parker 2007: 25). 
However, Parker acknowledges that this type of regime “generally only comes about 
through considerable struggle and conflict” (Parker 2007: 49). The ideal of an effective 
meta-regulatory regime has not yet come to pass. In the interim, the role of civil society 
organisations is becoming increasingly recognised, and the ability to censure and 
sanction state-corporate criminal behaviour is worthy of exploration. 
The elements of civil society examined here include NGOs in Ivory Coast and ‘global’, 
or ‘foreign’ or ‘international’, NGOs – sometimes referred to as INGOs. In order to use 
the contested notion of civil society to understand the processes of sanctioning state-
corporate crime, a working theoretical framework is first proposed. 
Defining Civil Society 
Even as it is used as a social scientific term, ‘civil society’ lacks clear definition. The 
definitional uncertainties are further confused by an academic divergence between civil 
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society as a normative ambition and civil society as an empirical reality (Pearce 1997, 
2000). Despite these issues, useful definitions and conceptualisations of civil society as 
a cultural phenomenon have emerged and have been developed through the literature.  
While its origins are murky (Pelczynski 1984), the idea of ‘civil society’ as distinct 
from ‘political society’ is thought to have originated in 18th-century Enlightenment 
Europe in the work of Adam Ferguson (Edwards and Foley 2001). It was later 
developed by Hegel who also emphasised the state-civil society distinction (Hegel 
1821). Hegel used the term ‘burgerliche Gesellschaft’ which can also be translated as 
‘bourgeois society’ – a meaning famously adopted by Marx to describe a social class 
based on the ownership of private capital (Pelczynski 1984). The modern theory of civil 
society is attributed, in the main, to the work of Hegel as developed by Alexis de 
Tocqueville and Gramsci (Whaites 1998). The idea was ‘forgotten’ for some time but 
rediscovered by counter-hegemonic intellectuals in communist Eastern Europe (Lewis 
2001), and in the 1970s and 1980s by social movements resisting dictatorships in South 
America and Central Europe (Trentmann 2003). These counter-dictatorship origins are 
retained in popular understandings of civil society, with Madison arguing that civil 
society is “everything that totalitarianism is not” (Madison 1998: 12). 
The definition adopted here (below) derives from a concept of civil society introduced 
by Ferguson, developed by Hegel and then Marx, and crystallised by Gramsci. A 
parallel modern formulation of Hegel’s work was developed by de Tocqueville but he 
employs normative assumptions of civil society as an altruistic force for good (Mercer 
2000). For Ferguson, civil society encompassed civilisation (meaning a departure from 
our natural state or ‘rudeness’) and the emerging modern standards of living as a result 
of specialisation; his main concern was that increased specialisation promoted an 
untenable diversification of interests that would lead to the fragmentation of society 
(Ferguson 1782). Both Ferguson and Hegel saw civil society as separate from and 
contrasted to the state, and Hegel argued that the solution to Ferguson’s problem of 
fragmentation was a modern, enlightened state (Edwards and Foley 2001). 
Hegel’s philosophically original and ‘problematic’ (Pelczynski 1984) recognition of a 
‘civil sphere’, as distinct from a political sphere (which regulated it) was criticised by 
Marx who sought to eliminate the theoretical distinction between civil society and the 
state. Marx reconceptualised the Hegelian idea of the primacy of the political sphere, 
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preferring to theorise civil society as the site of political discourse and change 
(Pelczynski 1984). Gramsci continued Marx’s work, but reached different conclusions 
based on a Hegelian notion of civil society. According to Bobbio, “Gramsci does not 
derive his concept of civil society from Marx but is openly indebted to Hegel for it” 
(Bobbio 1987: 149). In Gramsci’s view, “civil society was the site of rebellion against 
the orthodox as well as the construction of cultural and ideological hegemony” 
(Edwards 2006: 8); in other words, the struggle that is central to civil society allows 
lower or under classes to challenge the hegemony maintained by the ruling class as 
embodied in the state (Edwards and Foley 2001). 
Whaites (2000) illustrates two visions of civil society: the Tocquevillean approach 
which centres on groups that organise around issues and not ‘kin’, and the view of Jean-
François Bayart which is more wide-ranging in that it includes associations based on 
language and ethnicity. De Tocqueville’s work is based on the premise that a strong 
state acts as a stimulus or catalyst to civil society. However, others contend that ‘strong’ 
and ‘vocal’ civil society can emerge in those states that fail to provide basic services. 
The weakness or strength of a state is not a function of its size, but of its independence 
from elite social groups, who can hold the state to ransom; as was the case in Nigeria, 
Brazil, the Philippines, and Thailand (Whaites 1998). 
Mercer (2000) acknowledges an increasing trend in the voluminous literature on the 
subject towards conceptualising civil society (and by extension NGOs) through the 
theoretical lenses of Hegel, Marx and Gramsci. However, some scholars doubt the 
usefulness of the concept of civil society. This debate is today at a crucial juncture and 
some commentators (see for example Heinrich 2005, Edwards and Foley 2001) argue 
that the concept should be abandoned based on the multiplicity of views applied to civil 
society: “it would be difficult to claim that the concept represents a distinctive 
‘paradigm’ for social scientific inquiry” (Edwards and Foley 2001: 5). While 
acknowledging the complexity, generalities and ambiguities presented by the notion of 
civil society, this study nonetheless finds a Gramscian model of civil society to hold 
considerable explanatory value for the study of state-corporate crime, as shall be seen as 
this thesis develops. 
Van Rooy (1998) adopts a definition of civil society as, “the population of groups 
formed for collective purposes primarily outside of the state and marketplace”, while 
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other commentators argue that it is the political space/sphere which is found between 
the state and the household or the family (Urry 1981; McIlwaine 1998). This latter 
conceptualisation implies that the market, or private enterprise, may exist in this 
political space and in this light Colás argues that Gramscian civil society is “associated 
with the capitalist market and the contest between hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
forces that arise from this ‘private’ sphere of social relations” (Colás 2002: 10). 
Certainly the market, and specifically the illicit market, did enter Ivorian civil society 
but its penetration suggests not the eclectic or plural nature of that civil society but 
rather the weakness of that society. A more convincing interpretation of the Gramscian 
view of civil society entails “counter-hegemonic struggles against the market as well as 
the state” (Pearce 2000: 34). 
For Gramsci, civil society is intertwined with his theory of hegemony (Buttigieg 1995) 
and is “the sphere where the dominated social groups may organize their opposition and 
where an alternative hegemony may be constructed” (Forgacs 1999: 420). Counter-
hegemonic forces therefore contribute to the construction of an alternate hegemony. 
Hegemony, as refined by Gramsci (1971) in his Prison Notebooks, is the organisation of 
public consent, through the institutions of civil society, to the dominant ideology of the 
political and economic spheres. Parker’s (2007) meta-regulation provides a framework 
for the exercise of shifting concept of hegemony; which as ‘cultural, moral and 
ideological’ leadership (Forgacs 1999) is dynamic and, for Levy and Egan, hegemony 
“depends on an alignment of forces” (Levy and Egan 2003: 810). The first force is the 
power encompassed by the economic system (including production, taxation and sales). 
The second is organisational capacity (of corporations, the state and members of civil 
society). The third is the “discursive structure of culture, ideology, and symbolism that 
guides behaviour and lends legitimacy to particular organizations, practices, and 
distributions of resources” (Levy and Egan 2003: 810). From the point of view of civil 
society, the relationship between the second and third ‘forces’ is instructive; the 
organisational capacity of civil society organisations determines its ability to contribute 
to culture and ideology in order to ultimately guide behaviour, and: 
Gramsci’s theoretical approach to understanding the process of social 
contestation can be extended to encompass multiple social actors competing for 
influence over the rules, institutions, norms, and policies that structure markets 
and economic relations. (Levy and Egan 2003: 824) 
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For Gramsci, the elements of civil society include:  
Trade unions and other voluntary associations, as well as church organizations 
and political parties, when the latter are no part of the government, are all parts 
of civil society. (Forgacs 1999: 420) 
NGOs as ‘voluntary associations’ of civil society are “part of the public domain of 
governance” (Tandon 1991: 12). And for Parker (2007), international NGOs and other 
non-state actors may someday complement state law in the regulation of corporate 
behaviour. 
While Gramscian civil society is “the ideological arena in which hegemony is secured 
… the relative autonomy of civil society turns the ideological realm into a key site of 
political contestation among rival social groups and ideas” (Levy and Egan 2003: 806). 
This concept of ‘contestation’ or of a ‘war of position’ is described by Gramsci using a 
military metaphor as he describes a battleground to challenge hegemony. The 
competing nature of the victims organisations observed on my field trip to Ivory Coast, 
and the discourse between Trafigura and global civil society, resonates with Gramsci’s 
theoretical understanding of civil society as a ‘battleground’ (Gramsci 1971; Hearn 
2001). While civil society can be methodologically conceptualised as independent of 
political power, it has a symbiotic relationship with the government (Buttigieg 2005) 
and can access the political sphere. The constituents of civil society are ‘amphibious’ 
(Taylor 1990) – with the ability to operate politically when required. Civil society actors 
that do not take advantage of this political potential may limit their possibilities for 
resistance (Lasslett 2012a). The struggle can also move the other way, “with the state 
attempting to penetrate and control civil society” (Harvey 2002: 205). Gramsci argued 
for a strategic approach for counter-hegemonic activities: 
avoid a futile frontal assault against entrenched adversaries; rather, the war of 
position constitutes a longer term strategy, coordinated across multiple bases of 
power, to gain influence in the cultural institutions of civil society, develop 
organizational capacity, and to win new allies. (Levy and Egan 2003: 807) 
There is no generally accepted, ‘correct’ view of civil society but there is confusion 
between the term as a normative concept (i.e. what civil society ought to/aspires to be) 
and an empirical one (i.e. what it is) (Pearce 1997 and 2000). This study is, at once,  
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concerned with the variance between the normative and empirical descriptions of civil 
society in general, and in Ivory Coast in particular and with the way in which that 
variance played out in the reaction to a major state-corporate crime. 
Edwards and Foley argue that, “as an analytical concept, the contemporary notion of 
civil society and the sectoral models to which it is attached (i.e. the state and the market) 
… suffer from acute definitional fuzziness” (Edwards and Foley 2001: 4), which can be 
attributed to (inter alia) the treatment of civil society and the sectors as ideal, normative 
types. Civil society can be described neutrally as, “a sociological counterpart to the 
market in the economic sphere and to democracy in the political sphere” (White 1996: 
178). However, some definitions assume an idealistic model of what civil society ought 
to be, in that it is expected to provide a bulwark – protecting people against the abuses 
and domination of the market and the state. Harvey argues that the various 
conceptualisations of civil society treat it “as much as a normative concept as an 
analytical tool” (Harvey 2002: 205). The problem with the confusion between the 
normative and empirical views lies in the assumption that civil society is always or 
necessarily ‘a force for good’ under the normative, idealised view; a confusion 
compounded by a misplaced fusion of visions of Tocquevillean and Gramscian civil 
society. Mercer (2000) is dismayed to find that there is no obvious distinction in the 
literature between commentators who adopt a Tocquevillean perspective (civil society is 
a ‘good’ and therefore all NGOs are ‘good things’) and those who adhere to a 
Gramscian one (civil society as a contested space). Harvey (2002) adopts White’s 
definition of civil society as an; 
intermediate associational realm between state and family, populated by 
organisations enjoying some autonomy in relation to the state and formed 
voluntarily by members of society to protect their interests or values. (White 
1996: 182) 
The distinctiveness of this formulation, as Harvey points out, is that it so wide as to 
include organised crime or death squads and does not make assumptions that civil 
society is always a “positive force for development” (Harvey 2002: 205). Furthermore, 
‘some autonomy’ is not equivalent to “complete separation or independence” (Harvey 
2002: 205) and Buttigieg argues that it is an “error of thinking that civil society is or can  
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ever be sealed off from political society and the economic sphere” (Buttigieg 2005: 45). 
Gramscian hegemony too rejects the idea of a definable schism between government 
and civil society and holds any distinction to be purely methodological (Buttigieg 
2005). 
Global Civil Society 
A general lack of literature outside the North American and Western European contexts 
means that comparisons between the North and South
39
 are difficult; and this difficultly 
extends to the fashionable (but poorly problematised) concept of ‘global civil society’ 
(Edwards 2006). The term ‘global civil society’ has attracted the labels ‘fuzzy’ and 
‘contested’ (Giddens 2001) or “an elusive metaphor which doesn’t make much sense 
empirically” (Kaldor et al 2004). 
However, Cox (1993) argues for a ‘globally conceived civil society’ to link social 
classes within the constituent nations. And Tandon argues that “[t]he challenge to the 
power of multinational corporations … necessitates strengthening international linkages 
across Civil Societies” (Tandon 1991: 13). 
There are two liberal-cosmopolitan approaches to global civil society (Berry and Gabay 
2009). First, it is that space between the family, the state and the market where action is 
undertaken for good on a transnational level (Berry and Gabay 2009; Naidoo 2003). 
This corresponds to a non-global Tocquevillean notion of civil society and suffers from 
the corresponding assumptions of civil society as a force for good. The second, 
Gramscian, approach outlines a global level beyond the concept of nation-states (Berry 
and Gabay 2009) and is involved in defining and redefining social orders (Colás 2002); 
but there is no inherent assumption of ‘good’ under this view. However, despite this, 
elements of such an assumption persist in the global society literature (Clark 1995). 
NGOs as Organisations of Civil Society 
Civil society is primarily composed of organisations – such as religious institutions, 
charities, non-governmental organisations (NGOs and international non-governmental 
organisations, international NGOs) and a myriad of community groups – all of which 
are set up with overtly altruistic and moralistic ambitions. Anheier and Carlson describe 
the organisations that constitute the infrastructure of modern civil society as: 
                                                 
39
 North and South are used here to refer to the developed and developing world. 
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voluntary associations, and non-governmental or non-profit organisations, social 
movements, networks and informal groups … they are the vehicles and forums 
for social participation, ‘voice’ processes, the expression of values and 
preferences, and service provision. (Anheier and Carlson, undated) 
The assumption embodied in the quote above, and often made by state crime scholars 
and others, that civil society organisations are inherently a ‘force for good’ is, this thesis 
argues, too simplistic and does not allow for explanations of the full complexity of civil 
society and NGO activity in Ivory Coast. Data collected for this study show that the 
civil society sphere can be ‘hijacked’ and that organisations operating in this space can 
be used as vehicles for the pursuit of goals differing from, and often to the detriment of, 
the organisation’s stated intended beneficiaries. One of the key findings from this 
research is that a range of organisations, masquerading as civil society organisations, 
were in fact engaged in the exploitation of the victims of the dumping of toxic waste 
created and owned by Trafigura in August 2006. The corruption of civil society in Ivory 
Coast was further compounded and exacerbated both by Trafigura’s and the Ivorian 
government’s lack of transparency and accountability. At a global level, civil society 
fared better than its domestic Ivorian counterparts but the struggle to label Trafigura’s 
actions as deviant by international NGOs was met by an effective cover-up operation by 
the corporation. This chapter aims to provide a theoretical framework which will 
facilitate a greater understanding of the modest successes and catastrophic failures of 
civil society in exposing the fatal crime of toxic waste dumping in Abidjan in August 
2006. 
The normative view of an inherently reformist civil society characterises the NGO 
literature (Clark 1995; Hearn 2007) and Fontana argues that “since the middle of the 
1980s, the term civil society has been used as a kind of mantra and a panacea” (Fontana 
2006: 1). NGO literature portrays NGOs and civil society in a generally unquestioned 
positive light but, as this thesis suggests, such a view obscures the ambiguous and 
countervailing impact that civil society organisations can have. As Mercer argues, “a 
more contextualized and less value-laden approach to the understanding of the political 
role of NGOs” is required (Mercer 2002: 5). This overarching assumption is widespread 
and some scholars even go as far as to crudely count up the number of NGOs in a given 
region and “predict a positive correlation between their density and the vitality of 
democracy” (Trentmann 2003: 5). Todaro and Smith, for example argue that NGOs are 
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often perceived to be more trustworthy and more credible than companies or 
governments (Todaro and Smith 2006). 
The World Bank is a leading exponent of this perspective and has defined NGOs as 
“private organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of 
the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake 
community development” (World Bank 1989). This definition makes unjustifiably 
optimistic and value-laden assumptions of NGOs which this thesis argues cannot always 
be sustained. World Bank sentiment is often applied uncritically to the expanding cohort 
of domestic NGOs in Africa today (Lewis 2001). 
Applying altruistic and optimistic characteristics to civil society actors and ignoring the 
possibility of self-serving, deviant and criminal actors provides a distorted concept. And 
as the findings of this research suggest, an assumption that civil society is inherently a 
force for good can lead to a hijacking of that assumed goodwill. In the 1970s, Filipino 
post-Marxists fetishised the idea of civil society and “glamorized a hypothetical 
‘democratic space’ and electoral democracy” (San Juan 2009: 178), but without any 
substantive reforms. Beliefs in the inherent moral value of civil society are prevalent in 
the African context and Sesan argues that civil society in Africa has assumed the role of 
“custodian of the people’s hopes” for a better life (Sesan 2006: 5). Reading an inherent 
benevolence into civil society organisations and adopting an uncritical approach “can do 
more harm than good” (Whaites 1998: 130) as the potential for deviance is ignored. A 
lack of due diligence (at the least) by the state and assumptions made by victims about 
the nature of the victims organisations of Ivory Coast have led to the exploitation of 
these victims by deviant mafia-style organisations, which promised to work for the 
benefit of victims but are actually commodifying their victimhood for profit in the guise 
of civil society. From a Gramscian perspective, NGOs can be seen not only to challenge 
state incursions into civil life but also to reflect and illuminate the more fundamental 
struggles within capitalist society (Mercer 2000). When the toxic waste was dumped, 
the first reaction of many was to organise into victims organisations, of which there 
were to be hundreds (see Chapter 7). The deviant organisations amongst them used 
force, bribery and intimidation to profit from the victims’ suffering. This capturing of 
sections of civil society can only be understood in terms of the political and economic 
particularities of Ivory Coast, which is usefully described by Luckman (1996) as a 
democradura or illiberal democracy. While Ivorian governments are ostensibly  
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democratically elected, election results are normally fiercely contested by defeated 
parties and not infrequently result in civil war. In many ways Ivory Coast resembles a 
‘weak state’, which allows for a larger political space between the state and the family. 
Organised crime “typically takes root and flourishes where the state is weak” (Sands 
2007: 219) and will also seek to capitalise on the “vacuum created by an ineffective 
state” (Green and Ward 2004: 87). It is in this context that data was collected in Ivory 
Coast, to assess civil society’s ability to fill that space and to resist state and state-
corporate crime.  
The propagation of victims organisations in Ivory Coast is reminiscent of ‘civil society 
gridlock’ (Blair 1997), which is not just confusion or disjointedness caused by the 
volume of civil society organisations but the process by which claims on the state for 
services and resources are multiplied, thereby actually contributing to further weakening 
an already weak state (Lewis 2001). 
One of the functions of civil society is its capacity to “label state actions as deviant” 
(Green and Ward 2004: 4) in the absence of the state defining its own acts as criminal. 
Furthermore, a well developed civil society can be “a major constraint on state crime” 
(Green and Ward 2004). Green and Ward’s (2004) definition of state crime is broad, 
and ranges “from trade unions to television channels to single-issue pressure groups to 
revolutionary movements”. While it might be expected that the loudest voice for civil 
society in Ivory Coast, with regard to human rights abuses, would be the local 
community of human rights NGOs (along with local branch offices of international 
NGOs) and trade unions, significant questions were raised by the data collected in Ivory 
Coast in relation to the suitability and capacity of these types of civil society 
organisations to constrain or sanction of state-crime. 
In developing and post-conflict countries, civil society is often associated with the 
proliferation of NGOs (Howell et al 2006) and the idea of NGOs as the manifestation of 
civil society is not a novel one. The World Bank usually sees civil society solely as, 
“the new professionalized service and advocacy groups” (Edwards and Foley 2001: 4) – 
that is, NGOs – and does not subscribe to a wider definition that would include unions, 
community groups or non-profit organisations. Mohan (2002) also argues simply that 
civil society is composed of NGOs. NGOs have been growing in number throughout the  
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world, and have experienced a 2,000% growth in numbers from 1964 to 1998 (Malhotra 
2000). The 1980s and 1990s saw a particularly rapid rise in the number of NGOs, which 
can be attributed to the ascendancy of neoliberalism and the corresponding reduction of 
the state (Malhotra 2000). Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in this period 
required drastic cuts in education and health spending, which provided encouragement 
for NGOs to substitute for government activities (Whaites 1998). In June 2011, 3,337 
NGOs were registered with consultative status at the United Nations – up nearly 50% 
from 2003 (Todaro and Smith 2006). Forty-eight of these were based in Ivory Coast. 
There are two primary ways to categorise NGOs. First, by the type of activity or project 
they pursue, more specifically by orientation: “welfare, development, advocacy, 
development education, networking and research”. And second, by the level on which 
they operate, including local, national, and international (Vakil 1997). But as Vakil 
(1997) readily admits, an NGO may have several orientations and to categorise NGOs 
by level of operation may also be an overly simplistic formulation. Many African NGOs 
have links beyond Africa (Lewis 2001) and horizontal, transnational links imply that 
NGOs do not challenge the state ‘from below’ but are instead ‘contemporaries’ of a 
wide range of civil society and political institutions (Ferguson 1998). But the fact that 
many domestic NGOs remain grassroots organisations, despite international funding 
(see Chapter 6 for details of human rights NGO funding in Ivory Coast), is suggestive 
that despite transitional network links, they may still be forms of resistance to the state 
from below. However, without supporting data, it cannot be assumed that all NGOs will 
challenge the hegemony of the prevailing state. Further assumptions made about NGOs 
by commentators include: independence, trustworthiness and credibility, and the ability 
to assist weak or corrupt states to function (Todaro and Smith 2006). A good example 
of the respect in the literature for NGOs based on these assumptions can be seen in the 
work of Lawrence and Nezhad (2009) who argue that NGOs can, amongst other things; 
better address the needs of the community it is serving … can often bring 
innovative techniques and solutions to regions in need … provide public goods 
to sections of the population that might be socially excluded … the preservation 
of common property such as forests and rivers … teach sustainability techniques 
to people who would otherwise have limited incentive to conserve. They can act 
as an advocate of those who would otherwise not be heard within their own 
nation. (Lawrence and Nezhad 2009: 76) 
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This final point is important from the point of view of a counter-hegemonic struggle 
against the world-view of the perpetrators of state-corporate crime and NGOs. In Ivory 
Coast, human rights NGOs were expected to react to the abuses associated with the 
dumping and to provide the voice of victims of the dumping so that their views and 
experience of the event would become part of the social discourse.  
NGOs in Africa have particular strengths which Shastri (2008) outlines as: strong link 
with grass roots, empirical expertise, innovative ability, democratic work culture, cost 
effectiveness and long term commitment. But the literature is not wholly uncritical and 
weaknesses include: lack of experienced manpower, limited financial assistance, focus 
on short range objectives, political influence, legal obligations, high rate of growth in 
number of NGOs and a high corruption rate (Shastri 2008; Lawrence and Nezhad 
2009). The rate of corruption is particularly important for this study. The data collected 
shows that the Ivorian victims organisations set up in response to the dumping are 
involved in corrupt practices in pursuance of organisations and individual goals. The 
developing critique of NGOs in the literature identifies four main themes: a neoliberal 
orientation; relationships between INGOs and domestic NGOs; relationship with the 
state; and limited theory and research focused on NGOs (Pearce 2000). It is worth 
exploring each of these thematics in some detail to better understand the NGOs 
surveyed in this thesis. 
NGOs and Neoliberalism 
NGOs commonly advance a neoliberal idea that the responsibility and solutions to 
social problems lie within the private and civil society spheres, leaving the poor with 
self-exploitation (or self-help) as the only option to meets their needs (Petras 1997). 
This approach is based on a theoretical misconception that a separation of political and 
civil society exists (Forgacs 2000): 
[I]t is asserted that economic activity belongs to civil society, and that the state, 
must not intervene to regulate it. But since in actual reality civil society and state 
are one and the same, it must be clear that laissez-faire too is a form of state 
‘regulation’, introduced and maintained by legislative and coercive means. 
(Forgacs 2000: 210) 
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This takes us back to a Gramscian formulation: civil society + political society = the 
state (Gramsci 1970). However, it is questionable whether civil society, “has a global 
affinity with peace, democracy, and human rights, or is it yet another Western disguise 
for promoting individualism and market capitalism by other means?” (Trentmann 2003: 
6). Even without an overt neoliberal agenda, there is a risk that civil society is perceived 
as, “a tool for the promotion of democracy, the market economy or capitalism” (Harvey 
1998: 205). Civil society organisations will therefore be, “assumed to be independent 
from the state and a fundamentally positive force” (Harvey 1998: 204). Harvey’s 
critique is aptly illustrated in Ivory Coast where all human rights NGOs interviewed in 
Abidjan were at one time or another funded by the National Endowment for Democracy 
(NED), a staunch proponent and promoter of the neoliberal agenda. 
International NGOs and Southern NGOs   
Global civil society institutions operate within a North-South resource transfer 
paradigm (Malhotra 2000), with funding being the basis of the relationships between 
International NGOs and their domestic NGOs partners. However, since the 1990s, the 
UN, states and even NGOs in the developing world have questioned the legitimacy of 
‘northern’ NGOs to represent the interests of poor people in the developed world 
(Howell et al 2006). Commins, writing about northern NGOs, argues that there has been 
a backlash against them in which they are characterised as “useful fig-leaves to cover 
government inaction or indifference to human suffering” (Commins 1999: 71). 
Holloway (1999) reiterates the point, “[t]he word on the street in the South is that NGOs 
are charlatans racking up large salaries … and many air-conditioned offices” (in Pearce 
2000: 21) and some NGOs in Africa appear to be motivated by profit (Christy 1996). 
While there is debate about the relationship between northern and southern NGOs, the 
interdependent nature of these networked NGOs may not be conducive to viewing the 
entities as truly separate (Mohan 2002; Bebbington 2004). There are links between 
domestic groups and regional and global organisations (for example, the local chapters 
of Amnesty International and Club African Union in Ivory Coast receive financial and 
technical support from their parent organisations
40
) but the majority of Ivorian human 
rights NGOs are independent from other organisations and are, in fact, completely 
isolated from what can be called transnational civil society. This isolation also limits 
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their capacity to resist state-corporate crimes through organised regional and 
international networks. 
During the 1990s, the idea of an African civil society was often subject to enthusiastic 
debate in African politics and those debating tended to define it rather too narrowly and 
idealistically (Orvis 2001). As a result, the debate did not portray African civil society 
accurately: 
African civil society is more rooted in and representative of African society as a 
whole than the pessimists have admitted, but also less internally democratic and 
less likely to support liberal democracy than the optimists assert. (Orvis 2001: 
17) 
The African NGO sector is characterised by external financial dependence and an 
external orientation (Hearn 2007), and this ‘pessimistic’ view is borne out by data 
collected from human rights NGOs in Ivory Coast. 
NGOs and the State
41
 
NGOs may not be non-governmental at all (Petras 1997), as a considerable number 
receive funds from overseas governments to which they are ultimately accountable. This 
can create conflicting interests between the NGOs and the communities that they are 
supposed to serve. Contingencies attached to funding can limit services to a narrow 
range of the community, or section thereof, without being accountable to that 
community. NGO work is generally project based, without any commitment to social 
movements (Petras 1997). The result of the scramble for donor money can make NGOs 
more accountable to the donors than to those they were constituted to assist, and could 
even imply support for economic liberalisation (Hulme and Edwards 1992). Of the 
NGOs surveyed in Ivory Coast, all were funded to some extent by foreign states 
(including Canada, Denmark, Germany, Switzerland and the USA). In the struggle 
between civil society and the state, there is competition for donor funds and African 
NGOs are often taken under government control (Sesan 2006). In Ivory Coast, it was 
reported during interviews that the government had set up its own NGOs precisely in 
order to secure international donor funds. Hearn (2001) argues that African civil society 
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as an ‘autonomous social force’ is a spurious assumption, and may be an assumption 
that any working definition should avoid. 
Theory and Research (or Lack Thereof) of NGOs 
There is a ‘rather selective geography’ (Mercer 2002) of the empirical literature on 
NGOs and civil society. And those most frequently referred to include: Brazil, Chile 
and the Philippines followed less frequently by Bangladesh, India and Kenya, with less 
literature again on South Africa and Thailand (Mercer 2002). This restricted knowledge 
base restricts the literature to the experiences of only a few countries, with a limited 
number of NGOs. Furthermore this literature could promote normative ideals against 
which the performance of NGOs in other countries would be measured, completely out 
of context. 
Conclusion 
Under a Gramscian formulation, civil society is a sphere of society “where an 
alternative hegemony may be constructed” (Forgacs 2000: 420). Human rights NGOs 
are obvious candidates for the constituents of civil society in the state-corporate crime 
context given their potential to label corporate and state actions as deviant and their 
potential to apply sanctions to those deviant actors. Human rights NGOs and victims 
organisations in Ivory Coast might have been expected to propose an alternative to the 
discourse of the state and Trafigura following the toxic waste dumping and were chosen 
as participants for this study. However, as the data analysed in Chapter 7 revealed, “to 
regard [the oppressed, the marginalized, and the voiceless] as tantamount to civil society 
can only result in a false understanding of the complex dynamics of power relations 
within, among, and across States” (Buttigieg 2005: 35).  
The Gramscian distinction between the two major superstructural levels of society – the 
state and civil society – is not organic but methodological. Therefore, while the 
distinction may be analytically beneficial, it does not reflect the reality of the overlap 
between the state and civil society institutions (Forgacs 1999). Bearing this limitation in 
mind, this chapter aimed to synthesise the relevant criminological and development 
studies literature in order to come to a broad working definition of civil society. This 
definition has both empirical and theoretical aspects and can be summarised as follows: 
(1) the space between the state and the family, distinct from the market (White 1996); 
and (2) a Gramscian battleground in which a struggle against the dominance of the state 
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and the market takes place as well as the space in which members of civil society vie for 
position (Gramsci 1971). The empirical element of the definition assisted in locating  
participants for a case-study while the Gramscian framework allows for a theoretical 
grounded analysis of data collected in the field as well as primary documents and 
reports. 
This chapter examined the Ivorian institutions of civil society, and specifically NGOs, 
to provide context to the data collected and highlight the distinctiveness of the local 
NGOs. In addition to the economic and political difficulties faced by Ivorian NGOs, 
which are common themes for African NGOs; the Ivorian NGOs are particularly 
reticent to working with each other and suffer from an isolationist attitude: 
There is no genuine collaboration. In other countries, when governments take a 
decision and civil society does not agree with the decision, they resist 
collectively. But in Ivory Coast, this is not the case.
42
 
Furthermore, NGOs did not assist victims of the dumping in any significant way. This 
was a calculated stance and was taken in order to avoid any association with corrupt, 
government-backed victims organisations – an issued discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 7. 
This chapter proposes that the most appropriate theoretical approach to civil society – 
based on fieldwork in Ivory Coast and London – is the Gramscian formulation as 
adopted by leading state crime scholars (Green and Ward 2004). Gramsci’s articulation 
of civil society provides a useful tool for understanding and assessing the potential of 
human rights orientated grass-roots organisations in defending people against criminal 
actions of the state and international corporations. It also assists in understanding the 
very real limitations and ambiguities of civil society in sanctioning large scale state-
corporate crimes. This study focuses on voluntary organisations, in the form of INGOs, 
NGOs and victims organisations. These are the Gramscian institutions of the 
superstructure. While not without its critics (see, for example, Keane 2003), a 
Gramscian approach to civil society, which places conflict as central is, it is argued 
here, the most persuasive and one that has a strong resonance with the data collected in 
Ivory Coast.   
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Chapter 5 – State-Corporate Crime: the ‘Ship of Death’ 
Introduction 
This chapter explains how the Trafigura corporation created lethal toxic waste by 
processing a cheap oil product from Mexico (Day 2010) and, with the support of key 
sections of the Ivorian state, dumped that waste in Abidjan, Ivory Coast in August 2006 
(an incident hereinafter referred to as ‘the dumping’). The deviance perceived by civil 
society actors is catalogued in order to illuminate how the dumping came about and the 
criminal collusion between Trafigura and the Ivorian state. Coker naphtha, a heavy oil 
with a high sulphur content produced as a by-product of some refinery operations, was 
transported through the USA from the Mexican Cadereyta refinery and was loaded onto 
a Trafigura chartered Panama-registered ship, the Probo Koala. On board this ship the 
coker naphtha was mixed with caustic soda in a rudimentary refining process which 
produced a hazardous by-product. Once the ‘caustic washing’ was completed the toxic 
waste was pumped into ‘slop’ tanks designed to store excess oil and water. The cleaned 
oil was then blended with other oil products to make it marketable (Böhler 2009). The 
destination of the cheap oil product was Estonia, and on its way there the Probo Koala 
stopped to refuel in Amsterdam. While docked in Amsterdam the company attempted to 
dispose of the toxic waste by passing it off as standard ship’s slops but it was rejected 
from the Dutch port – illegally according to the Dutch judiciary (Böhler 2009). 
Trafigura made further attempts to arrange for the waste to be unloaded elsewhere 
before finally deciding to berth, unload and dump 550 cubic metres of the waste in 
Ivory Coast. Trafigura’s choice of disposal method was at all times dictated by the 
search for a cheap way to offload or outsource the waste and Knauer et al (2006) argue 
that the dumping was indicative of what happens when inter alia, “criminal profiteers 
seek low-cost solutions” (Knauer et al 2006: 2). 
The dumping was a complex crime, spanning the globe and involving multiple political 
and economic organisations. Achim Steiner, director of United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP), argues that the dumping was “a particularly painful example of 
how illegal waste disposal causes human suffering” (quoted in Knauer et al 2006: 2). 
The case-study is worthy of criminological study as it may provide some insight into 
Page | 81  
clandestine but potentially pervasive criminal activity. Stavros Dimas
43
 argued that “the 
Probo Koala incident is only the tip of the iceberg” (Dimas 2006). 
This chapter will track the decision-making by both Trafigura and the Ivorian state and 
will follow the waste’s path from off the coast of Gibraltar (where caustic washing took 
place aboard the Probo Koala) to sites around Abidjan, Ivory Coast. The chapter 
combines primary sources (including emails and diplomatic cables released by 
Wikileaks and others) with a wealth of secondary data and the focus of the chapter is on 
the interrelationship between Trafigura and the Ivorian government, and how this can be 
understood using a theory of state-corporate crime. The definition of state-corporate 
employed by this project is set out in Chapter 1. This chapter will analyse the decisions 
made using the state-corporate crime integrated model, which is conceptually concerned 
with motivation, opportunity, structure and operationality of control on three levels of 
analysis: the individual, the organisational and the institutional (Kramer et al 2002; 
Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998). 
According to Kramer et al, the theory of state-corporate crime focuses on “how certain 
behaviours, committed at the intersection of corporate and state goals, come to be 
understood as not-crime, either because they are not named as such by law or are not 
treated as such by those who administer and enforce the law” (Kramer et al 2002: 265). 
The intersection between the goals of the corporation and the state is the central focus of 
this chapter. Both corporations and state governments are motivated by goals and seek 
opportunities to realise these goals. While states and corporations (and any sub-culture 
therein) may not share the same goals, pathways to goal attainment can cross. 
State-initiated corporate crime “occurs when corporations, employed by the 
government, engage in organizational deviance at the direction of, or with the tacit 
approval of, the government” (Kramer et al 2002: 271). State-facilitated corporate 
crime, on the other hand, “occurs when government regulatory institutions fail to 
restrain deviant business activities, either because of direct collusion between business 
and government or because they adhere to shared goals whose attainment would be 
hampered by aggressive regulation” (Kramer et al 2002: 271-272). Therefore, state and 
corporations will share a common goal when the crime is state-initiated. On the other 
hand, with state-facilitated crimes, goals can be mutually exclusive but have shared 
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pathways to attainment. Lasslett (2010) questions the value of a state-facilitated/-
initiated paradigm, arguing that it ignores the fact that state-corporate crimes may be 
initiated or facilitated by a corporate body. In the case of the dumping examined in this 
chapter, the data reveals that the crime was indeed primarily ‘initiated’ by the 
corporation in its selection of and approach to Ivory Coast as a potential dump-site for 
its toxic waste. However, the dumping was readily facilitated by the Ivorian state and it 
will be argued that the fact pattern fits well with the above definition of state-facilitated 
corporate crime. Furthermore, because the focus of the definition of state-corporate 
crime is on the mutually reinforcing interaction between the institutions of the state and 
corporations (Kramer et al 2002), it is not necessary to literally determine ‘who started 
it?’ or determine precisely how and when this relationship (whether direct or otherwise) 
came about.  
The ‘deviant business activities’, that were identified by civil society organisations and 
outlined below, were not restrained by the state (through the law or otherwise) because, 
it is argued here, there was direct collusion between Trafigura and elements of the Ivory 
Coast state apparatus, both of whom were pursuing deviant organisational goals. The 
impunity which effectively followed this lack of control and sanction forms part of the 
crime.  
While Kramer et al’s (2002) integrated-model provides a useful framework for 
analysing the available data to understand how opportunity and motivation factors 
resulted in the large-scale crime, the list of ‘catalysts for action’ (Kauzlarich and 
Kramer 1998) employed by the model is not adopted wholesale here. A lack of controls 
and constraints in facilitating state-corporate crime also forms a significant part of the 
integrated model and can help frame and evaluate the actions of civil society in resisting 
the lethal dumping of toxic waste in Abidjan, an issue that is examined further in 
Chapter 6. 
The dumping precipitated further crimes and the conceptual thread linking this chapter 
and the following two is provided by the involvement of the state of Ivory Coast acting 
as a nexus between the market and civil society sectors. The dumping could not have 
been committed without the collaboration of state actors, through tacit approval and 
collusion. The victims created by the state-corporate crime of dumping are further 
exploited as a result of state-organised crime, again facilitated by the Ivorian state. 
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Throughout this chapter, Cohen’s (1993) theory detailing three forms of denial, which 
can operate at the individual and organisational level, is used to analyse statements 
made by corporate and state actors. The three forms of denial are: denial of the past, 
where history is distorted or misremembered; literal denial, statements of wilful deceit; 
and implicatory denial, “excuses, justifications, rationalisations or neutralisations” 
(Cohen 1993: 110). Denial and cover-up are indicative of deviant behaviour (Green and 
Ward 2004). It is important to note here that denial does not equate to deviance, not 
least because denial is not imposed upon actions by an audience. However, denial can 
be engaged to avoid exposure of acts to an audience in order to avoid or ‘neutralise’ the 
effects of a deviant label. And Green and Ward argue that “deviant behaviour is not 
only that which other people so label, but that which the actors conceal because of their 
anticipation of how a social audience would label it if it became known” (Green and 
Ward 2004: 20). It will be argued in this chapter that Trafigura employees used 
implicatory denial in order to organise the dumping in the face of warning signs that the 
results may be potentially damaging to the health of the local population. After the 
dumping takes place, tactics of denial of the past and literal denial are used to cover up 
the fact that the dumping event took place; or if it did, that the injuries had nothing to do 
with the international corporation’s decisions and actions. These latter manifestations of 
denial are examined in Chapter 8. 
The following sections follow the toxic waste from its source underground in Mexico to 
its victims in Ivory Coast, and examine the decisions made along the way. Using 
internal, leaked emails from Trafigura it is possible to piece together the decision-
making process of the corporation in relation to the waste and its disposal. Using 
official government reports and statements made by Ivorian government representatives 
and others, it is possible to demonstrate how the waste was allowed to be dumped 
without the requisite regard to the consequences on the local population. 
Origins of Trafigura 
Jenkins and Braithwaite notice two recurring themes in the empirical literature on 
corporate crime. Firstly, the worst corporate crimes result from pressure from senior 
management: “organizations, like fish, rot from the head down” (Jenkins and 
Braithwaite 1993: 221); and secondly, “it is greed or the profit motive that is 
responsible for corporate crime” (Jenkins and Braithwaite 1993: 222). The accusation of  
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greed in the latter theme is relatively uncontroversial and most companies would agree 
that their primary goal is that of profit maximisation (Hirshleifer et al 2005). Punch 
argues, however, that while the profit motive is fundamental, there are other possible 
goals for corporations: “to control markets, to damage competitors, to enhance their 
power” (Punch 2000: 255). The former theme argues that the worst corporate crimes are 
a direct result of the pressure brought to bear on employees by management. This 
illuminates paths for analysis of the criminality of an organisation, through 
management’s attitude to behaviour that could be perceived as deviance, which can 
trickle ‘from the head down’ through the organisational hierarchy, using internal 
communication systems. The major shareholder-owners of Trafigura were heavily 
involved in the day-to-day running of the corporation
44
 and were personally involved in 
the state-corporate crime of toxic waste dumping as described below. Pressure from 
senior management can induce criminal behaviour (Jenkins and Braithwaite 1993) and 
corporate culture is often created and directed by senior management. It is to the chief 
executive officer (CEO) and founders of a company that lower echelons of staff will 
look to and take lead from, and Punch (2000) argues that the ruthless domination of 
some leaders can lead to sycophancy in subordinates. Some of the emails analysed 
below display an obsequious tone by Trafigura staff when addressing the CEO.  
Trafigura’s organisational culture and approach to ‘doing things’ (Deal and Kennedy 
1982) may have been dictated by the corporate family from which it was born. 
Trafigura is a corporation that developed from a group of companies set up and 
controlled by Marc Rich in 1993 (Leigh 2009b; Ammann 2009) and was founded by 
Claude Dauphin (Trafigura’s CEO) and Eric de Turckheim, both former colleagues of 
Rich (Milmo and Adetunji 2009). Rich launched Glencore, the world’s largest 
commodities trader (Pidd et al 2011) under his own name in 1974 and he is credited by 
some commentators with the development of a spot market for crude oil (Onstad et al 
2011). Trafigura is in direct competition with Glencore but as former executives in his 
successful empire, Dauphin and de Turckheim experienced Rich’s way of doing 
business. Rich was indicted by Rudolph Giuliani
45
 in 1983 for breaching sanctions 
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against Iran and tax evasion.
46
 He was also involved in deals that breached sanctions 
against South Africa (Milmo and Adetunji 2009) and has admitted bribing officials in 
Nigeria and working with Mossad
47
 (Ammann 2009). Punch argues that it is “possible 
that seeking deviant solutions becomes imbedded in corporate culture” (Punch 2000: 
256) and the data analysed in this chapter shows that Dauphin and de Turckheim have 
employed remedies that have been labelled as deviant, both before and after the 
dumping. Rich evaded capture for 19 years, living as a fugitive of justice, and in 2001 
he was pardoned by US President Clinton on his last day of office (Leigh 2009b; Milmo 
and Adetunji 2009; US DoJ 2001). Clinton (2001) outlined his eight ‘legal and foreign 
policy’ reasons for the pardon in an op-ed article in the New York Times listing various 
lawyers and academics that agreed with him – and stressed an ‘important’ reason as 
being:  
Many present and former high-ranking Israeli officials of both major political 
parties and leaders of Jewish communities in America and Europe urged the 
pardon of Mr. Rich because of his contributions and services to Israeli charitable 
causes, to the Mossad’s efforts to rescue and evacuate Jews from hostile 
countries, and to the peace process through sponsorship of education and health 
programs in Gaza and the West Bank. (Clinton 2001) 
This preferential treatment by the US president points to the powerful connections 
enjoyed by Rich. Senior Israeli politicians, Ehud Barak and Shimon Peres, were among 
those who lobbied for his pardon (Ammann 2009). Trafigura too has links to powerful 
figures, most notably Lord Strathclyde, Conservative leader in the House of Lords, who 
was a director at Trafigura (and specifically at the Galena Asset Management hedge 
fund) until he decided to step down in readiness for the 2010 UK general election 
(Leigh and Evans 2009). 
Corporate Structure 
Trafigura is a large, privately held or ‘close’ international corporation and shares are not 
available for purchase. A close company does not have the same reporting obligations 
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as a publicly traded company
48
 as shares in the company are not available to members 
of the public. Public limited companies are subject to stricter reporting regimes as 
government regulations seek to protect the interests of the public share-holders by 
ensuring information is available regarding the companies’ activities. Therefore, close 
companies are inherently more secretive. While this form of corporation is popular, 
profits can be limited as they lack the advantage of being able to publicly raise capital 
by floating on a stock exchange. To give a comparison of the economic size of these 
types of firms, the largest 223 privately held firms in the US earn about US$1.4 trillion 
in revenues per annum (average of 2009 and 2010) (DeCarlo et al 2010). The top seven 
publicly owned firms in the US earned about US$1.4 trillion in revenues in 2010 
(Fortune 500 2010). Privately held companies may have limited abilities to raise capital 
publicly, but these limitations are mitigated by the ability of the board to maintain 
control of the corporation, as there is no risk of a hostile take-over for example, and to 
keep its activities and standard operating procedures (SOPs) secret. 
The term ‘Trafigura’ is used here to describe the corporate entity that includes a large 
group of incorporated bodies. In the UK, Trafigura Ltd
49
 was incorporated in 1992 and 
was formerly known as Merongroom Ltd and thereafter Raw Material Services Ltd. 
Trafigura Derivatives Ltd,
50
 was incorporated in 1998 and was formerly known as 
Trafigura Brokers Ltd. Trafigura Energy Ltd,
51
 was incorporated in 2001 and Galena 
Asset Management Ltd
52
 was incorporated in 2003 for business related to security 
broking and fund management and was formerly known as Trafigura Asset 
Management Ltd. All of the foregoing UK-based corporate vehicles listed their 
registered office as Portman House, 2 Portman Street, London W1H 6DU at the time of 
the dumping in August 2006 (Companies House 2010). Other main corporate units 
include: Farringford NV
53
 and Farringford Beheer NV,
54
 widely believed to be 
Trafigura’s parent companies; both incorporated in September 1992 and registered in 
Curaçao, The Netherlands Antilles (Curaçao Commercial Register 2011); Trafigura 
Beheer BV (The Netherlands); Puma Energy Holdings BV (The Netherlands); Trafigura 
AG (Switzerland), Trafigura Pte Ltd (Singapore), Trafigura Maritime Ventures Ltd 
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(Greek Branch), Trafigura Canada General Partnership and in Ivory Coast Trafigura has 
the 100% owned subsidiary called Puma Energy (Trafigura 2010). There are 
innumerable further subsidiaries, holdings and memberships making the full 
organisational structure and functioning of Trafigura – and indeed of any large 
international corporation – a complex issue, made more difficult in the case of private 
and secretive non-stock exchange-listed corporations. Harding (2007) defines an 
organisation based on three characteristics: “[A] clear structure, the existence of 
organizational goals which creates a sense of shared mission, and the substitutability of 
the individuals who work in them” (Harding 2007: 39). Trafigura does have a clear 
structure, despite the complexity of the relationships between its member units, and 
displays organisational goals as seen below. When examining organisational crime, 
wholly owned subsidiaries should be considered as an integral part of the larger group 
as they are merely sub-units of the whole – despite the fact that they may be 
incorporated as a separate legal entity. Subsidiaries owe their existence to, take direction 
from and share the organisational goals of the parent company.   
Despite often being misdescribed as Dutch, Curaçaon, British or Swiss, Trafigura is an 
international corporation and operates across borders with a physical presence in at least 
44 countries (Trafigura 2010). Leigh argues that Trafigura’s “operations are essentially 
run from London” (Leigh 2009b) and that Trafigura “runs many worldwide operations 
from a London headquarters” (Leigh 2010) but this may oversimplify the issue of 
corporate directing and overlooks the difficulty of how we define the where for a 
company’s centre of operations. International corporations may purposefully be not tied 
to any one base and can close down, move and set up offices where they see fit, at any 
time and without difficulty, to take advantage of disparate domestic criminal, civil and 
tax legal systems. For example, in early 2011, Galena Asset Management (a major 
Trafigura subsidiary) moved to Switzerland to take advantage of lower tax rates (Leigh 
2009d). But the question of where a company is based is essentially a problem of legal 
construction as most domestic or nation-state legal systems require a physical presence 
before they can exercise jurisdiction over ‘legal persons’. 
In considering the interrelationship which this thesis argues existed between Trafigura 
and the Ivorian state it is important to examine the balance of power which existed 
between the two. Trafigura is the world’s third-largest independent oil trader, behind 
Vitol and Glencore (Davis 2008; Tan 2010), and made about US$440 million profit in 
Page | 88  
2008 (Leigh 2009b), about US$1 billion profit in 2009 (Blas and Sakoui 2010) and had 
an annual turnover in 2008 and 2009 of over US$70 billion (Leigh 2009b; Milmo and 
Adetunji 2009). This turnover figure dwarfs Ivory Coast’s GDP of around US$25 
billion (OECD 2007; UN 2011). The corporation charters “up to 100 tankers at sea, and 
control[s] worldwide tank farms which blend fuel” (Leigh 2009b) and claims to trade 
over 2 million barrels daily, with access to 30 million barrels of storage facilities and 
employs about 2,000 people across the group (Trafigura 2010). Galena Asset 
Management alone is claimed to have assets of US$1 billion (Trafigura 2010). The 
market that oil trading corporations operate in is lucrative, involving large amounts of 
money. On any given day 1 billion barrels of oil change hands on the New York 
Mercantile Exchange, with a value of over US$70 billion (Leigh 2009b). This puts the 
relative financial power of the two organisations into stark perspective – Trafigura can 
earn the equivalent of the Ivory Coast annual GDP in about four months. However, 
financial might is not the only way to measure power and the Ivorian state had the 
ability to issue licences to the corporation enabling the dumping to take place. These 
included corporate licences to the companies involved and access to the state-run ports. 
These concessions are beyond the competence of any corporation and are essentially 
what the state brought to the table in this collusion. 
As a private company, Trafigura’s accounts are not routinely made available to the 
public and are difficult to verify. But there was a “rare glimpse” (Blas and Sakoui 2010) 
into the corporation’s 2009 figures when Trafigura issued its first Eurobond in 2010, 
which forced the organisation to reveal details that it had previously closely guarded. 
This brief, limited insight prompted the Financial Times to declare that “global traders 
enjoy a more profitable model than previously thought” (Blas and Sakoui 2010). The 
form of the model is unclear but the CEO (one of the founders) owns approximately 
20% of the corporation, while the rest is controlled by some 500 senior employees (Blas 
and Sakoui 2010). Therefore, any profits made by Trafigura directly correlate to the 
CEO’s personal fortune. In such cases motivational catalysts for action overlap on the 
individual and organisational levels of analyses under the integrated model; in other 
words, individual and organisational goals merge. This alignment can provide a 
powerful motivational force and may be a driver of behaviour that could be described as 
deviance. The following sections detail the deviant elements of the 2006 dumping, as 
outlined by government and civil society actors. 
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The Ivory Coast Dumping 
As detailed in Chapter 9, Trafigura is a recidivist organisation that appears prone to 
deviance. A deficiency of transparency and lack of cooperation with any authorities 
means that there is very little information available to allow an analysis of Trafigura’s 
other reported crimes. However, with the crime of toxic waste dumping in Ivory Coast 
in August 2006 there have been reports and documentation – some of which have been 
leaked
55
 – that allow for a modest insight into the mechanism of such a large scale 
crime. 
This section relies on a range of primary documentation including the Minton report 
(compiled on instructions from Trafigura’s solicitors and leaked by Wikileaks and the 
Guardian newspaper), the report of the Hulshof Commission,
56
 United Nations reports, 
the reports of the International Commission of Inquiry and National Commission of 
Inquiry (both based in Ivory Coast), the internal emails of Trafigura and internal letters 
of criminal investigators to look at the motivation and opportunity available to the 
company. We first examine the creation of the waste and then its subsequent dumping. 
The section to follow will analyse the role of the state of Ivory Coast in the dumping. 
Mexico to Ivory Coast 
Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) is a parastatal company formed in 1938 when the 
Mexican State forcefully commandeered the assets of UK and US oil companies. In 
2005 and 2006 and for almost 60 years prior, Pemex was the only company allowed to 
explore, produce, refine and sell oil and its derivatives in Mexico (Bogan 2009). By 
2006 Pemex’s revenue had peaked and the company claimed to be “the biggest 
enterprise in Mexico” (Pemex 2011). However, the company was soon on the decline 
and the pressure of poor performance led Mexico’s Congress to change industry rules in 
2008, allowing Pemex to hire private and foreign companies to explore and produce oil 
(Bogan 2009). Up to 2006, the Mexican government received about 40% of its budget 
from Pemex and it has accurately been referred to as the country’s ‘golden goose’ but a 
decline in daily oil production since 2004 (Rodriguez 2010) – from 3.8 million barrels 
                                                 
55
 Reports have been received from international press correspondents based in Abidjan and international 
NGO staff in the United Kingdom. The sources wish to remain anonymous. 
56
 A report prepared at the request of the Deputy Mayor of Health, Environment, Human Resources, 
Public Space of the City of Amsterdam and the Alderman of Finance, Economic Affairs and the Ports of 
the City of Amsterdam. 
Page | 90  
per day to 3.25 million in 2006 to 2.5 million in 2010
57
 – has, despite the buoyant world 
market where oil was trading up to US$100 per barrel, led to over US$50 billion debt 
(Caruso-Cabrera 2011). In 2006, output declined by over 13% (Malkin 2007). PMI 
Comercio Internacional, SA de CV (PMI) is the commercial arm of Pemex and exports 
crude oil and related products, including coker naphtha (PMI 2007) – a by-product of 
the refinery process (TCE 2009). Its stated mission is, inter alia, “[t]o maximize the 
value of petroleum exports” (PMI 2007). This mission was important not only to the 
company but to the Mexican state and Pemex was under considerable political pressure 
to generate profit at an institutional level, compounding internal managerial pressure at 
an organisational level (Kauzlarich and Kramer 1998). An alignment of two levels of 
motivational catalysts for criminal action provided a strong driver for goal attainment, 
each of which on their own could be a factor in deviancy (Jenkins and Braithwaite 
1993).  
In 2002, Pemex refurbished its refinery at Cadereyta, Mexico. In an internal letter from 
Holland and Knight, lawyers for PMI, to a US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA)
58
 criminal investigation agent, it was revealed that at this time Pemex “began 
refining heavier crude oil slate 47/53 Isthmus/Maya ratio”,59 which produced the coker 
naphtha as a by-product. The letter also contained an explanation for the export of coker 
naphtha to the US by PMI:  
Coker gasoline is normally reprocessed at the refinery through the use of a 
reactor to remove sulphur and silica. However, the Cadereyta revamping project 
did not consider the construction of such a reactor (mainly due to budget 
reasons).
60/61 
According to the BBC’s legal team, coker naphtha rarely comes onto the open market as  
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 In February 2007, Pemex stated that they would upgrade the Cadereyta refinery in order to “produce 
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it is usually refined on-site,
62
 and the exclusion of such facilities was an unusual 
decision. The coker naphtha had, since early 2003, been stored anywhere the company 
could find space, in “crude oil tanks, gas oil tanks and gasoline tanks within the 
refinery”.63 After about 30 months of accumulation, capacity at the refinery was filled, 
and Pemex made the decision to offer the unrefined oil for sale on the market.
64
 
This decision was founded on basic economics – storage capacity had run out, and in 
order to continue production at any level storage needed to be cleared up quickly. The 
urgency will have devalued the contents of the storage, thus leading to PMI showing 
prices that were very attractive to Trafigura who purchased at “very low cost”.65 
The commodity needed to be trucked to a suitable point of sale because the relevant 
Mexican and US pipelines only accepted ‘finished’ or refined product. PMI transported 
about 84,000 tons of coker naphtha on trucks to the Port of Brownsville, a deep water 
seaport in Texas, USA and a terminus of the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, located about 
13 kilometres from the USA-Mexico border on the Rio Grande (PoB 2011) where 
Trafigura accepted delivery
66
 (TCE 2009). 
Three loads of coker naphtha of approximately 28,000 tonnes
67
 each were loaded onto 
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respectively (Minton 2006). The Probo Koala is a bulk cargo transporter or oil tanker, 
which sails under a Panamanian flag
72
 (UNHRC 2009; Eze 2008) or ‘flag of 
convenience’. 
In 2006, around 16% the world fleet of oil tankers were recorded in Panama’s open 
registry and about 55% of the world fleet of oil tankers were registered in the ten major 
open and international registries
73
 (UNCTAD 2010). Ships on the high seas are only 
subject to the authority of the state whose flag they fly
74
 and some commentators have 
argued that vessels sailing under flags of convenience have become “nearly 
synonymous with environmental hazards … [as] [o]pen registries do not sign on to 
marine safety and environmental treaties and have also been said to be apathetic toward 
enforcement of international law” (Emeka 2001: 115, 116). Even when the open registry 
states sign international treaties, they “appear reluctant to enforce standards against their 
ships” (Lowe 1975: 108). The main reason for oil-shipping multinational corporations 
to have adopted flags of convenience is simply the maximisation of profit (Payne 1980) 
as they need not bear the cost of complying with international standards (Emeka 2001). 
Furthermore, the open registry states have no incentive to adopt or enforce standards 
that may send a lucrative business elsewhere. Panama receives 5% of its national budget 
from fees charged for the registry and in Liberia (Panama’s main open registry 
competitor), the ship registry earns one-sixth of the country’s total revenue (DeSombre 
2008). The use by Trafigura of a ship registered in Panama allowed them to increase 
profits while avoiding international environmental norms. 
The Probo Koala was chartered by Trafigura in 2004 and, according to the UN 
investigation, had two slop tanks for the storage of “cargo residues, tank purging water 
and hydrocarbon mixtures” (UNHRC 2009: 7). The waste produced by caustic washing 
was stored in these tanks. The sulphur content of the unrefined coker naphtha needed to 
be reduced to make it saleable and the method of caustic washing was decided upon, 
where caustic soda (NaOH, one-third aqueous) and ARI-100 EXL catalyst (cobalt 
phthalocyanine sulphonate) was added. The tanks were allowed to circulate for one day 
and then allowed to settle. The caustic solution, the extracted sulphur (Day 2010) and 
the bottom layer of the naphtha were pumped into the slop tanks to ensure removal of 
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all the undesirable by-products. The process reduced the sulphur content of the naphtha 
by half and it was then used as a blendstock to make gasoline. The slops were reported 
as containing 150 cubic metres of NaOH, 370 cubic metres of treated naphtha and free 
water, and 24 kilogrammes of ARI-100 EXL catalyst (Milton 2006). 
Internal emails between a group of ten Trafigura personnel – including the CEO and 
London-based traders – released simultaneously by the Guardian (Guardian 2009) and 
Wikileaks (Wikileaks 2009) reveal the decision-making process that led to the waste 
travelling from Europe to its dumping in Ivory Coast. Greenpeace France argued that 
the emails show how Trafigura’s management were fully aware that the waste was 
dangerous and decided to send it to Africa so that it could be disposed of cheaply 
(Greenpeace 2011). At the outset, on 27
th
 December 2005, the emails made reference to 
the profit goal that could be realised by the deal: “This is as cheap as anyone can 
imagine and should make serious dollars.”75 But the corporation quickly became aware 
of the problems associated with the caustic washing of such cheap oil: “… 
US/Singapore and European terminals no longer allow the use of caustics soda washes 
since local environmental agencies do not allow disposal of the toxic caustic after 
treatment.”76 According to an email from a London-based trader (Guardian 2009), the 
solution was to employ a ‘floating’ location for the caustic washing, but the problem of 
treatment and outsourcing of the waste remained: “… find a chemical carrier and treat 
cargo on vessel outside US (but we still need to find a company that will take the 
waste)”.77 The first attempt to offload the waste involved engaging a Baltic region 
caustic supplier to take away the unwanted toxic material after the caustic washing
78
 
and they were aware that “…the Caustic supplier disposes the slurry in Fujairah (not 
sure if in a legal way!)”.79 At one point, early on in the exchange, a trader based in 
London displays ignorance of the process involved in washing the coker naphtha: “This 
is not very hazardous in the overall scheme of things, a bit of caustic in some water with 
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trace gasoline,”80 but further investigation by employees of the corporation revealed that 
the options for the disposal of waste from this type of process are very limited: “There 
is only one specialist disposal in rotterdam [sic] they charge $250/kg but not allowed to 
drive across EU borders etc.”81 At this stage the corporation were plainly aware that the 
caustic washing process was illegal in some states because of the toxic nature of the 
waste produced, but management was determined to continue the operations. 
By late December 27
th
 an email is sent to the Trafigura CEO from a Trafigura trader 
praising his innovative intervention on the issue of the unwanted waste and promising 
more cheap oil: 
FYI – following your lateral thought about cleaning the PMI origin high 
Mercaptan Sulphur material and paying a disposal company to process the waste 




The CEO’s idea is pushed to others, along with a reminder of the profits available: 
Claude owns a waste disposal company and wants us to be creative. Graham has 




The motivation provided by this high profit margin is a goal of capital accumulation 
which is often, as argued by Green and Ward, a “highly criminogenic force” (2004). 
The situation by the end of 2005 is summarised by a chemist based in Trafigura’s 
London office (Milmo 2010) on 28
th
 December: 
I have approached all our storage terminals with the possibility of Caustic 
washing and only Vopak Fujairah and Tankmed La Skhirra our [sic] willing to 
entertain the idea, and currently perform this operation at FRCL (Fajairah) only. 
This operation is no longer allowed in EU / US and Singapore. Caustic washes 
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are banned by most countries due to the hazardous nature of the waste 
(mercaptans, phenols, smell) and suppliers of caustic are unwilling to dispose of 
the waste since there are not many facilities remaining in the market. There is a 
company in Rotterdam that burns such waste in a high stack chimney and 
charges are approx $200/kg and could have up to 1000kgs of sludge after a 
treatment operation. Under EU law you no longer allowed to transport such 
waste across EU borders.
84
 
This email clearly shows that in 2005 Trafigura were fully aware that the waste 
produced by the caustic washing process was hazardous. The staff member who wrote 
this email was instrumental in attempting to pass off the waste as slops in Amsterdam. 
Furthermore, the CEO of Trafigura was carbon copied on this email. Punch, in a study 
of cases of corporate wrongdoing, argues that, “some managers, in order to control their 
markets and environments (and for a broad spectrum of other motives), will consciously 
and forcefully employ almost any means – devious, foul, or downright illegal – to 
achieve their aims” (Punch 1996: 1). 
By the end of December 2005, Trafigura staff had described further attempts to dispose 
of the waste with the caustic supplier in Estonia, but the supplier wanted to test it first 
and this deal appears to have fallen through after the waste was tested
85
 (a problem 
which recurred in Amsterdam, discussed below). The authorities at La Skhirra, Tunisia 
were also still considering disposal at that time and Trafigura was engaged in 
negotiations with them.
86
 But as both these options fell through, Trafigura was forced to 
consider ‘creative’ alternatives for both the washing and the waste disposal. 
La Skhirra agreed for the coker naphtha to be de-sulphurised at the port, but this led to 
offensive smell problems, “which caused great distress to the local workers and 
population”.87 From 1st February to 10th March 2006, the company was forced to look 
into alternate possibilities for caustic washing. A large, cheap old ship – “costed [sic] at 
$15,000 [about €12,000] per day”88 and big enough to treat 40,000 cubic metres – was 
considered a good option as there was a distinct possibility that the washing process 
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would erode a ship’s seals, leading to the vessel’s sinking. The decision to specifically 
use an ageing ship for a process that may precipitate that ship’s sinking displays a 
disregard on the part of Trafigura, both for the crew of the ship as well as the ocean 
environment. Another scheme involved converting a small crude unit at Statia 
Terminals (Caribbean) into a Merox unit (Merox stands for mercaptan oxidation, a 
chemical process for the removal of mercaptans), “to treat the 1500 PPM mercaptains in 
the coker naphtha”.89 This option would take up to four months with an estimated cost 
of about US$1 million to put in place. Such a capital outlay was not viable unless 
Trafigura could guarantee a long-term supply of the coker naphtha, which appeared to 
be uncertain in December 2007 according to an internal email of Trafigura where staff 





 March, there was a tentative mention of dumping in an email between the head 
of gasoline trading in London and US-based staff: “I don’t know how we dispose of the 
slops and I don’t imply we would dump them, but for sure there must be some way to 
pay someone to take them.”91 This email was interesting from the point of view of the 
denial of the subsequent crime (see Chapter 8 for further detail on the denial of the 
existence of toxic waste and the dumping). It seems that emphasis was being shifted by 
the author from dumping to paying someone to take it away, absolving the company of 
responsibility. The statement was a kind of implicatory denial (Cohen 1993), employing 
the euphemism of ‘taking’ the waste away in place of the word ‘dumping’. 
The Probo Koala was built in 1989 by a Greek company (Helsingin Sanomat 2009), old 
enough to assuage worries of losses in the event of the ship sinking. The ship was 
authorised to transport liquid sodium hydroxide (caustic soda), which could be used for 
removing mercaptans (sulphur-containing organic compounds) from the coker naphtha 
(UNHRC 2009). At some point prior to April 2006, a decision was made to drop anchor 
off the coast of Gibraltar, “as a makeshift processing plant” (TCE 2009) or “a floating 
processing plant” (Milmo 2009). Trafigura informed the subsequent UN investigation 
that; 
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gasoline blend stocks were transferred to the Probo Koala in the Mediterranean 
between April and June 2006. The blend stocks were treated with caustic soda in 
order to reduce the level of mercaptans. (UNHRC 2009: 7) 
Trafigura sold the cleaned or ‘sweetened’ naphtha for a reported profit of UK£4 million 
(about €6 million) per cargo (Milmo 2009) with total profits of US$19 million (about 
€15 million) (TCE 2009) and then had to deal with the waste contained in the slop 
tanks, which the corporation falsely reported to the UN investigation as “a mixture of 
water, blend stock and caustic soda” (UNHRC 2009: 8). Without a clear and legal 
solution for waste disposal, the corporation turned to subversive means and the 
following message sent to the captain of the Probo Koala showed a clear intention on 
the part of Trafigura to hide the nature of the waste: 
pls ensure that any remains of caustic soda in the tanks’ interface are pumped 
into the slop tank to the best of your ability and kindly do not, repeat do not 
disclose the presence of the material to anyone at La Skhira and merely declare 
it as tank washings.
92
 (emphasis added) 
This is a ‘literal denial’ (Cohen 1993) of the toxic nature of the waste and could be an 
indicator of deviance on the part of the company. The issues of denial and the cover-up 
of the dumping are dealt with more comprehensively in Chapter 8. 
In late April 2006, communications over the issue of the waste material display a more 
desperate tone and emails now bore the subject “PMI Shit”:93 
… we are coming up with some problems regarding treating/disposing of the 
PMI naphtha out of Brownsville. We are now limited to caustic washing on a 
ship. La Skhirra where we were washing/discharging will not let us discharge 
this material anymore, so the ship we’re using for washing is now converted to 
floating storage. We also still haven’t tackled how we will dispose of the 
washings on board the vessel washing the cargo.
94
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In late June, the possibility of offloading the waste in Amsterdam is considered and an 
email is sent by Trafigura’s London chemist to Amsterdam Port Services (APS) seeking 
to dispose of the material as ‘slops’ (Day 2010): 
we would like to dispose between 200-250 cbmsos [sic] gasoline Slops Majority 
is Water, Gasoline, Caustic Soda). This is currently stored in the slop tank of our 




It is important to note here that Trafigura was, at this stage, well aware that the material 
in question was not in fact what is commonly known as ‘slops’ – wastewater from the 
ship. Furthermore, the company was also aware that only Rotterdam, and not 
Amsterdam, had the facilities to treat and dispose of this waste.
96/97
 
APS produced quotes for the offload and treatment of the waste to which Trafigura 
agreed, stating, “we would like to proceed with this offer”,98 giving an estimated arrival 





The Probo Koala – en route to Paldiski, Estonia – docked in Amsterdam at the 
predetermined time with the stated intention of refuelling and purging its slop tanks. On 
the night of 2
nd
July 2006, APS collected some material from the Probo Koala’s slop 
tanks and, noticing a strong smell took a sample, “which revealed a significantly higher 
chemical oxygen demand than it was permitted and able to process on its premises, in 
addition to a high quantity of mercaptans, which was causing the foul stench” (UNHRC 
2009: 8). An employee of APS stated that it was “the worst stench we have ever 
experienced here” (Eze 2008: 352). 
Based on the toxicity of this material, APS then gave Trafigura a revised cost estimate – 
up from €20 to €900 per cubic metre, totalling up from about €10,000 to about 
€500,000 (Day 2010) – for treatment at Rotterdam (Eze 2008: 352). Trafigura rejected 
this quote as it posed a threat to profit margin and ordered the waste to be reloaded onto 
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the Probo Koala (UNHRC 2009 and Eze 2008): “we have instructed the slop barge to 
re-deliver the slop washings back to the vessel in subject due to the high cost of delivery 
and processing at Amsterdam”.100 Had Trafigura paid the full treatment costs, the 
profits would have dropped from about €6 million to about €5.5 million. The avoidance 
of a sensible, viable solution to the waste issue because of this reduction in profit 
showed the lengths the corporation was willing to go to in order to maximise profit, a 
key indicator in corporate crime (Jenkins and Braithwaite 1993). 
The Hulshof Commission found that this reloading of waste back onto the ship was 
against environmental regulations but Amsterdam’s environmental department were 
apparently unaware of this and failed to report the matter to the Amsterdam port 
authority (Hulshof Commission 2006). APS and the City of Amsterdam have now been 
successfully prosecuted by Dutch authorities for this failure. On 5
th
 July 2006, the 
Probo Koala sailed for Paldiski but Amsterdam port officials had sent an urgent 
message to port authorities in Paldiski, warning of a “suspicious cargo” (Eze 2008: 352) 
and the Probo Koala was unable to offload the waste (Knauer et al 2006; Eze 2008). At 
Paldiski, Trafigura offloaded 3,300 tons of gasoline, loaded 26,000 tons of unleaded 
gasoline bound for Lomé, Togo and Lagos, Nigeria and set sail on 13
th
 July 2006 
(UNHRC 2009; Eze 2008). As noted above, Trafigura again tried to offload waste in 
Paldiski leading to an investigation by the Estonian police. There were also attempts to 
offload in Nigeria, and according to Trafigura, “the slops were not discharged in Nigeria 
as it was clear that there were insufficient facilities in place to receive them” (BBC 
2009c). After unloading its gasoline cargo at Lomé and Lagos, the Probo Koala sailed 
to Ivory Coast. Since the tanker did not have a cargo, and none was scheduled to be 
picked up, its journey to Ivory Coast could only have been to unload the toxic waste. 
Further, the company would be well aware that the facilities in Ivory Coast would likely 
be no better than those in Nigeria. 
In an email of 17
th
 August, an employee of Trafigura (Fraser 2010) emailed the head of 
Puma Energy (KN), a local Trafigura subsidiary, stating that “we would like to 
discharge approx 528 CBM of … a mix of Gasoline with caustic Soda and high 
concentration of Mercaptan Sulphur”.101 The mix was again referred to using the 
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euphemism ‘slops’. The email said that the waste should be “disposed properly to avoid 
any environmental concerns or problems with authorities”.102 Puma Energy then 
telephoned WAIBS, Trafigura’s local shipping agent, who gave them a number for a 
‘two-bit’ (Day 2010) company called ‘Tommy’ – the organisation that was contracted 
to receive the ‘slops’. 
The next day, 18
th
 August, the Trafigura employee telephoned the head of Shipping 
Services for WAIBS, to ask him “if it was possible for a ship, before passing through 
the Port of Abidjan, to include in its port costs the costs of discharging the slops in case 
of emergency”.103 WAIBS agreed that this was possible and had been done in the past. 
WAIBS then informed two shipping agents of the specifics of this telephone 
conversation. Later that day, one of those agents informed Salomon Ugborugbo, 
director at Tommy, of the impending arrival of the Probo Koala and told him to make 
arrangements for the discharge of ‘slops’. During the afternoon of 18th August, the 
shipping agent introduced Ugborugbo to Puma Energy at Puma Energy’s request, where 
Puma Energy verified the licences and authorisations for Tommy. Puma asked Tommy 
to make an offer which took the following form:
104
 
Given the high concentration of Mercaptan Sulphur and the strong smell of these 
products, a chemist, after reading your two emails, has advised us to dump the 
waste in an area outside of the city, called Akouédo, equipped in an adequate 
manner for receiving these kinds of chemical products. In order to avoid any risk 
of environmental accidents being imputed to Puma Energy, the ship or to you, 
the Tommy company assumes all responsibility and assures you that a good job 
will be done. The necessary documents will be given to the ship following the 
operation. 
Marpol slops: 30 $ US per m3 
Chemical slops: 35 $ US per m3 
The terms of this hand-written ‘quote’ suggested that Tommy was an unprofessional 
operation, despite stating that they would ‘do a good job’ while assuring Puma Energy 
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that any environmental accidents would not be imputed back to them. This view was 
supported by the National Inquiry (2006) which argued that Tommy had neither “the 
competence nor the technical or human means to treat the waste from the Probo 
Koala”.105 The inability of Tommy to deal with this toxic waste was a fact that 
Trafigura should have known or ought to have known. Furthermore, the offered price of 
about US$35 per cubic metre is significantly less than the Dutch quote, and this should 
have put Trafigura on notice that further investigation of Tommy’s capabilities was 
necessary. The Marpol Convention (discussed below) at 11(d) enumerates a list of 
waste-receiving facilities in each state and includes details of their capacity. Ivory Coast 
is not listed as possessing any suitable facilities and the National Inquiry states that this 
fact was acknowledged by the CEO of Trafigura and the West African Director of 
Trafigura.
106
 Tommy is also believed by some commentators to be a vehicle set up by 
Ugborugbo solely for the purposes of this transaction, and “had just been established in 
July” (Eze 2008: 352).107 Some commentators maintain that Simone Gbagbo, the 
Ivorian ‘first lady’, was involved in the incorporation of this company and Gonto 
reports that he was arrested and charged with ‘offences against the head of state’ for 
publishing a newspaper article that suggested as much (Gonto 2006). 
On 18
th
 August an advisor to Puma Energy telephoned the Abidjan Port Commander 
(‘Bombo’) to ask if he knew the head of Tommy, Ugborugbo. The Port Commander 
invited Ugborugbo to his office and verified the existence of Tommy’s documentation, 
and thereafter reassured the Puma Energy advisor as to the ‘conformity’ of them. This 
appears to be the extent of Trafigura’s due diligence of the suitability of Tommy to 
carry out the specialised operation. That same day, a message from Trafigura asked 
WAIBS to coordinate with Tommy and set out the following details of an operation to 
eliminate 528 cubic metres of “wastewater”:108 
Would you kindly confirm that you are able to make the arrangements for the 
collection and removal of the wastewater and to provide suitable documentation 
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from the slop removal company about compliance with local regulations by 
environmental administration and customs on disposal of the wastewaters.
109
 
The Arrival of the Probo Koala in Abidjan 
With all the arrangements made, “the receipt of the toxic waste had its starting point 
with the authorisation for entry into port of the Probo Koala ship”.110 This authorisation 
was requested from the Port Abidjan Captaincy by WAIBS and was received by the 
Transmissions Agent of the Port in the afternoon of 18
th
 August, who noted the mention 
of “wastewater”. 
At the same time, Tommy attended the customs office and sought the assistance of 
customs officials in the waste disposal operations. The head of this office put three 
agents at Tommy’s disposal. 
Tommy then went to the PETROCI landing stage office at around 4pm to obtain a work 
permit for the collection of slops from the Probo Koala. This office contacted Puma 
Energy for confirmation of the ship’s entry and of the planned operation. Puma Energy 
confirmed by telephone Probo Koala’s entry and the disposal of the slops. The Port 
Captain also confirmed the details. The team leader at Vridi-Gasoline customs also 
confirmed the disposal operation for the next morning.
111
 
The Probo Koala arrived from unloading its main cargo in Nigeria at around 10am the 
next morning (Saturday, 19
th
 August 2006) at the PETROCI wharf in the Port of 
Abidjan.
112
 The WAIBS agent was on the wharf to supervise the reception of the waste 
and stated that “his role involved helping the ship’s commander in his dealings with the 
port authorities”.113 WAIBS stated that the port services agents from the 
Administrations for Maritime, Health, Immigration, Pollution and for the Environment 
all boarded the ship.
114
 The question as to how it was that none of these services were 
able to determine that the waste may have been harmful is dealt with below. 
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The Dumping of Waste around the City 
Tommy had visited the dump facility at Akuédo in the morning of 19
th
 August, to 
confirm that the waste would be dumped as had been arranged on 18
th
 August with a 
Pisa-Impex employee. Tommy had paid 500,000 CFA francs (about €760) in fees to 
Pisa-Impex (AFP 2006),
115
 which is a private company that jointly manages rubbish 
with the Abidjan administration (the relationship between this corporation and the state 
is discussed further below). The Pisa-Impex officer present on 19
th
 August stated that 
his superior had been informed and a team had been put in place in case the dump 
closed before the operation had been completed, but this fact has been denied by that 
superior when interviewed by the National Commission of Inquiry on the Toxic Waste 
in the District of Abidjan (the ‘National Inquiry’).116 
The dumping started with the collection of material from the Probo Koala on Saturday, 
19
th
 August 2006 at about 1pm.
117
 Tommy had hired around 12 tanker-trucks with 
drivers, and “offloaded the sulphurous sludge from the cargo vessel and deposited the 
waste at 18 locations around the … city” (Milmo 2009; UNHRC 2009) during the night 
of 19
th
 August and into the morning of 20
th
 August (Eze 2008). Three of the trucks 
belonged to a company, Les Camionneurs, the manager of which stated that these 
drivers had acted without the knowledge of the company (National Inquiry 2006). Eze 
reports that “Tommy simply poured 528 tons of the waste at 17 public sites around 
Abidjan” (Eze 2008: 353). The waste contained “a mixture of petroleum distillates, 
hydrogen sulphide, mercaptans, phenolic compounds and sodium hydroxide” (WHO 
2006). It has also been suggested by the United Nations Disaster Assessment and 
Coordination that more dumping of this waste may have taken place on 14
th 
September 
(UNHRC 2009). It is important to note that “[n]one of the dumping sites had proper 
facilities for the treatment of chemical waste” (UNHRC 2009) and waste was dumped 
“into vegetable fields, water-courses and outside a baby-food factory” (Goode 2010). 
The first tanker-truck arrived at the dump at about 7pm and left at about 8pm, after 
which the dump was closed by agents of the Abidjan District – some three hours earlier 
than usual. An agent for the city of Abidjan based at the dump told the National Inquiry 
that while security reasons were the official reason given for the closing of the 
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dumpsite, this was a pretext for staff to avoid the odour emanating from the toxic waste. 
Despite the closure of the dump, and an inability to weigh the trucks as a result, Pisa-
Impex stayed there until 3am to assist three further trucks to dump on the site.
118
 Pisa-
Impex, who had originally agreed with Tommy to calculate their fee based the total 
weight of the waste dumped, had to extrapolate their final price based on the weight of 
the first truck. Pisa-Impex say that it is after these four loads of waste were dumped that 
they noticed an odour from the dumped material. A fifth truck arrived at about 6am but 
was immobilised by an Abidjan Port spokesman (in charge of the environment) by 
taking the keys and some parts from the truck. A senior member of staff of Pisa-Impex 
intervened and returned the key and parts to the driver, who dumped his cargo upon the 
departure of the Abidjan Port spokesman. Tommy paid to Pisa-Impex 500,000 CFA 
(about €760) according to a Pisa-Impex employee’s personal receipt book, 90,000 CFA 
(about €140) of which was paid into the Pisa-Impex bank account, the rest being 
distributed between Pisa-Impex employees.
119
 This irregular accounting procedure cast 
a shadow on the integrity of the internal control systems at Pisa-Impex and implies poor 
corporate governance. Wu’s (2005) cross-country analysis (which did not include Ivory 
Coast) argues that poor corporate governance can be a factor that contributes to the 
incidence of corruption. 
By the dawning of the next day toxic waste had been dumped at sites all around 
Abidjan, as access to the city dump had been denied to drivers of the remaining truck-
loads of waste and alternatives were sought: “the other drivers panned out across the 
city and just dumped it wherever they could” (Day 2010). 
Health Issues 
According to the International Commission of Inquiry on the Discharge of Toxic 
Wastes in the District of Abidjan (the ‘International Inquiry’) official estimates are that 
15 people died, 69 were hospitalised and over 108,000 medical consultations were 
sought as a result of the dumping (CIEDT 2007; also referred to in UNHRC 2009). 
The National Inquiry found that: 
Since Sunday August 20, the nauseating odour emanating from this waste has 
spread considerably and polluted the surrounding atmosphere. Because of its 
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high level of toxicity, the inhabitants of the contaminated areas had to at some 
points abandon their homes.
120
 
As well as people abandoning their homes, “businesses forewent commercial earnings 
for a significant period of time following the contamination” (UNHRC 2009: 9). 
The smell was described as, “thick and suffocating” (Eze 2008: 353) and Eze reports 
that in the surrounding area, “eyes were stinging, noses bleeding, stomachs, chests and 
ears were aching” (Eze 2008: 353). Within days thousands of people from populations 
local to the dumping areas started complaining of health issues and seeking medical 
treatment for symptoms that included: “nosebleeds” (WHO 2006) and “nausea, 
headaches, vomiting, abdominal pains, skin reactions and a range of eye, ear, nose, 
throat, pulmonary and gastric problems” (UNHRC 2009: 9). The World Health 
Organization argued that these symptoms were “consistent with exposure to the 
chemicals known to be in the waste” (WHO 2006). Tests of the ‘sludge’ confirmed that 
it “contained mercaptans and hydrogen sulphide, a potent poison that, particularly in 
confined spaces, can cause blackouts, respiratory failure and death” (Eze 2008: 353). 
And the National Inquiry found that “people were affected with various illnesses 
requiring medical assistance and hospitalisations, whilst others, sadly, died”.121 
The University of Cocody study included efforts to describe the epidemiologic profile 
of the people poisoned and to identify their symptoms: 
Of 4573 people surveyed, 4344 people, about 95%, were home during the toxic 
waste discharge. In all, 2369 (51.8%) had signs of poisoning. Sex, district of 
residence, and presence at home at the time of the discharge were all statistically 
related to poisoning. (Tiembre et al 2009) 
Of those surveyed who sought treatment (1,297 – 64.4%), the main signs of poisoning 
were: respiratory problems, in particular a cough and thoracic pains; digestive 
complaints, diarrhoea and abdominal distension; cutaneous (pruritus) and neurological 
(headaches) issues (Tiembre et al 2009). The study concluded that there was; 
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persistence of the symptoms among many of those poisoned more than 4 months 
afterwards … [and] … although the sites have been partially cleaned: the long-
term effects on population health remain alarming. (Tiembre et al 2009) 
The suppressed Minton report, released by Wikileaks (see Chapter 8), was 
commissioned by Trafigura. Based on the information provide to them by Trafigura, the 
report found that: 
The most severe symptoms are likely to be experienced by those living and 
working at or near the dump sites who may come into direct contact with the 
liquid slops residues and high concentrates of gas. For these people, the possible 
consequences are burns to the skin, eyes and lungs, vomiting, diarrhea, loss of 
consciousness and death. (Minton 2006) 
According to the UN report, “[s]uffocating odours originated from the dumping sites” 
(UNHRC 2009: 9) and: 
Residents in areas close to the dumping sites were directly exposed to the waste 
through skin contact and the breathing in of volatile substances. In addition, 
secondary exposure reportedly occurred through contact with surface water, 
groundwater and eventually through the consumption of food grown on or 
extracted from contaminated land and water. (UNHRC 2009: 9) 
With regard to operations on the Mt Probo Koala, the Minton report concluded that 
it is not unreasonable to surmise that there was a considerable quantity of 
mercaptide, sodium sulphate and sodium hydrosulphide dissolved in the aqueous 
phase of the slops, possibly far greater that found in the refinery produced 
caustic waste. (Minton 2006: 4) 
Following the dumping of waste from the Probo Koala, the Senior Examining 
Magistrate of the 4th Chamber of the District Council of Abidjan ordered an 
investigation of its consequences by the Laboratoire de Toxicologie et Hygiène Agro-
Industrielle, Abidjan. As part of its investigation, numerous solid and liquid samples 
were taken from the bodies of 12 deceased people by forensic scientists - including from 
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In March 2007, samples of organs that were likely to have been affected by hydrogen 
sulphide (H2S), i.e. the lungs and the brain, were analysed.
123
 The results ranged from 
2.4 to 18.28 H2S in µg/g of brain or of lungs, above the reported fatal poisoning rates of 
0.8 to 0.92. The BBC argues that there “is no alternative credible source for the 
Hydrogen Sulphide other than the Probo Koala Waste”.124 
Testimony from victims confirms the devastating effect of the dumping: 
We live in the Deux Plateaux,
125
 almost all my family has been contaminated. 
Now I carry the illness, my eyes hurt and are scratchy all the time and they are 
crying. My mother as well, she’s always sick. We go the hospital, but we really 




Another victim from around the same area also complained of persisting symptoms, 
four years after the dumping: 
Ever since that morning I have felt it. I have a headache that doesn’t stop. Then I 
have a chronic cough, it calms down for a bit but then it comes back again. And 
then sometimes my body heats up. Sometimes when I walk a bit my whole body 
gets tired. Ever since that day, I haven’t felt well.127 
These testimonies, relayed to the author at the end of 2010, reveal how that the effects 
of the waste from the Probo Koala may have continued long after the ship left port.
 
The Departure of the Probo Koala 
WAIBS registered a ‘leaving request’ for the Probo Koala on the morning of Sunday, 
20
th
 August 2006 with an indicated departure time of 11pm that night. However, the 
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anchor malfunctioned and was ‘blocked’ or ‘locked’128 and delayed the departure of the 
ship and WAIBS recommended that the Ivorian Tow and Rescue (IRES) be engaged to 
assist and asked Puma Energy to put pressure on the port authorities to get IRES to 
unlock the boat’s anchor, which they did on 22nd August 2006 at about 1pm, “upon the 
Port’s insistence”.129 The National Inquiry argued that Bombo had insisted that IRES fix 
the anchor so that the Probo Koala could leave quickly.
130
 Here, the Port Commander is 
engaged in what Cohen (1993) would call implicatory denial and at an organisational 
level the role of the Probo Koala is “subjected to cultural reconstruction” (Cohen 1993: 
110). That is, the Port Commander employed both ‘technical and legalistic’ (Cohen 
1993) terminology to justify the departure.  
Before the ship’s departure, the director of the Ivorian Anti-Pollution Centre (CIAPOL) 
received results of the preliminary analysis of the tests of the samples and confirmed the 
presence of toxic waste and began the process of immobilising the Probo Koala. 
However, an oil tanker cannot easily be contained by force and the cooperation of the 
captain of the ship is required. The captain of the Probo Koala insisted that only Bombo 
could prevent the ship from leaving. The CIAPOL director went to the Commander of 
the Port’s office to ask for help in stopping the departure but the commander insisted 
that the state Public Prosecutor be summoned first in order to block the Probo Koala. 
The CIAPOL director asked for half an hour to do so, to which Bombo replied: 
At any rate, blocking a boat is very expensive and necessitates appropriate 




The CIAPOL director then requested a meeting with the General Director of the Port 
Authority, Marcel Gossio. Upon arrival at the General Director’s office, the 
Commander of the Port, Bombo was already there. The CIAPOL director made a 
request to immobilise the Probo Koala. Gossio asked for Bombo’s opinion, who stated 
that “the ship was not at fault and thus could only be blocked at the request of the Public 
Prosecutor”.132 According to the CIAPOL director, Gossio then stated “you heard it, go 
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and get the DA order or there is nothing I can do”.133 To which Bombo added, “at any 
rate the Probo Koala ship is already on its way”.134 
The General Director of PETROCI stated that he too was “unable to block the Probo 
Koala, despite several attempts to do so”.135 The General Director of PETROCI and the 
President of SIR Administrative Services had made repeated attempts to make contact 
with Gossio to ask him to prevent the Probo Koala leaving but were told by his 
personal secretary that he was unavailable. It is clear from the testimony outlined above 
that the Probo Koala – effectively a crime scene – was allowed to depart despite calls 
from various state agencies to block the ship as a result of the collusion between the 
Commander and the Director of the Port. 
Deviance of the Trafigura Corporation and its Subsidiaries 
Despite the evidence presented in the above section, Trafigura deny any connection 
between their company, the dumping and the resultant human suffering and have 
instituted a widespread cover-up operation (see Chapter 8 for full details). Greenpeace 
Nederland argues that it is “a scandal that to this day the company denies guilt and 
through law firms and PR agencies trying to cover up the facts” (Harjono 2009). 
Trafigura’s wholly owned subsidiary, Puma Energy, also played a significant role in the 
dumping. The Assistant General Administrator of Puma Energy told the National 
Inquiry that he was not involved in the “illicit transfer of toxic waste”,136 and reasoned 
that “Puma Energy CI’s activities … did not have anything to do with Trafigura’s 
commercial operations”.137 However, based on shipping agents for WAIBS’ testimony 
to the National Inquiry, “[the Assistant General Administrator of Puma Energy] took an 
active part in the phase of the illicit transfer of toxic waste which involved the Cote 
d’Ivoire”.138 Further, as noted above, the Assistant General Administrator of Puma 
Energy was at the meeting with Tommy where he received a hand-written quote for the 
offloading of waste which he transmitted directly to Trafigura.
139
 The National Inquiry 
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stated that he “played a determining role in the operations of transferring and dumping 
the toxic waste in Abidjan”.140 
It seems clear, as Dimas argued, that “an illegal shipment of European toxic waste 
caused health and environmental havoc among the population” (Dimas 2006) and the 
health effects described above are clear violations of the human rights of the local 
population. The pressure this incident placed on the health facilities also had foreseeable 
knock-on effects, crippling an already stretched service. A University of Cocody
141
 





 August and that “numerous cases of poisoning were reported to the 
health authorities, who were unprepared for such a problem” (Tiembre et al 2009), and 
health centres were faced with double their normal workload in the weeks ahead, “such 
that regular consultations have all-but-ceased” (WHO 2006). In one day – 11th 
September 2006 – in the Cocody neighbourhood, over 1,000 people visited the local 
teaching hospital. And the Yopougon teaching hospital and Akouedo Health Centre 
reported that 600 and 300 people (respectively) were attending daily, “including many 
children and young infants” (WHO 2006). The WHO report stated that: 
The overwhelming numbers of people seeking medical attention because of this 
chemical waste are severely disrupting medical services and have resulted in 
shortages of medicines. This has put a double burden on the already weak health 
system of Cote d’Ivoire. This crisis has shown that the country does not have the 
capacity to deal with such an emergency. (WHO 2006) 
The UN Special Rapporteur’s (the Special Rapporteur) investigation uncovered 
deviance, without calling it such, and identified problems with “specific elements of due 
diligence in relation to the dumping of the waste from the Probo Koala in Abidjan” 
(UNHRC 2009: 7). These problems relate to: 
(a) Full disclosure of and clarity on the composition of the Probo Koala’s slop 
tanks and destination for disposal prior to the unloading of the waste; 
(b) Evaluation of port reception capacities and waste disposal facilities in terms 
of environmentally sound waste treatment prior to the unloading of the waste; 
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(c) Remedial action after the dumping of the waste 
(UNHRC 2009: 17) 
The first two issues have each attracted a label of deviance by a variety of audiences. 
Firstly, according to the Hulshof Commission (2006), the waste was described as a 
“mixture of tank washing, petrol and caustic soda”, “oily tank washings and cargo 
residues”, “watery cleaning liquids” and “waste from steam degreasing” (quoted in 
UNHRC 2009: 17). The UN report notes that upon arrival in Abidjan, Trafigura called 
the waste “chemical waste water” (UNHRC 2009: 17). The UN Special Rapporteur 
argues that this shows a lack of transparency: “the discretion with which different 
descriptions were used appears to be broad and not conducive to transparent decision-
making on the treatment of potentially toxic waste” (UNHRC 2009: 17). The PMI 
product, as stated by Trafigura, “has 1500ppm Mercaptans, high Gums, H2S, Cu 
Corrosion and low oxidation stability”142 and the Minton report adds: “the slop/residue 
waste discharged from the vessel is likely to have contained very high concentrations of 
noxious sulphur compounds” (Minton 2006: 5). It is clear from both these sources as 
well as from the emails analysed above that Trafigura did not consider that the slop 
tanks contained merely ‘wastewater’ and were denying the harmful potential of the 
cargo. 
The second problem noted by the Special Rapporteur (UNHRC 2009) relates to 
Trafigura’s investigation of the suitability of Abidjan Port to receive this type of waste. 
Having been refused the possibility of treating the waste in Amsterdam, because of a 
lack of appropriate facilities, the Special Rapporteur argued that “the onus would be on 
Trafigura to show in what way the port of Abidjan would be equally or better equipped 
to process the waste” (UNHRC 2009: 17). The Basel Convention secretariat mandated 
mission found that the Abidjan port was, “… not equipped with the necessary facilities 
for the offloading and treatment of wastes covered by the MARPOL Convention” 
(referred to in UNHRC 2009: 17). Further to the facilities at the port, the Special 
Rapporteur looked too at the companies that were available to take the waste and 
process it: “At the time of the events, the port of Abidjan reportedly had only one 
experienced de-slopping service provider, the company Ivoirienne des Techniques des 
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Energies (ITE) … [and] … the exercise of due diligence would seem to suggest that ITE 
was the only viable option in this particular case” (UNHRC 2009: 17). 
These failures of due diligence are recognised in the internal emails of Trafigura. As 
early as 27
th
 December 2005, they admit that they don’t know much about the process 
and state that they “… need to list locations that allow caustic washing – if [name 
redacted] hadn’t informed us we still wouldn’t know about it – as I don’t think we have 
scratched the surface of caustic washing yet”.143 And on the issue of finding an 
appropriate company to deal with the waste, they seem to be aware that this too will 
require some level of due diligence: “We should also be talking to specialist Chemical 
clean up companies about the process of clean up afterwards if that is the rate 
determining step.”144 It is no surprise then, that the UN Special Rapporteur finds a lack 
of due diligence in hiring an inexperienced company in Abidjan to take on the waste: 
Tommy … was only created shortly prior to the arrival of the Probo Koala and 
had neither previous experience with waste treatment nor adequate facilities, 
equipment and expertise to treat waste. It is of concern to the Special Rapporteur 
that these shortcomings do not appear to have been taken into consideration by 
Trafigura. (UNHRC 2009) 
The process of caustic washing is not new, but it is out of favour due to the hazardous 
waste it produces, and is banned in the US, European Union and Singapore for that 
reason: “Refineries used to wash with caustic soda back in the bad old days but it’s a 
really dirty old-fashioned process” (John Atherton quoted in TCE 2009). There are only 
a limited number of refineries today (as listed in the Basel/MARPOL conventions) that 
process this “very hazardous” waste, containing both sodium hydroxide and hydrogen 
sulphide (TCE 2009). 
According to its International Chemical Safety Card (ICSC), sodium hydroxide causes 
burns when touched directly and burns the lungs when inhaled and exposure can result 
in nausea, headaches, and respiratory problems. The ICSC lists unconsciousness and 
death as possible effects of hydrogen sulphide.
145
 The BBC claim to have seen an 
analysis by the Dutch authorities which reveals the toxic waste to be lethal. They quote 
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John Hoskins from the Royal Society of Chemistry who stated that it would “bring a 
major city to its knees” (Jones and MacKean 2009) and report that the waste included 
“tons of phenols which can cause death by contact, tons of hydrogen sulphide, lethal if 
inhaled in high concentrations, and vast quantities of corrosive caustic soda and 
mercaptans” (Jones and MacKean 2009). As for the problem of ‘remedial action’ 
following the dumping (UNHRC 2009), it appears that no comprehensive clear up was 
undertaken (Tiembre et al 2009) and Trafigura denies that it has responsibility for any 
such operation. 
The question of whether the actions by Trafigura amounted to organisational deviance 
goes beyond those problems raised by the Special Rapporteur’s (UNHRC 2009) report 
and must be fully addressed. How has the dumping breach institutionalised rules? Have 
the company’s “actions been labelled deviant by national and international civil society 
organisations”? Furthermore, have these organisations “attempted to institute sanctions” 
against the company? (Green and Ward 2004: 42). 
Institutionalised Rules 
The dumping of the toxic waste has been considered by many commentators to breach 
European and international rules designed to avoid harmful consequences for people 
and the environment. The transgressions include violations of criminal law and of 
human rights and environmental treaties. 
The main legal, institutionalised rules come from international treaties, regional 
(African) treaties, European Directives and local domestic law. Eze (2008) argues that 
the incident in Abidjan “constitutes a litmus test for the existing international 
instruments, revealing their strengths and weaknesses” (Eze 2008: 351). In this case the 
results of the litmus test showed mainly weaknesses, and as argued by Dimas, “[s]uch 
highly toxic waste should have never left the European Union. European and 
international laws were broken” (Dimas 2006). 
According to a BBC legal team,
146
 the waste produced by the onboard caustic washing 
fell within Regulation 3(1)(A) of Marpol
147
 Annex II (as interpreted under Appendix 1 
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of Annex 2) and Regulation 5 of Marpol Annex II.
148
 Regulation 5 requires the disposal 
of Regulation 3(1)(A) waste to a suitable reception facility and no such facility was 
available in Abidjan. The BBC further argued that the waste was covered by the Basel 
Convention
149
 under Annex 1,
150
 as it had properties as listed in Annex III.
151/152
 No 
notice of the importation of the presence of waste was given under Article 6 of the Basel 
Convention, and was therefore illegal.
153
 The National Inquiry argued that the waste 
should have received special treatment under Article 13.
154
 The Basel Convention had 
been specifically designed to prevent incidents such as the one under study here, 
specifically to prevent transfer of hazardous waste from developed to less developed 
countries, and the preamble to the treaty states that the signatories are “Concerned about 
the problem of illegal transboundary traffic in hazardous wastes [and] the limited 
capabilities of the developing countries to manage hazardous wastes.”155 
Similarly, no notice of the importation was given as required by Article 9 of the 
Bamako Convention,
156
 and was therefore illegal.
157
 The case has also shown failures of 
the institutional and operational systems implemented by these international treaties and 
designed to prevent the dumping of toxic waste. For example, under the Basel 
regulations, the German authorities should have been notified of the ship’s passage 
through its waters (Knauer et al 2006). 
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The dumping would have been illegal in Europe under Council Directive 91/689/EEC 
on hazardous waste as amended by Commission Directive 94/31/EC
158
 and Council 
Directive 99/31/EC of 26 April 1999 on the landfill of waste. While these directives 
have no direct legal effect in Ivory Coast, they would be well known to Trafigura which 
has an extensive presence in Europe. The objectives of these directives to prevent harm 
would also be well known to Trafigura executives and any violation would be a clear 
breach of institutionalised rules. 
Domestic, Ivory Coast Law S8-651 of 1988 prohibits the importation, deposit or storage 
of industrial toxic waste.
159
 This law was clearly violated and the mechanism by which 
the relevant authorities did not carry out their duties in examined below.  
On the institutional level of analysis, the export and movement of toxic waste around 
the world illegally is a “thriving business” (Eze 2008: 351) and an “infamous trade” 
(Eze 2008: 351), and Dimas estimates that “up to half of the sea transports of hazardous 
materials could be illegal” (quoted in Helsingin Sanomat 2009). Eze argues that the 
incident also shows “a drastic lack of capacity of a large number of countries to manage 
waste in an environmentally sound manner” (Eze 2008: 351). The evidence suggests 
that opportunities to commit these types of organisational crimes are plentiful and that 
the legal enforcement of constraints and controls are deficient. 
To summarise, the deviant and illegal acts of Trafigura include: forgery of documents; 
concealing the nature of the waste in Amsterdam, Lagos and Abidjan; attempts to dump 
toxic waste in Nigeria (and the proposed use of a barge from Togo returning to Lagos 
under a different name – see below); employing the services of Tommy when the 
company clearly had no experience in dealing with toxic waste, and requesting false 
invoices from Tommy; and quickly departing the port to avoid exposure to censure or 
sanctions once the dumping had taken place. 
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Deviance of the Trafigura Corporation’s Subcontractors 
Compagnie Tommy SARL registered its company statutes in Abidjan on 24
th 
May 2006 
and they contain Tommy’s objectives,160 which make no mention of waste management. 
The company’s route into the waste management business was through a series of 
licences and authorisations by multiple sub-units of the Ivorian state. On 9
th 
June, 
Tommy submitted an application for a maritime chandler licence to the General 
Direction of Maritime and Port Affairs. On 23
rd June, Tommy’s licence was approved 
and transmitted to the Transport Minister, who signed it on 12
th 
July 2006. On 20
th
 July, 
Tommy applied to the General Director of the Port Autonome of Abidjan (PAA) for 
authorisation to collect and remove oil and waste from ships and on 9
th
 August was 
granted the authorisation to be in practice in the Abidjan Port by Bombo, the Port’s 
Harbourmaster Commander.
161
 The National Inquiry felt that Tommy was an 
organisation specially incorporated to receive this toxic waste and argued that: 
The speed with which Tommy’s license and authorization to practise in the port 
was obtained is unsettling and appears to be a fraudulent collusion … [and]… 
the Tommy Company had all the appearances of a cover company created 
specifically for the circumstance … and … it is undeniable that Ugborugbo was 
the principal author of the toxic waste dumping in the Abidjan district.
162
 
Before the clean-up operation ordered by CIAPOL on 23
rd
 August, Tommy – at the 
request of Pisa-Impex – poured 96 litres of cresyl-pure over the waste at Akuédo, “in an 
attempt to dissipate the smell”.163 This was repeated on 24th and 25th August and can be 
viewed as an attempt to hide the waste itself, literally to cover it up. Once this operation 
had been completed, Puma Energy, WAIBS and Tommy met and Puma Energy and 
Tommy were asked to provide a bill for 10 million CFA for work done and provide 
another one for 100 million CFA, “in order to conform with international standards”.164 
This fake invoice was an attempt to feign conformity with the law and can be 
understood as a prima facie indication of criminal behaviour. 
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Pisa-Impex was founded in the 1990s to lease construction plant equipment and is 
headquartered in Yopougon, a neighbourhood of Abidjan. In 1999 and 2002, the 
company was awarded the contract for the management of the Akuédo dump.
165
 
Without any sufficient controls or oversight put in place by the contract, Pisa-Impex 
was able to contract for private waste to be dumped at Akuédo and the National Inquiry 
found that; 
… the Pisa-Impex agents who manage the Akuedo dump were in grave violation 
of the public service conceding contract clauses and without any control from 
the Abidjan District. The Commission also notes that the company Pisa-Impex 
has no expertise to manage a dump like Akuedo.
166
 
Tommy paid 500,000 CFA to an agent of Pisa-Impex who said he used half to repair a 




The criminogenic relationships between Trafigura and its subsidiaries and 
subcontractors are clear. The oil trader used its local subsidiary and agents to find a 
solution to a problem that had been pre-occupying them for months and they colluded 
with the larger organisations to commit the crime. 
As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, the crimes under study in Ivory Coast are 
not limited to Trafigura and its subsidiaries and agents; the state’s role is crucial in 
understanding the mechanics of a state-corporate crime. The waste was repelled from 
the states of Estonia and Nigeria before arriving in Ivory Coast, where it was apparently 
welcomed. Trafigura avoided dumping in Nigerian waters because, as stated in an email 
of 10
th
 August, to do so would have had “potential implications on us”;168 meaning that 
the effects of the waste on the environment or the local population could be negatively 
imputed to Trafigura. When it became clear that the company receiving the waste was 
not happy to take delivery in international waters, Trafigura stated that “[i]n this 
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instance due to the nature of the slops on board I would prefer the slop to be discharged 
in a different port other than Lagos if possible”.169 This reveals that Trafigura was 
concerned that dumping in Nigeria could be traced back to the company and would have 
implications for their business. Furthermore, Trafigura’s CEO reportedly suggested that 
they try to smuggle the waste into Nigeria: “I spoke to [Trafigura’s CEO] … go to 
Lome [sic], charter a barge and bring it back to Nigeria for Daddo [Marine Services] 
under a different name.”170 Nigeria is Africa’s largest oil producer and one of the 
world’s largest oil producers171 and the company would not want to sully its relationship 
with the Nigerian state. The Nigeria oil industry has “received considerable attention in 
academic literature or from human rights organisations” (Green and Ward 2004: 30). A 
less commercially important and more vulnerable state, Togo, was chosen as the next 
target for the waste and an email dated 15
th
 August stated, “see if they can arrange for a 
barge to pick up the slops, preferably offshore Lome [sic] or as far as possible offshore 
Nigeria and within international waters”.172 Trafigura stated a preference for the security 
provided by the legal regime applied to international waters, again indicating an 
awareness that their actions could be labelled deviant. The reason that international 
waters would be a preferable location to transfer the waste is that the local domestic 
laws of Nigeria would not apply, implying that the corporation was aware that what 
they were doing was likely to be illegal. 
An email from Comoditex
173
 to the captain of the Probo Koala dated 15
th
 August stated, 
“they will only be able to arrange for a barge to de-slop in Nigerian waters … He will 
also ensure that we get proper paperwork for receipt of slops.”174 The next day, 16th 
August, an email outlines that if the waste must be offloaded by Daddo Maritime 
Services, then Trafigura must receive documentation to show that the cargo had been 
cleared: 
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Understand and share your concerns about doing this in Nigerian waters. If we 
can not manage to convince Daddo to do it outside Nigeria then please make 
sure that Daddo understand that we do not want any issues and proper clearances 




However, Trafigura’s CEO was not happy with such an operation as it could potentially 
be traced back to Trafigura and it is called off later that day: 
Dude, pls call CD [Trafigura’s CEO]. I spoke to him yesterday and he said no to 
any such operation in Nigeria.
176
 
The following day, Trafigura contacted its subsidiary in Ivory Coast to arrange disposal 
of the waste. But what is it about the character of the Ivorian state that allowed the 
waste to be dumped there when it had proved so difficult elsewhere? The next section 
will look at the deviance of the Ivorian state. 
Deviance of the Ivorian State 
The state of Ivory Coast has a history of neopatrimonial rule since independence, 
moving from the stability and legitimacy enjoyed by the long-standing leader 
Houphouët-Boigny to the more unstable, ‘predatory’ type of state embodied by Laurent 
Gbagbo’s administration. The Ivorian state is fragmented, in the sense that constituent 
sub-units do not work in any coherent manner or follow shared goals. 
Green and Ward argued that any state “does not always or even in the majority of cases 
act as a unitary force” (Green and Ward 2004: 5). This was undoubtedly true of the 
aftermath of the dumping. The main governmental sub-units involved in the present 




The director of the National Institute for Public Hygiene told the National Inquiry that 
his three-person team
178
 boarded the Probo Koala on 19
th
 August and verified the ship’s 
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documentation and checked its general condition. He states that they found that nothing 
was out of the ordinary and “neither did they smell anything in particular”.179 
The Port’s Police Commissioner told the National Inquiry that the police agents who 
boarded the Probo Koala reported that nothing was out of order.  
The director of Territory Surveillance stated that his agents boarded the ship and 
checked the ship’s papers, which declared only slops and that their responsibility was 
thus limited to operations related to unloading slops. He stated that his officers “were 
never informed of the dangerous nature of the Probo Koala’s cargo”.180 
The head of Abidjan’s Port Surveillance Department stated that his department does not 
intervene with transactions unless there are foodstuffs involved.
181
 
The commander of the Port Security Sector of the National Police stated that since 
2002, following a meeting at the General Secretariat of the Port, his agents are no longer 
authorised to board ships.
182
 
The director of Navigation and the Coastguard stated that the General Director of 
Maritime and Port Affairs suspended the Maritime Police’s activities183 in 2004 in order 
to avoid ‘agent abuse’, and therefore his agents will only board a ship to locate defects 
in the ship and to check any equipment’s suitability in accordance with International 
Maritime Organization standards. In this case, his agents “did not detect any defects 
likely to cause any accidents in the sea”.184 And he stated that his department was “not 
alerted to any particular security or pollution problems”.185 This exchange suggested 
that the corruption (or perceived corruption) of the Maritime Police created a situation 
which precluded them from effectively carrying out their duties. 
The oil storage facility of Abidjan
186
 is supplied by pipeline from the nearby oil refinery 
of Abidjan
187
 and by ship via the PETROCI landing stage in the Vridi Canal. A Vridi 
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customs officer told the National Inquiry, “he smelt a strong odour which triggered a 
series of sneezes. He thus asked Ugborugbo if the products were dangerous. Ugborugbo 
reassured him that the experts’ analyses showed that the cargo presented no danger.”188 
Vridi customs argue that they couldn’t have known the nature of the materials being 
pumped from the ship to the trucks and their “involvement was limited to control of the 
quantity of products discharged”.189 This contrasts to the reaction of the Amsterdam 
personnel, who raised the issue of toxicity when they smelled the waste (UNHRC 
2009). 
Customs services are supposed to sit on a Licence Commission meeting when granting 
a licence like that given to Tommy. Despite not being invited to any such formally 
prescribed meeting, customs services granted the probationary licence
190
 to allow 
Tommy to act as “maritime chandler specialised in refuelling, maintenance and 
refuelling of ships in the Port of Abidjan”.191 Tommy submitted its request for a 
maritime chandler’s licence on 7th June 2006 and it was granted on 12th July 2006.192 
The Customs General Director told the National Inquiry that he had, “well before the 
arrival of the Probo Koala ship, prohibited his agents from going on board oil tankers 
and ships which did not unload merchandise … to avoid bothering the ships’ crews”.193 
This seriously hampered customs’ ability to stop the importation of toxic waste and the 
customs services’ claim to have not found out about the toxic waste until after the 
Probo Koala had departed. This shows some serious problems with their intelligence 
collection operations, and the National Inquiry found “a malfunctioning of the Custom 
Administration … contributed to the dumping of toxic waste in the Abidjan District”.194 
In the Ivorian Environmental Code, ‘environment’ is defined as: 
all of the physical, chemical and biological elements and all the social, 
economical, moral and intellectual factors susceptible to having a direct or 
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indirect, immediate or in time, effect on the development of the atmosphere, 
living beings and human activities.
195
 
The Department for the Environment and Waters and Forests administers the Ivorian 
Anti-Pollution Centre (CIAPOL) and the Minister for the Environment told the National 
Inquiry that the Director General of PAA refused his agents a presence at the port. This 
was the same problem experienced by the Maritime Police and suggests a fiefdom 
mentality as the port authorities are very protective of the territory and jurisdiction of 
their governmental sub-unit. The Minister for the Environment also stated, as did the 
Director of CIAPOL and the Head of the Port Authority Environmental Department, 
that environmental officers do not board ships.
196
 The Minister, on 21
st
 August, set up a 
crisis committee and instructed CIAPOL to investigate the smell pervading the city. By 
25
th
 August, the Minister felt that there had been a case of illegal toxic waste trafficking 
and informed the Prime Minister who ordered and sat on an Inter-ministerial 
Committee. On 29
th
 August, the Minister formally informed the Government Council of 
the dumping.
197
 While the Minister belatedly reacted to the dumping and violation of 
the Environmental Code (from where he gets his obligations), he failed to prevent such 
violations and the National Inquiry argues that “the Environmental Minister did not use 
all the appropriate means that should have allowed him to undertake controls on the 
Probo Koala when it arrived at the Abidjan Port”.198 
On 21
st
 August, CIAPOL in collaboration with the Central Environmental Laboratory 
and the Antipollution Police Services Unit, traced the toxic waste to the Probo Koala 
but were refused boarding by its crew. They did, however, take samples of the toxic 
waste that had been spilled on the wharf in the course of the pumping from the ship to 
the trucks. Later that day, CIAPOL issued a formal notice to the Probo Koala,
199
 “to 
immobilise the boat until the nature of its cargo had been determined”.200 The notice 
was sent to WAIBS as well as the Port Authority, the District of Abidjan and to the 
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Ministry of the Environment but none of these government agencies prevented the ship 
from leaving port (whether they were in a position to do so or not). 
On 20
th
 August, Bombo was notified of the odour of the waste from the Probo Koala. In 
the morning of the 21
st
 August, Gossio telephoned Bombo to enquire about the odour 
but Bombo “did not judge it necessary at the time” to inform Gossio, who was informed 
at a meeting with CIAPOL and Bombo the next day. The National Inquiry concluded 
that the port authorities were ‘accomplices’ in the dumping and in the speedy departure 
of the Probo Koala.
201
 
The operating licence issued by the Department of Mines and Energy to Puma Energy 
(Trafigura’s subsidiary) was granted illegally.202 Tommy’s request for an operating 
licence was granted without reference to the Licence Commission
203
 and the General 
Director of Maritime and Port Affairs justified this breach of the law as a measure to 
avoid petitioners’ direct contact with the Prime Minister’s office as a procedural 
appeal,
204
 and the National Inquiry concludes that: “This argument cannot succeed for 
one cannot rely on a violation to obstruct a route of appeal.”205 The licence granted 
legitimised Tommy as an organisation competent to receive the hazardous waste, and 
the circumnavigation of administrative rules in awarding the licence was a determining 
factor in the dumping. 
The District of Abidjan had responsibility for environmental protection and the 
management of waste
206
 and it conceded management of the Akuédo dump to Pisa-
Impex, a private company. During his hearing in front of the National Inquiry, the 
Governor of the Abidjan District stated: “as a District, we are not concerned with the 
management of industrial waste”.207 However, the 2003 law which transferred the 
state’s responsibilities to the territorial authorities208 does not make a distinction 
between types of waste, and the National Inquiry argues that the Governor’s statement 
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“has no legal founding”209 and the Governor contributed to the dumping and “in no way 
carried out the mission to protect the environment”.210 
PETROCI,
211
 the parastatal in charge of Ivory Coast’s oil and gas industry who ran the 
berth where the Probo Koala docked, did not have the power to refuse the docking or 
unloading of the ship as all of the required paperwork was produced on demand. The 
General Director of PETROCI considered this a ‘loop-hole’ and has written new 




This chapter addressed the question of whether the actions by Trafigura amounted to 
organisational deviance and catalogued a list of elements of the dumping that has been 
labelled as deviant by a social audience. The dumping of the toxic waste has been 
considered by many commentators to breach European and international rules, 
including violations of criminal law and of human rights and environmental treaties. 
The Hulshof Commission concluded that the reloading of waste back onto the Probo 
Koala in Amsterdam was against environmental regulations (Hulshof Commission 
2006). Furthermore, the company would have been well aware that Ivory Coast lacked 
the facilities to treat the waste. The terms of the hand-written ‘quote’ provided by 
Tommy corroborate this, a view which was supported by the National Inquiry (2006). 
The UN Special Rapporteur too found that there was a lack of due diligence in hiring 
Tommy. The National Inquiry found that Trafigura’s wholly-owned subsidiary, Puma 
Energy, took an active part in the illicit transfer of toxic waste
213
 and that Puma Energy 
received the hand-written quote for the offloading of waste from Tommy, which was 
transmitted directly to Trafigura.
214
 The resultant detrimental health effects of the 
dumping have also been outlined by international civil society actors (Dimas 2006; 
WHO 2006). 
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The deviance of the Ivorian state has also been identified by social audiences, 
particularly the National Inquiry. The operating licence issued to Puma Energy was 
granted illegally.
215
 Tommy’s request for an operating licence was granted without 
reference to the Licence Commission.
216
 This licence legitimised Tommy as an 
organisation competent to receive the hazardous waste, when it was incompetent to do 
so. The authorisation allowing the Probo Koala to dock was granted by Bombo who, 
the National Inquiry argued, had insisted (after the dumping) that the ship was not at 
fault and organised for the Probo Koala to leave port quickly.
217
 The Ivorian state was 
also heavily criticised for operating a weak regulatory system. 
The National Inquiry found that the dysfunctional customs administration contributed to 
the dumping.
218
 The Department for the Environment and CIAPOL’s agents, as well as 
the Maritime Police, were refused a presence at the port and this prevented them 
exercising the requisite control. The National Inquiry argues that the Minister for the 
Environment failed to prevent violations of the Ivorian Environmental Code. The 
National Inquiry argues that the Governor of the Abidjan District contributed to the 
dumping and “in no way carried out the mission to protect the environment”.219 The 
collusion between Trafigura and the Government has been highlighted in this chapter 
through the granting of licences illegally and through unfettered access to the port of 
Abidjan, and the National Inquiry concluded that the port authorities were 
‘accomplices’ in the dumping and in the speedy departure of the Probo Koala.220 
Lasslett argues that any crime’s ‘phenomenal nature’, “sets a gradient of difficulty, 
which will shape the practice’s amenability to exposure and analysis” (Lasslett, 2012a). 
This is true of the dumping, which presented multiple barriers to analysis: scientific – 
due to the complex chemical composition of the waste; medical – determining the 
health impact of the waste required specialist knowledge; legal – the corporate veil of a 
close company is very difficult to penetrate; and geographical – the location of the 
crime in a poor post-conflict West African country made access to information difficult. 
These difficulties were compounded by the reaction of Trafigura to public scrutiny. The 
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corporation engaged in widespread cover-up and public relations management activities, 
making it more difficult to collect and analyse data. But what have been revealed by the 
available data are the clear breaches of norms by Trafigura and the Ivorian state. The 
task now is to quantify civil society’s reaction to the state-corporate crime. 
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Chapter 6 – Situating Domestic NGOs within the Topography of Resistance 
Introduction 
The analysis in this chapter is based on interviews with four domestic human rights 
NGOs. These organisations are a representative sample of the civil society sector in 
Ivory Coast concerned with human rights. The three major human rights NGOs in Ivory 
Coast are: Action pour la Protection des Droits de l’Homme (APDH), Ligue Ivoirienne 
des Droits de l’Homme (LIDHO) and Mouvement Ivoirien des Droits Humains 
(MIDH). Club Union Africaine Côte d’Ivoire (Club UA) was identified as the most 
important of the smaller organisations. Together APDH, LIDHO, MIDH and Club UA 
represent the vanguard of Ivorian civil society concerned with human rights abuses. 
Based on the participant selection methodology (see Chapter 2 for details), these 
organisations would be expected to be an important measure of the capacity of civil 
society in Ivory Coast to resist state and state-corporate crime. 
Organisational Resources 
Lasslett argues that a determination of the capacity of civil society organisations to 
resist state crime “must take into account the movement’s class composition, the 
institutional pockets of opposition from which it can draw support, and the movement’s 
capacity to employ the right balance of tactics” (Lasslett 2012: 4). Ndegwa’s (1996) 
study of African NGOs reaches a similar conclusion in relation to resistance: 
… for NGOs and other organizations in civil society to advance democratization 
(for instance, through successful opposition to state control of civic activities), 
four conditions must obtain: organization, resources, alliances, and political 
opportunity. (Ndegwa 1996: 1) 
The following analysis begins by looking at the composition, institutional resources and 
internal processes of the NGOs, before looking at external networked links to a wider 
civil society and the state. 
LIDHO employs three people; the permanent secretary, the guardian/watcher and 
someone who runs errands for the organisation. LIDHO claims to have about 3,000 
voluntary workers in 56 sections around the country.
221
 This appears to be a high 
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number, when other organisations claim serious personnel problems. However, the 
LIDHO website does list email address for some 50 sections
222
 in the interior of the 
country, lending weight to the claim with respect to the number of sections at least – but 
it is unlikely that an organisation of this size and capabilities could effectively sustain 
3,000 volunteers. MIDH staff are all said to be voluntary workers. However, there are 
five persons to whom they “pay concessions to be permanent at work”.223 MIDH boasts 
about 400 members; about a hundred of these are “really committed to the 
organisation”.224 APDH has four salaried staff: the secretary, the accountant, the cleaner 
and someone to run errands. They have 20 permanent volunteers.
225
 Club UA has more 
than 200 members and ten permanent staff, five of which are salaried – the accountant, 
the secretary, the vice-secretary general, the staff member responsible for elections and 
the staff member in charge of conflict related to land – and the rest are paid expenses for 
transport.
226
 The main four human rights NGOs therefore employ a total of only 17 
salaried staff – of which only half are involved in human rights activities, the rest being 
accountants, cleaners or errand runners. The number of salaried staff across the sector is 
low in a country of 20 million people, but is relative to an official employment rate of 
4% (IRIN 2005). 
During interviews, this problem of personnel was a recurring theme. APDH stated that 
it was their main problem; and it is not just a case of finding the funding, as they felt 
that “it’s quite difficult to find volunteer workers”.227 Even when funding is 
forthcoming, LIDHO said that funds put at the organisation’s disposal are strictly 
targeted to specific projects and cannot be used to pay salaries, rent or transport
228
 (this 
problem of project-based funding is discussed below). Club UA sees two major inter-
linked problems facing NGOs in Ivory Coast today: training and funding. Without 
trained personnel you cannot develop sophisticated project management strategies to 
attract funding. And even if you do manage to attract funding, you don’t have the 
personnel with the competence to deal with it.
229
 This problem of unskilled staff is 
related to the inadequacies of the institutions of the Ivorian state. Education is 
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underdeveloped, with illiteracy standing at about 50%
230
 and the average length of 
schooling is reportedly six years (US CIA 2011). 
When compared to Trafigura, the human resources of these NGOs are limited. Trafigura 
can offer attractive wages to highly educated individuals. The local NGOs have 
difficulty in finding and hiring skilled staff due to both a lack of funds and suitable 
candidates. This imbalance suggests that the local NGOs would struggle to meet the 
demands of sanctioning and censuring large-scale state-corporate crime in the face of 
significant corporate power. 
Data Collection and Dissemination Methods of Domestic NGOs  
The NGOs’ lack of capacity is further exacerbated by the fact that their offices are all 
centralised, based on the south coast of the country. There is a significant urban-rural 
divide, compounded by infrastructural deficiencies. There is also a north-south divide, 
the country having been effectively partitioned for years. Making contact with the 
NGOs would be very difficult from outside of Abidjan – there is a limit to the advocacy 
and support that can be provided via the underdeveloped mobile telephone network. The 
small size of the organisations, along with their apparent financial and human resource 
constraints, limits their capacity to send personnel into the interior of the country to 
serve individual victims of human rights abuses outside of Abidjan. 
Similarly, it is not easy for these NGOs to get their message across electronically to 
rural populations. While most Ivorian civil society organisations or individuals are not 
online, and internet connectivity is very low,
231
 the NGOs’ websites give an indication 
of the communication structures of the organisations. APDH had a website (www.apdh-
ci.org) but it was not working as at August 2011. MIDH say they have a website, but 
the president did not know the address.
232
 LIDHO have a website (www.lidho.org), but 
“that needs to be updated”;233 and Club UA have a website (www.clubua-ci.org) with 
about eight pages, but about 50% of these have no content.
234
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A lack of modern communication tools severely hampers an organisations’ ability to 
censure the criminal actions of the state and large corporations by disseminating 
information on abuses to domestic and international audiences. The domestic audiences 
that could be reached by online campaigning would be predominantly city elites and the 
educated middle class as internet connections are relatively expensive at US$20 per 
month.
235
 Improved modern communications structures would assist the NGOs in 
getting their message across to the general public, as well as provide a platform for 
reports and statements that censure the deviant actions of states and corporations. Better 
communications would also facilitate collaboration between NGOs.  
Decision-Making Structure 
The following section analyses how decisions are made within the organisations, and by 
whom. It also looks at the accountability of the organisations as it is important to 
understand any restraint on individuals in the organisation to act towards stated goals. 
The issue is not just whether the organisations are transparent and can be held to 
account, but also a question of who can hold an organisation to account – often 
determined by the funding streams that the organisations rely on for survival. Decision 
making and accountability procedures impact upon the organisations’ capacity to resist 
state-corporate crime. The speed at which an organisation can gauge and respond to a 
major human rights event is an important measure of resistance, as is their capacity to 
critically reflect on this response and modify future strategy.  
The domestic NGOs deal with complaints from individuals, as well as proactively 
designing projects to promote human rights and democracy. APDH state that they 
receive complaints of human rights abuse from “two or three persons per day and 
throughout the month it may be near 50 persons”.236 They also run seminars every three 
months in the interior of the country, which attracts about 50 attendees each time.
237
 
Yearly, MIDH provide services for 50 to 60 individuals.
238
 These individuals are dealt 
with on a case by case basis, and any decision to assist is based on the ‘merits’ of each 
case. No criteria were outlined for assessing the merits influencing decisions to take on 
cases. This creates the possibility of clients being arbitrarily refused assistance and 
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could expose the client recruitment process to claims of discrimination on ethnic or 
gender grounds, clientelism and the misplacement of resources on cases that the 
organisation does not have the capacity to effectively deal with. 
With respect to project work, NGOs in Ivory Coast must focus on a discrete range of 
abuses so that limited resources can be used effectively. The decision-making process 
for taking on projects and individual clients is important as it determines where the 
energies of the organisation are focused and which human rights abuses may be 
neglected. Based on an apparent lack of action in the Trafigura case this decision-
making process was explored, as well as any assessment and auditing mechanisms in 
place.  
The question asked – “Who decides what projects to work on?”239 – was one of the 
most challenging to get an answer to and required rephrasing and/or repeating during 
the majority of interviews in Abidjan. The problems stemmed from, in some cases, a 
misunderstanding of the question – one NGO responded, “We do”240, referring to their 
own organisation. All NGOs interviewed eventually answered that their management 
board makes all decisions as to which project they will undertake, and this decision is 
usually made democratically. However, the management boards do not propose projects 
and can only decide whether to pursue a project recommended by a special department 
of the NGO or its president. The decision on which projects to roll out will necessarily 
be influenced by the likelihood of receiving funding (the problem of project-specific 
funding is discussed below).  
APDH’s decisions as to which projects are pursued is made by a board, which consists 
of ten members: the president, two vice presidents, the secretary general, the secretary 
general for finance, an organiser, the secretary in charge of communication, the 
secretary in charge of women and children, the secretary in charge of training and 
projects, and the secretary in charge of social affairs. Decisions are reached by consent, 
and voting if necessary: “generally speaking it is by consent and it is rare that they go to 
voting”.241 MIDH have a similar five-person board; it is presided over by the vice-
president (in charge of projects) and includes the president, the staff member in charge 
of investigations, and the two staff members in charge of projects. The staff member 
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who proposed and drafted the project is also in attendance to take part in the discussion. 
They discuss the project and decide whether to proceed. When asked whether all board 
members must agree to proceed with a project, the president answered, “generally, this 
is the case”.242 LIDHO works in teams to assess potential projects, determining their 
viability before submitting to partners for financing.
243
 LIDHO were working on two 
projects when interviewed: a project of ‘cohesion’ in the border regions between 
Liberia, Guinea and Ivory Coast and project of training and reinforcement of capacity in 
terms of decentralisation, where local populations are trained to get involved in the 
development of their own area.
244
 At Club UA the president, once elected for a term of 
five years, appoints a 12-person board (which includes all the permanent members of 
staff) and this board makes decisions on which projects to pursue. The president also 
reports to the general assembly of all members every two years.
245
 While on paper these 
processes appear to be transparent and democratic, it would be difficult to assess the 
impact of influential members of the boards. Furthermore, the composition of the board 
itself can be heavily influenced by the head of some organisations – with the entire 
board of Club UA being appointed by its president.  
The reality of the above decision-making process was hard to discern and, as noted 
above, the question caused difficulties. It is possible that projects are chosen on the 
basis of their human rights impact and correlation with the NGOs’ stated missions. 
However, in the scramble for funding, it is likely that applications are made when 
funding opportunities become available for projects and that the organisations will 
choose projects based on those opportunities.  
Another aspect of an organisation’s transparency and organisational capacity is the 
mechanisms of oversight that are applied to individual projects. MIDH, APDH and 
Club UA follow up their human rights projects using questionnaires which are 
submitted to participants.
246/247/248
 MIDH also stated that they measure a project’s 
effectiveness by the amount of congratulatory phone calls they receive.
249
 The only 
organisation which moves beyond congratulatory phone calls or questionnaires was 
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LIDHO, who has a staff member responsible for writing project evaluation reports. 
There was no discussion by any of the participant organisations as to how the feed-back 
generated is used to improve future performance. The lack of proper assessment 
mechanisms reduces the organisations’ capacity to act as agents of censure as a lack of 
accountability erodes the legitimacy of their operations and will impact their ability to 
generate public opinion. From a practical point of view, it hampers their ability to learn 
from previous projects so that processes can be improved and mistakes can be avoided. 
Consequently, it would appear that all key human rights NGOs in Ivory Coast have in 
place fairly rudimentary procedures for evaluating their work. These NGOs lack reliable 
data-sets that could be used to empirically evidence their organisational deficiencies and 
strengths. Without a resistance strategy that is informed by critical reflection and 
rigorous data-sets, it could be argued that these organisations risk repeating practices 
that are inappropriate, ineffective or counter-productive. 
The internal organisational limitations of the NGOs are amplified, if they are compared 
with the internal practices of the corporations they are expected to resist. In 2008, 
Trafigura agreed to a £9 million management training programme following an 
organisational audit.
250
 The weaknesses identified at Trafigura were similar to those of 
the Ivorian NGOs, and included: poor data quality, lack of expertise at senior levels of 
the organisation, and lack of adequate oversight at the management level. But while the 
problems may be similar, the NGOs lack the financial resources and expertise needed to 
deal with them. This of course is a product of the broader political-economic 
environment in which they operate. Indeed, Makumbe explains that civil society in 
Africa is generally 
… fairly weak and beset with constraints of a financial, organizational, 
operational and even environmental nature. Some of these constraints have been 
generated by Africa’s history, while others are the result of the continent’s 
present social, cultural and political condition. (Makumbe 2008: 316-317) 
Here Makumbe (2008) is specifically referring to the effects of colonial regimes, which 
… made strenuous efforts to ensure that no civic groups would emerge in their 
colonies to challenge them for violating people’s rights, for imposing 
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authoritarian governance and for pillaging the Africans’ human and natural 
resources. (Makumbe 2008: 310) 
It is clear then that each NGO’s internal issues are determined to some extent by its 
environment. Thus the next section will look at the external factors that influence the 
NGOs’ capacity to resist state crime. 
External Factors: Funding and Access to Government 
According to Lasslett (2012), if resistance movements are to be effective they must 
possess “… the right measure of financial assistance, complemented by a range of 
avenues for legal and direct action” (Lasslett 2012: 4). He adds that these 
determinations are always relative to the crime itself, and the campaign of denial 
mounted by the powerful. This section discusses how the human rights NGOs are 
funded, the influence donors have over the organisations’ operations, and the effect this 
has on their capacity to act as agents of resistance. Avenues for legal action and censure 
are explored in the following section. 
Makumbe (2008) argues that funding secured by most African NGOs is ring-fenced and 
inadequate. Project agendas are set by external donors and NGOs must ensure that 
funding applications and project delivery fit with the aims of these donors. This is 
similar to the situation observed in Ivory Coast and even when funding is forthcoming 




The majority of APDH’s project funding is from three external partners: the Swiss 
Embassy, the US Embassy and the local UN office. The average project budget is about 
10 million CFA (about €15,000) over one or two years. Project accounts are self-audited 
internally and audited externally when required by external partners.
252
 
Initially, MIDH collected money from members but it was not a stable funding stream 
so they now only seek funding from external partners.
253
 This highlights the problem 
faced by NGOs working in Ivory Coast and the conflict of interest that may pervade the 
organisation; as even attempts to be funded by the population which would be served by 
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the NGOs have failed – necessitating foreign donors to fund the organisation. The main 
external partners are Oxfam, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the 
Canadian Embassy, German Embassy and US Embassy. The average project budget is 
€35,000 to €100,000 for projects that run from one to three years.254 MIDH have both 
internal and external audits. Internal audits are concerned by independent auditors and 
external partners use external auditors to oversee their respective projects.
255
 The main 




LIDHO have two main external funding partners – the Danish Refugee Council and the 
European Union (EU). They have also some funding from the International Rescue 
Committee (IRC). In the past they have been financed by Oxfam and NED. The 2010 
project budgets range between 2 and 50 million CFA (about €3,000 to €75,000). In the 
past, when they were financed by Oxfam Novib, they had a project worth 200 billion 
CFA (about €300,000) over three years.257 
CLUB UA’s main projects concern children’s rights and principally exhorting parents 
to obtain birth certificates for their children, land rights and training the population on 
how to vote. The most recent project had a budget of about 10 million CFA (about 
€15,000), and their accounts are audited internally and externally by a firm of 
auditors.
258
 Club UA do collect funds from their members and they also have external 
funding partners: the Canadian Embassy, US Embassy, the European Union, NED, 
Organisation International de la Francophonie, Ecole le Paix de Grenoble (School of 
Peace, Grenoble) and “an organisation in Switzerland”.259 
Clearly the local NGOs are heavily funded from outside the state and most of the aid is 
specifically project-based and from foreign government sources (with the notable 
exception of France, the post-colonial power). This creates a number of problems which 
reduce the capacity of Ivorian NGOs to resist state crime. 
First, the NGOs are beholden to foreign funders, who have their own acute political 
agenda, which may not necessarily be allied to victim interests. For example, a number 
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of the NGOs received funding from NED, which has a history of funding projects and 
movements that further the US’ neoliberal agenda in the developing world. NED uses 
the cloak of civil society to operate politically (Blum 2002) in countries important to US 
interests
260
 and claims that its “nongovernmental character gives it a flexibility that 
makes it possible to work in some of the world’s most difficult circumstances, and to 
respond quickly when there is an opportunity for political change”.261 Blum (2002) 
argues that “NED likes to refer to itself as an NGO because this helps to maintain a 
certain credibility abroad that an official US government agency might not have. But 
NGO is the wrong category. NED is a GO” (Blum 2002: 179-180). NED is clearly not 
an NGO, as it is funded by the US Congress with oversight provided by the US 
Congress and the US Department of State and has an annual grant budget of about 
US$100 million
262
 (NED 2011). NED’s engagement in the country has steadily 
increased over the years; in 2005 and 2006 NED committed about US$400,000 each 
year to Ivory Coast. In 2010, this figure rose to US$1.1 million. Over 67% of the funds 
were channelled to three NED sister institutions (‘the NED institutions’): the National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), chaired by Madeleine Albright, the 
International Republican Institute (IRI), chaired by John McCain, and the Center for 
International Private Enterprise (CIPE) which has a stated mission of strengthening 
democracy through corporate interests and market-oriented reform. The remaining 
funds are distributed amongst the local NGOs. This includes about US$450,000 to 
MIDH (which is 9.2% of the total funds distributed by NED in Ivory Coast between 
2005 and 2010 inclusive), about US$145,000 to Club UA (3% of total), about 
US$160,000 to APDH (3.3%), US$68,000 to LIDHO (1.4%), and about US$95,000 to 
RAIDH (2%). All the funding was project based, with no allowances for institutional 
funding. The projects ranged from those concerned with prison conditions (MIDH) to 
various vague and general projects; for example, to “improve civil society oversight of 
public institutions” or “strengthen women’s knowledge of civil rights and democracy”. 
While NED is a major contributor to the human rights NGOs, they are funded by other 
governments too. When funding is obtained from foreign governments, Ivorian NGOs 
must adjust their agenda to the corporate goals of the relevant foreign mission. 
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Second, as Ivorian NGOs lack direct budgetary funding, any human rights project must 
go through a cumbersome process of application of review. These projects take some 
time to propose and initiate and limits the NGOs response times, and could go some 
way to explain a lacklustre reaction to the dumping. Without contingency funds, an 
NGO must await a funding approval before moving forward with any project. An 
alternative stream of funding could in theory come from the Ivorian state, but the reality 
of the relationship between the NGOs and the state does not support the transfer of 
funds from the state. 
Project money from embassies are imperialistically applied and this could be considered 
a method of control; using project-based funding means that the organisations cannot 
run projects without the approval of donors, the vast majority of which are states 
(through embassies and NED); “a number of African NGOs have responded chiefly to 
governments rather than their supposed clientele. Others have lost local legitimacy 
through their dependence on funding sources from outside the country” (Grugel 2000). 
The scramble for funding can make NGOs accountable to donors as opposed to those 
they were constituted to assist. To justify the continued attraction of funding to an 
NGO, funders’ expectations must be satisfied and most aid will have conditions (or 
‘strings’) attached. The vast majority of funding for human rights NGOs comes from 
overseas aid and as a result the NGOs are answerable to large organisations that are far 
removed from the realities of local life. 
Decisions on which projects to pursue cannot be made by NGO boards as they will 
depend on whether funding is available. Ensuring that funding is inadequate assures the 
NGOs’ dependence on the donors for survival. Grugel (2000) argues that the presence 
of external donors challenges NGOs to maintain two policy agendas: “their own, based 
on a notion of civil society as people-centered development and democratization; and 
that of their funders, who use the term to mean capitalist modernization and 
liberalization” (Grugel 2000: 103). One of the major donors, NED, has funded projects 
for all of the NGOs under study here at one time or another. 
Tombs and Whyte (2003) argue that studies of state-corporate crime examine the 
complex relationships between harm and economic, political and social power. The next 
section sets out the landscape of the interrelationship between the political (state) and 
social (civil society) powers in Ivory Coast. The section looks first at the support, or  
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lack of, provided to NGOs by the government and then tries to untangle the political 
influences of the state on the NGOs and the social influences of civil society on the 
government. 
NGOs and the State 
It appears that the NGOs, despite their history, distance themselves from the suggestion 
that they are aligned to any political actors in Ivory Coast. An analysis of the interaction 
between the government and the NGOs provides more insight into the relationship. The 
interviews question the support and encouragement provided by the government to the 
NGO community, whether financially or otherwise.  
The Ivory Coast government has never it appears directly encouraged APDH to take on 
any projects, nor are they financed by the government. And while their advocacy and 
project based activities are not facilitated by the government, they claim to take a 
complementary approach and “are associated to some activities that the government 
undertake”.263 While APDH hope to complement governmental tasks, this has not 
always been the case and their activity has tended to assume the role of governmental 
tasks: “the government does not play its role so [APDH] are obliged to”.264 Even though 
APDH finds itself substituting for government, they claim that the government has 
never impeded their work.  
While this may be true of the ‘official’ government based in Abidjan, there have been 
territories outside the Ivorian state’s control at one time or another, and in June 2010, 
during a campaign in the northern part of the country, APDH were attacked by “well 
armed rebel forces” – the New Forces (or Forces Nouvelles) army who controlled that 
territory.
265
 It is not clear why the group were attacked but NGOs have been accused of 
siding with one side or another during spats of civil war that Ivory Coast has 
experienced, and in 2002 the Minister of Justice accused MIDH of working for the 
rebels, which led to assaults on NGO members by the public.
266
 
Despite these accusations, MIDH have received encouragement from the government to 
take a more active role in pursuing projects, but, “not openly”.267 The reasons for this 
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lack of ‘openness’ is unclear, but it may be that the political considerations of engaging 
with an NGO in a way that would admit an inability of the government to fully deal 
with a situation. Alternatively, it may be to avoid association with organisations that 
have been accused of political ties to the opposition in the past. 
MIDH substituted for government with their prison project, as implemented in Bouake 
and Daloa, providing assistance to prisoners: “normally a government task”.268 While 
MIDH claim that government has never directly impeded their work, their first 
president and his replacement were both exiled to the USA for highlighting human 
rights abuses by the government.
269
 LIDHO claimed that the government have never 
either encouraged or impeded their work. But they also stated that human rights NGOs 
are sometimes threatened by the government, organisations or individuals.
270
 Club AU 
state that apart from the signing their incorporation documents, they have never 
received encouragement from the government to take a more active role in any area. 
The government has impeded the work of Club AU, especially in the interior of the 
country, and they attribute this to ignorance of government officials as to their role and 
a “rivalry between their actions and those of the government”.271 
It may be that the government threats are considered an indirect impediment to work, or 
alternatively that participants were careful not to criticise the government in interview – 
but no participant attempted to convey dissatisfaction with the government either off-
tape or off-the-record. However, there are clear attempts by the government to suppress 
criticism and this will undoubtedly promote caution on the part of NGOs when 
criticising government human rights abuses. This apprehension will tend to limit the 
NGOs’ ability to censure government activity. It would appear that elements of the 
Ivorian state have at times employed force, or the threat of force, to shape how 
institutions of resistance within civil society strategically pursue their cause. The 
Ivorian state has not exhibited any ambition to completely silence dissent but it is 
apparent that their goal is to ensure that it is expressed in a manageable fashion. When 
NGOs have acted in ways that complement the government, they have received 
encouragement from the state. However, when they have reacted in ways that threaten 
the existing governing project they have been harassed. As a result of this subtle state 
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terror, the range of desirable strategies available to Ivorian NGOs when resisting state-
corporate crime has been limited and this will have weakened their capacity to censure. 
It is apparent from the above that the Gramscian ‘struggle’ for civil society is played out 
within the NGO sphere – and this battle is more obvious between the victims 
organisations, discussed in Chapter 7 – but this ‘rivalry’ shows that there is also a 
potential struggle between civil society, represented by NGOs, and the state. 




LIDHO – Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) 
APDH  – Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) 
MIDH – Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR) 
Club UA – Gadaffi inspired group 
APDH say that have no connection to any political parties but know that the political 
parties in Ivory Coast have, because of “their willingness to control some NGOs and 
civil society”. But they are not perceived as powerful actors on the ground: “they are 
legless, they are not significant”. APDH refused to name any of these NGOs.273 When 
asked whether his NGO had any connection to a political party, the president of MIDH 
answered, “No”, but with a caveat: “… as soon as you get out of this office and you ask 
anybody in Ivory Coast, they will say RDR”. The reasons for this were explained as, (1) 
the first president of MIDH, Zorro Ballo, was the judge who signed the nationality 
certificate of Allassne Ouatarra, then president of RDR. Ouatarra was formerly the 
deputy director of the IMF and is now the president of Ivory Coast, after the UN and 
French forces overthrew Gbagbo on his behalf. And (2) the fact that a former president 
of MIDH was from the north of the country and the majority of the organisation’s 
members are also from the north – RDR is therefore seen as a party of people from the 
north. But MIDH deny the claim: “I can assure that they have no particular link with 
this political party.”274 
The president of MIDH stated that there is a perception that APDH is close to FPI, the 
political party of Gbagbo, but again denied this to be the case: “after long discussions 
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with the president of this NGO, I know how the man is and I cannot say that he is from 
a political party.”275/276 It was noted that this was a personal perspective that would 
require corroboration. He went on to explain that at the beginning of the Ivorian crisis, 
in 2002, APDH supported the position of the president, so some of those in power 
participated in creating LIDHO. The previous president of LIDHO used to be the 
financial director of the labour party.
277
 When asked whether the interview at LIDHO 
could be recorded, the president answered; “LIDHO is a non-political, non-
governmental organisation concerned with the defence of human rights, so they have 
nothing to hide.”278 When asked whether any of the large NGOs in Abidjan are 
politically motivated, the vice-secretary general of Club UA said, “Personally, I do not 
know.”279 However, they did state that the organisation is inspired by Gadaffi. 
Clearly, it would appear that Ivorian NGOs are reluctant to acknowledge any links with 
specific parties. Nevertheless, while this may be politically expedient on their part, from 
a sociological vantage point, the capacity of NGOs to resist the crimes of the powerful 
depends on their ability to establish relationships with institutional organs within the 
state and civil society. A capacity to work with opposition political parties avails to 
NGOs governmental resources and forums, which can potentially increase their 
strategic ability to expose and censure crime. 
As Lasslett (2012) argues, resistance should be mounted by movements and networks of 
actors. In Ivory Coast, the NGO community is at pains to remain independent from 
politics and the sector is internally fragmented. Despite the heritage of political 
involvement, the NGOs have few viable connections with the state and report no 
conduits in government to work through. Furthermore, as we shall see, lawyers are well 
represented by NGO staff but rarely make use of the judiciary system. The Ivorian 
Ombudsman does not provide an avenue into the state apparatus as it is a weak 
institution with no legal powers.
280
 Struggle and resistance, along with the mechanism 
of sanction and censure, should involve the state and other civil society actors and a lack 
of these connections will weaken resistance movements (Lasslett 2012). 
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Application of Significant Sanctions by Domestic Human Rights NGOs 
With a state-corporate crime, there are two actors – the state and the corporation. The 
significance of sanctions applied will differ from each actor’s point of view. A 
corporation strives primarily for profit (and to a lesser extent, growth with a view to 
increasing future profit generation capacity). In order to achieve the profit goal, a large 
international corporation must pursue power and influence; in order to be a preferred 
commercial partner. Typical sanctions applied against corporations include legal actions 
(with a view to fines) and public campaigns (and/or boycotts) that damage a corporate 
reputation and, by extension, future profitability (at least in the short term). Campaigns 
are more effective against consumer-facing companies, which Trafigura is not, and fines 
would have to be very large to make an impression on Trafigura’s annual turnover. 
Therefore, arguably the most effective sanctions that could be applied to a large close 
business would be to affect their power to influence governments for favourable 
treatment and industry-friendly laws. One powerful tactic in this respect is legal action. 
Major legal actions can mobilise public support for human rights issues, while exposing 
offenders to prolonged periods of negative publicity. In Ivory Coast, where NGOs lack 
the capacity to mobilise the public through political campaigns, the law remains one of 
the few conduits open to them. Nevertheless, as we shall now see, it is employed 
unevenly and conservatively by Ivorian human rights NGOs. 
Use of the Legal System as a Tactic to Defend Human Rights (and the Associated 
Communication to the World of the Crime) 
Human rights law in Ivory Coast is enshrined in both international and domestic law 
instruments, by international treaty and domestic constitutional arrangements. But 
serious crimes tend to involve human rights abuses, and criminal charges (under 
domestic law) can be made against individuals as well as organisations. The human 
rights NGOs appear to have some capacity, in terms of staff and legal standing, to resist 
state crime by filing legal complaints against the government but most do not take 
advantage of this fact. This may be a result of suspicions regarding the independence of 
the judiciary (see Chapter 3). Whatever the reason, the inability of civil society 
organisations in Ivory Coast to access justice through the legal system allows for state, 
state-organised and state-corporate crime to flourish. 
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APDH get legal support from a board known in English as the commission of legal 
affairs and judiciary assistance. The APDH executive board and administrative staff 
includes three lawyers, two magistrates, three people working in justice, a secretary of 
justice and eight law graduates.
281
 APDH have lodged complaints on behalf of civilians 
against government military forces at a military tribunal. They have also started 
proceedings against a student union (namely FESCI, discussed below), by lodging 
complaints with the Attorney General, but they were not acted upon. Since 2008, they 
have acted on behalf of 20 people in criminal legal proceedings.
282
 
MIDH have a legal department with five lawyers and four law graduates. They have 
never filed an action against the government within the domestic legal system but 
MIDH has initiated two separate proceedings against the Ivorian state at the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (cases 246/02 and 262/02). Both cases 
alleged, with some success, that the Ivory Coast constitution contained provisions which 
are discriminatory to some citizens.
283
 From 2008 to 2010 MIDH launched about ten 
criminal actions against individuals, including against policemen for extortion. While it 
is difficult to gauge the success of such actions, the status quo has been maintained and 
even state crime researchers are prone to extortion by Ivorian police.
284
 MIDH have also 
assisted a student union to file a criminal legal complaint against another student union 
following the rape of one of their members.
285
 
When faced with legal issues, LIDHO consult with their former chairman, a professor 
of law and a lawyer, and the third president who is also a lawyer.
286
 LIDHO have never 
considered legal action against a corporation, but they do provide assistance to victims 
in finding a lawyer. LIDHO has considered legal action against a student union but has 
never considered legal action against the government or an individual.
287
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Club UA do not have a legal department but do have ‘legal officers’. They have never 
considered legal action against the government, a corporation or an individual.
288
 
The NGOs sparingly use law as a tool to resist the crimes of the powerful, and do not 
deal with a large number of individual complaints. Furthermore, none mentioned that 
they were involved in any project that dealt with the human rights abuses that resulted 
from Trafigura’s toxic waste. It is to this topic the questions now turn. 
Use of Censure to Resist State-Corporate Crime: the Trafigura case 
In order to censure a large company such as Trafigura, which is engaged in complex 
forms of crimes, resistance groups need to be exceptionally well resourced and employ 
extensive links to nodal points within the state and civil society through which they can 
act.  
It is very difficult to match the resources of a large, powerful organisation like Trafigura 
in order to censure the corporation; and the above analysis has revealed that NGOs are 
completely isolated and have no connections with the state or other NGOs in order to 
achieve effective censure. NGOs were aware of the dumping from the outset and APDH 
provided a succinct version of events: 
A ship that came from Europe, declared that it had onboard waste water but in 
reality it was toxic substances. They gave the waste to a company for treating 
and dumping. This company was not competent in treating the substances, and 
immediately dumped the toxic substances in Abidjan. Immediately, on the 
morning of the dumping, all of Abidjan was invaded by bad odours and people 
were intoxicated. Officially, 500,000 victims were intoxicated and 21 dead. 




APDH have been approached by victims of the toxic waste dumping and, now four 
years after the event, claim that they are considering the matter and possible future legal 
action against the government.
290
 However, as noted above the legal system may not be 
sufficiently independent in order to be relied upon to provide relief against the 
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government. Moreover, human rights NGOs’ legal strategy appears haphazard at best, 
and poorly resourced. 
MIDH claim to have had “un peu” (a little) involvement with the toxic waste case of 
2006. They investigated the matter in collaboration with la Fédération Internationale des 
Ligues des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH), a Paris-based association of NGOs, of which  
LIDHO and MIDH are member organisations.
291
 FIDH, LIDHO and MIDH published a 
report (in French) in April 2011, outlining how this crime was dealt with by the 
domestic and international justice systems. It is indicative that neither LIDHO nor 
MIDH have independently published reports on the issue and it is their relationship with 
this international NGO that has produced results. MIDH also claim to have assisted the 
UN Special Rapporteur when visiting Ivory Coast to investigate the matter. 
Club AU did investigate the toxic waste dumping and visited numerous dumping sites 
before making a declaration, “to condemn vehemently what was considered as a real 
violation of human rights in Ivory Coast”.292 However, they did not produce any 
documentation or reports on the issue as they felt the issue was outside their 
expertise.
293
 Club UA highlight here another aspect of the mismatch with Trafigura: this 
small underfunded NGO cannot command the same scientific knowledge as the 
international corporation. 
It appears that domestic NGOs did not have the capacity to resist the state-corporate 
crime of the dumping and did not get involved in the pursuit of civil or criminal legal 
justice. MIDH say that they have not followed the matter too closely because it has been 
tainted by profiteering: “when people see you more active, they immediately think that 
you want to have money”.294 And for this reason they currently only provide advice to 
the victims and don’t get involved with the matter. 
Thus, it would appear that while domestic human rights NGOs were aware of the 
dumping, and its significance as a human rights violation, they have fundamentally 
failed to respond in a decisive fashion. At first glance, this might be seen as a simple 
result of organisational preference. However, it would appear the factors underlying this 
lacklustre response lie in the weakness of those resisting state-corporate crime in Ivory 
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Coast. As I have argued, these organisations lack financial resources, skilled personnel, 
and reflective strategy. Moreover, Ivorian human rights NGOs are isolated, indeed 
many celebrate this isolation. However, without links to organs of opposition within the 
state, or to counter-hegemonic institutions within civil society, these organisations lack 
the capacity to react to the crimes of the powerful, or formulate a carefully theorised, 
well resourced, censure strategy. The relative strength of the offender compounded the 
weakness of human rights NGOs.  
However, none of the above processes occurred within a vacuum. The state has 
attempted to terrorise civil society. And while this has not totally suppressed dissent, it 
has ensured that it is expressed in ways that are more tolerable to the state. Moreover, as 
NGOs are dependent on project funding, they are also beholden to foreign states. In the 
case of Trafigura, this entailed that they simply lacked the resources to respond through 
more conservative means (legal actions, research studies), while more radical courses of 
action were closed off by a lack of inter-linkages with political groups, unions and 
churches. 
Conclusion 
This research reveals that – relative to those who they were resisting against – the 
domestic NGOs had little capacity to expose, control, constrain or sanction the large-
scale state-corporate crime seen in Chapter 5. The failure to mount a comprehensive 
resistance is a result of a combination of internal and external factors. Internally, NGOs 
suffering from a lack of institutional funding, resources and quality personnel, as 
reported during interviews. The external factors include the apparent unwillingness of 
Ivorian NGOs to pool resources and expertise with other civil society organs (for 
example, trade-unions, the church, community groups, and probably most importantly, 
other NGOs), as well as an inability to maintain a working relationship with elements 
within the state which could aid resistance (for example, an ombudsman office, the 
judiciary, or sympathetic political parties). It will be suggested, that the fundamental 
underdevelopment of NGOs in Ivory Coast – which fundamentally weakened their 
capacity to censure Trafigura – is a manifestation of successive colonial and post-
colonial government policies, the imperial agendas of foreign states, and Ivory Coast’s 
peripheral role in the world economy. 
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Employing Lasslett’s (2012) relational paradigm of resistance, this chapter gauged the 
capacity of domestic NGOs in Ivory Coast to resist state-corporate crime – specifically 
the dumping as explored in Chapter 5 – and showed the lack of faculty for local NGOs 
in Ivory Coast to resist, expose and/or sanction a state-corporate crime akin to the 
dumping. Lack of funding, staff and expertise was a common feature and a function of 
the economic and political environment in which the NGOs found themselves. The vast 
majority of funding (when it is forthcoming) comes from foreign governments, some 
with a spurious agenda, and is project-based so that the organisations are restrained 
from building on their institutional capacity. Perhaps the most surprising failure was the 
isolationist attitudes of the NGOs, and Club UA pointed out that the local NGOs rarely 
pool resources: 
There is no genuine collaboration. In other countries, when governments take a 
decision and civil society does not agree with the decision, they resist 
collectively. But in Ivory Coast, this is not the case.
295
 
This lack of collaboration between NGOs to ‘resist collectively’ is a serious limitation 
and precludes the establishment of an effective resistance movement to single issue 
events like the dumping. When asked about what advice they give to victims who 
approached them about the dumping, the president of MIDH stated that they would 
redirect them to the local victims organisations. But he was clear to state that he would 
not advocate victim organisations or federations. MIDH distance themselves from these 




While researching human rights NGOs on my field trip to Ivory Coast, it emerged that 
the interests of the victims of the dumping were not being served by the existing human 
rights NGOs based in Ivory Coast but by newly formed, bespoke organisations and 
federations – victims organisations. The next chapter reveals how the victims 
organisations, facilitated and encouraged by the state, have taken a role upon themselves 
that would normally be expected to be within the purview of the state or of the well-
established human rights NGOs. Further investigation revealed that these victims 
organisations were in fact self-serving so that victims have been left without genuine 
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representation on the issue, and are further being exploited based on their status as 
victims. It is to these victims organisations and that this study will now turn. 
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Chapter 7 – Organised Crime and the Commodification of Victimhood 
The victims organisations interviewed appear to be in the business of producing 
victimhood for a fee, which can be understood as an ‘organised crime’. The term 
‘organised crime’ is used here to describe a form of ‘organisational crime’ (or deviance) 
on the one hand and rather primitive or ‘unorganised crime’ on the other. The use of the 
term ‘organised crime’ is problematic and Levy argues that “it might be better not to 
rely on the term or alternatively to rely on the fact that it does not have a stable 
meaning” (Levy 2007: 799).297 However, this thesis embraces the instability of the term 
and adopts a broad definition of organised crime based on Woodiwiss’ definition: 
“systematic criminal activity for money or power” (Woodiwiss 2001: 3). While this 
definition is wide enough to include inter alia corporate crime (Green and Ward 2002), 
it is applied here to organisations that purport to be civil society organisations – would-
be ‘champions of the people’ – but have the ulterior and hidden motives of capital 
accumulation at their clients’ expense. As will be shown, the more ‘successful’ victims 
organisations in Ivory Coast were set up by opportunists/crime entrepreneurs. 
Using such a broad interpretation of organised crime avoids the pitfalls of legal 
definitions, the unresolved discourse in academic attempts at a definition, or an 
association with enduring stereotypical ‘Sopranos’ (la Cosa Nostra) type organisations 
(also known as ‘syndicated crime’; Newburn 2007). 
Legal definitions are too restrictive for present purposes. For example, the EU definition 
of ‘organised crime’ requires that a collaborative enterprise between at least two people 
be suspected of criminal offences carrying sentences of at least four years (European 
Commission and Europol 2001). A reliance on domestic criminal law can, as was seen 
with state-corporate crime in Chapter 5, allow other deviant behaviour to fall outwith 
that definition. Furthermore, the use of ‘suspicion’ is too far removed from the principle 
of objectively for the purposes of a scientific study of crime. 
As for academia, Levy argues that: 
Very few academics would defend the analytical utility of the term organized 
crime, with its crude binary organized/unorganized distinction which means that 
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there is more variation within the category of organized that there is between 
organized and unorganized … many have shifted towards using the term 
‘enterprise crime’… (Levy 2002: 887) 
As will be seen in this chapter, the organisations acted in a disorganised, ad hoc manner 
and the crude binary that Levy (2002) refers to fails to account for the behaviour 
observed. It was also not deemed necessary here to follow a shift towards ‘enterprise 
crime’, or indeed to coin any new term (such as, for example, ‘NGO crime’) as once 
defined for present purposes, organised crime fits with the activity uncovered by the 
research – that is, the exploitation of victims by newly established victims 
organisations. 
The attractiveness of victimhood to local members of the community could be based on 
two premises. The first is that they have indeed been the victim of the state-corporate 
crime and seek recognition of this fact (for various possible psychological and 
sociological reasons), and the second is the promise of a future claim for compensation. 
The previous chapter analysed a range of factors which weakened the response of 
domestic NGOs to the toxic dumping. Underpinning this analysis was a criminological 
assumption that those censuring state-corporate crime are necessarily a force for ‘good’ 
and social justice. This chapter is going to question this assumption. While data-
collecting on my field trip, it became apparent that the civil society actors that were 
spearheading domestic efforts to censure Trafigura were in fact embedded in organised 
crime. Victimhood became a commodity, which they attempted to manufacture by 
encouraging victims to come forward and pay to join non-existing class actions which 
were to take place in foreign courts. Therefore, this chapter will examine the infiltration 
of civil society by organised crime groups and describes how the dumping incident 
created the opening for organisations to exploit victims, essentially criminalising 
resistance. 
The chapter begins by exploring the relationship between the nation-state and various 
forms of organised crime, “which ultimately defines organised crime’s power, character 
and persistence” (Green and Ward 2004: 104). The next section of the chapter discusses 
the precedent of the transformation of a student union (FESCI) from a resistance 
organisation to a criminal gang. By looking at this historical example, some indictors of 
the mechanism of such a transformation are noted. The chapter finally looks at how 
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criminal groups took advantage of an absentee government to exploit victims of the 
dumping and reveals the conditions “for organised crime to fill the vacuum created by 
an ineffective state” (Green and Ward 2004: 87; Sands 2007). 
Background of Organised Crime 
There is a base level of organisational crime in Ivory Coast, against the background of 
which the newly formed victims organisations should be analysed. In 2004, about 4% of 
the population was employed (at least officially). About 64% of the total population was 
under 24 years old. This lack of formal employment for a large, young population fuels 
the expansion of an informal sector – a sector dominated by criminal networks in West 
Africa (Wannenburg 2005). The informal sector in Ivory Coast is significant, and even 
the National Council of Ivorian Employers (CNPI), according to Integrated Regional 
Information Networks (IRIN) (2005), encourages companies to “exploit opportunities in 
the informal sector”. The drivers of organised crime in Ivory Coast have changed during 
the state’s short history and have been both of an internal and an external character.  
The enduring conflicts in Ivory Coast have had an effect on the prevalence of organised 
criminality. There are a number of dimensions to this factor. First, as McMullin (2009) 
argues, organised criminal groups are “involved in a wide array of activities within 
conflict states” (McMullin 2009: 76) and civil wars in conflict states have brought about 
“cross-border demand for arms, soldiers and natural resources” (McMullin 2009: 88). 
Second, Wannenburg argues that human trafficking in West Africa “is exacerbated by 
civil wars, refugees, internal displacement, the recruitment of child soldiers and 
economic conditions” (Wannenburg 2005: 11). Third, the UN claims that West African 
conflict states,
298
 have “played a significant part in international drug trafficking, 
diamond smuggling, human trafficking, cigarette smuggling, forgery, money 
laundering, armed robbery and arms trafficking” since 1995, in order to generate 
revenues for combating internal threats (UNODC 2005: 13). Fourth, armed groups that 
are spawned by conflict interact with the established criminal groups: “armed groups 
co-opted, displaced or co-operated with existent criminal groups” (McMullin 2009: 84; 
and see Wannenburg 2005: 8 and UNODC 2005: 38). Thus, the endemic civil conflict 
that has punctuated Ivory Coast’s modern history has generated a variety of 
opportunities for organised crime groups (in the traditional sense, and under the 
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definition employed here) to flourish, under the protection of a state that welcomes the 
revenues generated by these illicit industries (ICG 2004: 4). Regional conflict fuels 
demand for weapons and the “highly porous, largely unpatrolled borders” (Small Arms 
Survey 2006: 256) are a failure of Ivorian government to secure the state’s territory 
which allows for the illicit trade. Fighters and tens of thousands of weapons (UNODC 
2009) circulate between war-torn states in West Africa, whose borders are “revolving 
doors of trafficked arms and de-mobilised soldiers of one state re-recruited to fight in 
another” (McMullin 2009: 88). According to Amnesty International (2008), the main 
players in arms trafficking weapons in Ivory Coast are private Ivorian and European 
brokers. However, the government is also proactively involved in the arming of pro-
government militias, and has “provided support for some ten thousand ill-disciplined 
militia fighters” (HRW 2005: 1). These militias are highly criminogenic, “but enjoy 
impunity due to their relationship with the government” (Small Arms Survey 2006: 
255). Human Rights Watch also claims that these militias have perpetrated “serious 
crimes with impunity …” (HRW 2005: 1). On the other side of the conflict, the Forces 
Nouvelles de Côte d'Ivoire “engage in serious human rights abuses such as extrajudicial 
executions, torture, arbitrary detentions and confiscation of property” (HRW 2005: 1). 
However, while significant, war is not the only factor fostering organised crime. In a 
country where government is dominated by a form of patrimonial politics, the state has 
been treated as the private property of the ruling factions. Using state power these 
factions have been able to extract personal wealth as well as funding for the war chests 
(Global Witness 2007) from the economy through the use of cocoa and coffee 
marketing boards. The International Crisis Group (ICG), for example, claim that 
Houphouët-Boigny’s ‘slush fund’ was fed by the complex arrangement of the cocoa 
marketing board and its associated organisations referred to as the cocoa filière: 
The labyrinthine cocoa filière, a kind of Enron-type structure of front 
companies, secret bank accounts, and transfer of funds with multiple layers of 
insulation between the criminal acts and their eventual beneficiaries, is the 
ultimate testament to their sophistication. (ICG 2004: 4) 
The filière system, which was originally designed to guarantee a minimum price for 
cocoa and coffee payable to farmers, “operates through a nexus of interconnected 
institutions that make up the cocoa and coffee marketing system” (ICG 2004: 5) and up 
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to the 1980s received about 60% of the cocoa and coffee revenues, leaving farmers with 
about one quarter of world market prices (ICG 2004). 
The cocoa filière’s role is to regulate the market but cocoa institutions have, claim 
Global Witness, “directly contributed to the war effort by providing the government 
with money, vehicles and weapons, using money from cocoa levies” (Global Witness 
2007: 24). The ICG report the allegation that US$100 million was extorted from one of 
the institutions of the filière system, “and later used to buy weapons in a deal managed 
by an off-shore company” (ICG 2004: 5). A World Bank official told Global Witness 
that “[w]e know that the revenues collected from cocoa are used to fund the military” 
(Global Witness 2007: 24). 
In March 2002, at the request of Gbagbo, a government inspector François Kouamé 
Kouadio (of L’Inspection Générale d’Etat or IGE) started investigating the reformed 
filière system. He reported on accounting anomalies in the form of gifts and ‘loans’ of 
about US$200 million and in August 2002, shortly after his report was leaked, he was 
beaten up in Abidjan. This report had also warned that the state bank holding cocoa 
proceeds might not be “able to resist (possible) demands for funds from the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance” (Global Witness 2007: 56). He has since been fired from the 
IGE and reportedly remains in hiding (ICG 2004; Global Witness 2007). 
Others reporting on corruption within the filière system have suffered a similar fate to 
Kouadio. In April 2004, for example, Guy-André Kieffer
299
 was kidnapped in Abidjan. 
He had been working on reforming the cocoa sector and had been investigating Ivorian 
corruption as an independent journalist. His whereabouts are unknown but he was 
reportedly tortured to death (Global Witness 2007). Several months later, in November 
2004, Xavier Ghelber
300
 was kidnapped in Abidjan during his EU audit of the cocoa 
sector. At gendarmerie headquarters in Abidjan, Ghelber was reportedly threatened at 
gunpoint before he managed to escape with the help of French troops (Global Witness 
2007). A French judge is looking into both the Kieffer and Ghelber cases: “The judge’s 
preliminary findings indicate that three of Xavier Ghelber’s kidnappers belonged to … 
the president’s private security force” (Global Witness 2007: 57). The disappearance of 
Guy-André Kieffer and the attacks on Kouadio and Ghelber exposes “the very real 
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dangers of denouncing corruption and other abuses in the cocoa sector” (Global Witness 
2007: 59) and does nothing but discourage civil society’s role in resisting these crimes. 
Not surprisingly in a country that has been burdened by civil wars and state corruption, 
formal economic opportunities are few and largely unattractive (for reasons that have 
already been outlined). This has created the incentive for a variety of illicit trades based 
around smuggling (drugs, humans, natural resources and weapons) and money 
laundering. The following section briefly outlines these activities. 
Drug production in Ivory Coast is on the increase but is limited to low-grade cannabis
301
 
(Gonto 2010), grown by farmers trying to avoid the volatile cocoa and coffee markets 
and the exploitative filière. The financial advantages of growing marijuana are obvious: 
Whereas coffee and cocoa get the seller an average of FCFA 500 (US$ 1) per 
kilogram, and of this sum, a host of taxes is still deducted centrally, one 
kilogram of marijuana can get the seller a tax free FCFA 4000 (US$ 8). (Gonto 
2010: 25) 
The country is one the four main producers of cannabis in West Africa
302
 and supplies – 
by way of criminal organisations – local or regional markets (Wannenburg 2005). 
However, despite a lack of ‘hard drug’ production in the state, Gonto (2010) argues that 
the expanding regional trade is headquartered in Abidjan. Drug traffickers use the 
territory as a hub for transporting heroin (from Asia) and cocaine (from South America) 
to Europe and the United States (Adamoli et al 1998; Gonto 2010; US DoS 1994). 
Increased policing of drug trafficking in the ports of Nigeria has driven criminal 
networks to the less policed coastline and waterways of Ivory Coast
303
 and the “vast and 
porous land, riverine and seaports and extensive corruption among government and 
customs officials provide an ideal environment for illicit trade” (Wannenburg 2005: 11). 
This ‘ideal environment’ is one of the reasons for the toxic waste being repelled from 
the Nigerian ports and being accepted in Ivory Coast, and is another indication of how 
the Ivorian state facilitates crime. But it is not just the corruption of customs regime on 
the coast that has allowed smuggling to thrive; the northern borders are porous too, 
which has facilitated a range of illicit industries. 
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During the partitioning of Ivory Coast from 2002 (see Chapter 3), the north became a 
kind of “free trade zone” (Wannenburg 2005: 10). Cheap cigarettes are imported from 
Guinea and sugar is imported from Burkina Faso and Mali. Cotton, cultivated 
exclusively in the north (IRIN 2005), is exported to Burkina Faso and Mali. All these 
transactions are illegal and no duty is payable to the Ivorian state treasury. However, 
charges are levied by rebel forces (Wannenburg 2005) who argued that “government 
taxes would be used by the presidency to buy arms and prolong the war” (IRIN 2005), a 
view confirmed by Global Witness (2007).  
The volume of the illicit market is significant. In the 2004 and 2005 seasons, about 
220,000 tonnes (about 55% of total production) of cotton were illegally exported to 
Mali and Burkina Faso (IRIN 2005). The UN argues that the volume of Asian sugar 
being illegally imported damages local industry and is “undermining local production” 
(UNODC 2009: 23). Northern Ivory Coast, outside the full control of the state 
centralised in Abidjan, is the second largest market for illicit cigarettes in the region 
with 17% of West Africa’s illicit cigarette market (worth US$104 million per annum, 
23% of the regional total): “the trade is rife in the unstable north but almost non-existent 
in the south” (UNODC 2009: 31). The UN also argues that ‘a large share’ of oil stolen 
from Nigeria is refined in Ivory Coast (as well as in Ghana and Cameroon) (UNODC 
2009: 23). This suggests state involvement in criminal activity, as the only oil refining 
facilities in Ivory Coast are government owned (Wild 2010).  
Ivory Coast is also a well documented human trafficking route (Wannenburg 2005), 
especially for children (Chanthavong 2002; International Institute of Tropical 
Agriculture 2002). The number of trafficked children working on plantations in Ivory 
Coast ranges from 12,000 to 15,000; which is between 9% and 12% of the total child 
workforce in the industry (Ellenbogen 2004). In an international press offensive, in 
order to avoid a boycott of Ivorian chocolate, the government insisted that “it should be 
seen as the victim, not the perpetrator of child trafficking. It says that it had no idea 
what was going on its plantations” (Blunt 2001). 
Funds from the above organised criminal activities usually find their way to Abidjan, 
the financial hub of West Africa, and are laundered along with the proceeds of regional 
organised crime. The cross-border trade in cocoa (and to a lesser extent diamonds), 
“generates contraband funds that are laundered into the banking system via informal 
Page | 156  
moneychangers” (US DoS 2007). A lack of government oversight and regulation 
facilitates these financial crimes. 
This section would suggest that, owing to a variety of factors, organised crime is a 
central feature of Ivory Coast’s political economy. Moreover, organised crime has 
infiltrated the state and vice-versa. Thus organised crime in Ivory Coast is both 
instigated and facilitated by the state. In such an environment, it is perhaps not 
surprising that no sector of civil society has remained untainted by the influence of 
organised crime. This is certainly the case with the victim groups that were set up in the 
wake of the dumping. However, the hijacking of civil society by criminal gangs is not 
new. The case of the main Ivorian students’ union, FESCI, demonstrates how resistance 
has been criminalised. An analysis of this union has two roles: to look at the context in 
which resistance can be criminalised and also to discuss the links between FESCI and 
the victims organisations. 
FESCI and the Criminalisation of Civil Society 
The Fédération Estudiantine et Scolaire de Côte d’Ivoire (Student Federation of Ivory 
Coast or FESCI) has been accused of organised criminal activity and has reported 
connections to some of the influential victims organisations (see below). This section 
looks at the transformation of FESCI from a genuine pro-democracy student group 
engaged in the resistance against state crime to a violent, repressive criminal 
organisation. The union was originally founded in 1990 as “a platform for students to 
air their grievances” (IRIN 2007: 40). However, owing to its opposition to the 
government, FESCI was driven underground and appears to have emerged in the late 
1990s as a criminal gang. Despite the apparent criminality of FESCI, the group is 
considered to be a training ground for future leaders of the Ivorian state: “FESCI is the 
best school for leaders there is. You come out battle hardened and ready to do 
politics”304 (HRW 2008: 1). This section charts the union’s transition and links the 
changes to the criminalisation of resistance. 
FESCI started out in 1990 to seek reform of the Ivorian one-party system and from the 
outset was funded by opposition parties, including the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI). 
Consequently, Houphouët-Boigny and his Ivorian Parti Democratique de la Côte 
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d’Ivoire (PDCI) party viewed FESCI as subversive and after the state’s first presidential 
election (Houphouët-Boigny versus Gbagbo) in 1991 saw Houphouët-Boigny win 
amidst accusations of electoral irregularities, “the organization was formally banned and 
forced underground soon after its creation, with many of its leaders hunted and jailed” 
(HRW 2008: 7). This period also saw allegations of collaboration between FESCI and 
the army. Human Rights Watch claim that a government inquiry into a raid into a 
university dormitory led by General Guéï in 1991 and including both soldiers and 
FESCI ‘foot-soldier’ members resulted in the rape of at least three women and a number 
of beatings. Guéï was not sanctioned by the government for his involvement (HRW 
2008), which – following Green and Ward (2004) – may indicate that he was carrying 
out acts in pursuit of the state’s, (or a section of the state’s) organisational goals. 
The majority of FESCI’s leaders were jailed during the 1990s. Martial Ahipeaud 
(FESCI founder), Eugene Djué (FESCI founder), Guillaume Soro (rebel leader and 
prime minister) and Charles Blé Goudé (Young Patriots founder) were all considered by 
Amnesty International (1992) to be ‘prisoners of conscience’. Outside of the leadership 
of FESCI, Gbagbo (and his wife) and the president of LIDHO were arrested and 
sentenced to prison terms for activities related to the union (HRW 2008; Amnesty 
International 1992). 
FESCI re-emerged in 1997 but with an apparent shift in character. Following the 1999 
coup General Guéï allowed the union to resume full operations (US DoS 2001). Since 
the early 2000s, FESCI has, HRW claims, “[b]een responsible for politically and 
criminally motivated violence, including assault, extortion, and rape” (HRW 2008: 6) 
and has been accused of attacks on the state (including ministers and judges), civil 
society (including human rights NGOs and journalists) and individuals. The group is 
especially violent towards those opposed to the Gbagbo administration and in 2004 
FESCI lynched the communist party leader (US DoS 2006). Furthermore, “FESCI is 
routinely associated with ‘mafia’ type criminal behavior including extortion and 
protection rackets” (HRW 2008: 99) on and around university and high school 
campuses (HRW 2008). The victims of FESCI are mainly the students they purport to 
represent but they have also targeted other civil society actors.  
The bulk of FESCI’s criminal activity takes place on campuses, university residences 
and the surrounding areas throughout Abidjan, and the group allegedly aims to “control  
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political thought, student activities and even commerce on campus” (LIDHO quoted by 
IRIN 2007: 40). Academic freedom is threatened and students report “harassment and 
extortion by FESCI members” (IRIN 2007: 40) as well as cases of rape and torture 
(IRIN 2007). University professors and lectures are also targeted: “One teacher’s face 
was disfigured in an attack, prompting his colleagues to halt work for two weeks” (IRIN 
2007: 41). 
HRW claims that since 2002, FESCI has “exhibited an increasing tendency to 
criminally appropriate and allocate key university facilities and services” (HRW 2008: 
52). Students are forced to pay monthly stipends to remain in student residences and 
small-traders selling food and drinks on campus must pay monthly ‘taxes’ to FESCI 
(IRIN 2007). This protection racket for the merchants includes a system of ‘justice’ that 
would normally be provided by the state. A FESCI member interviewed by HRW in 
2007 explains: 
If a merchant we protect has a problem with a thief, he will bring them to us. 
He’ll come to whoever is on duty that day who listens to both the thief and the 
merchant and then decides what to do. Usually he decides how much the thief 
owes to the merchant and takes a commission from the thief as well. Often the 
thief is beaten too. Merchants prefer to come to FESCI because we’re more 
efficient than the police where you risk things not going anywhere. Police have 
no right to come to our territory. If they come, we chase them away. They are 
usually afraid of us anyway. So even if a citizen goes to the 8
th
 precinct to say 
they have a problem with FESCI, the police will tell you they can’t do anything 
about it. (HRW 2008: 55) 
This interview reveals the substitution of the state’s justice system by FESCI and also 
highlights the relationship between the student group and the police. The impunity 
afforded to FESCI was also reported by participant human rights NGOs, both by the 
inaction of the police and the criminal justice system.
305
  
In May 2007, “LIDHO and APDH were victims of violence by FESCI”306. FESCI 
attacked and ransacked the headquarters of LIDHO and APDH (with the damage 
estimated at about €60,000). The apparent motive was the NGOs’ support of strike 
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action by university professors but it has been claimed by members of LIDHO and 
APDH that “FESCI’s real goal was both the elimination of files and records that 
contained details regarding FESCI’s misdeeds, as well as punishment for having 
publicly denounced FESCI’s actions in the past” (HRW 2008: 71). Police were present 
at one of the attacks and stood by (HRW 2008). This incident shows how agencies of 
the state facilitate the repression of the censure capabilities of local NGOs and also 
highlights the volatile relationship between FESCI and the human rights NGOs. 
APDH started proceedings against FESCI following the attack, by lodging complaints 
with the Attorney General, but they were not acted upon.
307
 LIDHO was forced to 
abandon its former HQ after the attack.
308
 LIDHO also considered legal action against 
FESCI.
309
 MIDH has assisted a student union to file a criminal legal complaint against 
FESCI following the rape of one of their members.
310
 Nothing has come of these legal 
complaints, and the next section explores the relationship between the student group and 
the state with a view to explaining the impunity that FESCI enjoy. 
The head of FESCI from 1995 to 1998, Guillaume Soro became the secretary general of 
the Forces Nouvelles (FN) and then the Prime Minister of Ivory Coast, in a ‘unity’ 
government, from March 2007 to October 2010 (Global Witness 2007). His rise from 
student leader to government leader is not unusual as “FESCI appears to have become a 
training ground for emerging Ivorian leadership” (HRW 2008: 93). Many FESCI 
leaders have moved on to lead the youth wings of many of the major political parties 
and other former leaders have set up their own parties. Another example is Charles Blé 
Goudé,
311
 leader of FESCI from 1999 to 2001 (HRW 2008). The atmosphere created by 
the FESCI ‘political nursery’ promotes the creation of “a generation of leaders who 
have cut their political teeth in a climate of intimidation, violence, and impunity…” 
(HRW 2008: 8). 
The secretary general of FESCI denies that the organisation is politically motivated or 
violent but did admit that there have been violent incidents and claims that “we remind 
the instigators to be orderly” (IRIN 2007: 41). This sanction is not significant and 
indicates that the individuals involved in violence are pursuing organisational goals. 
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HRW (2008) claim that the head of the Ivory Coast army supported FESCI when they 
attacked the national television station and supported the student group generally during 
the anti-UN riots in January 2006 (HRW 2008). This close-knit relationship between the 
government and the student group has both contributed to state-organised crime and the 
criminal impunity “associated with nearly all offenses perpetrated by members of 
FESCI” (HRW 2008: 82). 
Indeed, interviewees for Human Rights Watch’s report claimed that FESCI’s political 
power and criminal behaviour is a result of governmental support as the group is 
“protected by power” (HRW 2008: 81) and “supported by the FPI” (HRW 2008: 81). 
University residences are known as a “no mans land” (HRW 2008: 82) due to the 
“absolute control exercised by FESCI and the inability or unwillingness of state security 
forces to intervene in the face of criminal conduct by FESCI members” (HRW 2008: 
82). Judges and police interviewed by Human Rights Watch in 2007 explained the 
impunity in terms of fear for their career and personal or family safety, as well as “the 
unpredictability of taking action against those they believe to have enormous political 
cover” (HRW 2008: 84). So while the criminal activities of FESCI are well 
documented, they are well protected and “government authorities have only rarely 
investigated, arrested, and prosecuted those FESCI members responsible” (HRW 2008: 
81). 
FESCI are a large criminal organisation operating in Abidjan with impunity. This is a 
form of state-organised crime owing to the organisation’s inter-linkages with the state. 
But the particular interest in the FESCI group for this thesis is that fact that, as a student 
union, they would be expected to be a ‘force-for-good’ member of civil society. 
However, any positive role they played as the representative voice of students has been 
changed into a quasi-state body role dictated by close links with political parties and 
senior politicians. This creates the framework in which their role to “control political 
thought” (LIDHO quoted by IRIN 2007: 40) on campus on behalf of the political elite 
can be commodified through their supplementary rackets and extortion activities. The 
commodification of a civil society therefore appears to be a phenomenon with deep 
roots in Ivory Coast. Therefore, when the toxic dumping looked like generating a 
significant monetary windfall, it is not surprising that victimhood became commodified 
under the direction of organised groups. FESCI was, as will be seen, involved in this 
process. 
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Victims Organisations 
Looking at the reaction of the government to the dumping, it is clear that Ivory Coast 
was an ineffective state. A UN Special Rapporteur
312
 who visited Ivory Coast in August 
2008 was clear that the Ivorian government was not in a position to deal with the 
dumping: “it is fair to say that the Government did not have the capacity and was not 
prepared to handle a crisis of this magnitude … [and] … while various relevant 
Ministries were mobilized to deal with the crisis, many did not have the capacity or the 
budget to respond adequately” (Ibeanu 2008). Green and Ward (2004) warn that 
… there is a tendency in weaker states … for organised crime to fill the vacuum 
created by an ineffective state. In these circumstances organised crime is able to 
flourish and even to compete with the state in terms of specific administrative 
and political functions. (Green and Ward 2004: 187) 
The inaction of the government left a vacuum that has been filled by a myriad of brand 
new bespoke voluntary organisations who have countenanced numerous allegations of 
corruption and extortion. The victims organisations cannot be usefully equated with 
traditional organised crime or enterprise crime organisations, as there is no penetration 
of a formal or informal market as such. They have in a sense generated a market by 
commandeering victimhood. They are attracting funding and generating return based 
solely on the victimhood of their members, who are being enticed through false-
promises and propaganda. 
As outlined in Chapter 2, six victims organisations or federations were interviewed by 
the author: UVDTAB, FENAVIDET, RENADVIDET, CNVDT, FAVIDET and 
VUCAH (see Glossary for long-form names). As shown below, there are a number of 
commonalities between these organisations. All were purportedly set up in late 
2006/early 2007, claim to have many thousands of ‘members’ and have similar stated 
missions. Significantly, they also share mechanisms by which to extort fees from 
victims for some hypothetical and unlikely future compensation claims. Furthermore, as 
the data below reveals, many of these groups claim to be the official group set up by the 
president and to have been involved with the class action launched by Leigh Day & Co 
solicitors. 
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Some Basic Details of the Main Organisations 
UVDTAB was founded on 26
th
 September 2006, and is staffed by volunteers. The 
president of UVDTAB claimed that there are 560 volunteers. However, this number 
seems high. These organisations would not have the logistical capacity to sustain so 
many volunteers
313
 and no evidence was presented to support the claim. UVDTAB 
claims to represent about 100,000 victims and offers them registration: “we list them, so 
these people can also receive the status of victims and receive medical care”.314 The first 
stated objective of UVDTAB is the identification of all victims, with the view to 
organising to resisting the perpetrators of the crime; “we have to get united to fight 
together”.315 Another objective is the identification of toxic waste sites, located 
throughout the city and its suburbs, which have been neglected by the authorities; “to 
identify as well places that have been forgotten by the state of Ivory Coast, places where 
there are toxic wastes”.316 Their third objective is the “absolute decontamination of all 
polluted sites”.317 Fourthly, UVDTAB are asking for the construction of a medical 
centre that can assist all the victims. Fifthly, they are also pursuing compensation for 
victims that is “proportional to the crime committed”.318 Finally, they would like to see 
a study of the medium- and long-term consequences of the toxic waste on human health 
and on the environment. They say that such a study has never been carried out.
319
  
CNVDT claims to have been originally formed in 2006, three weeks after the dumping 
– when they “saw the scope of the disaster” – under the name ‘Association pour les 
Victimes d’Abidjan’. About two years later, from the end of 2008 to February 2009, 
about forty victims organisations that had been independently formed merged to form 
this federation.
320
 They claim to have been instructed by Leigh Day & Co solicitors 
(Leigh Day), who are running the class action claim in the UK. However, this is denied 
by Leigh Day (Brown 2009). CNVDT is staffed by 42 people, each president of the 40 
original associations and two members of staff that are paid: the secretary and the head 
of the IT service. They claim to represent 289,000 people, 134,000 of whom are 
children, across all of the districts of Abidjan. They have four main objectives: first, to 
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better organise those affected by the dumping; second, to fight for compensation for the 
organisation’s members; third, to arrange health care for victims; and finally, to lobby 
political leaders to legislate to prevent this kind of disaster happening again.
321
 
FAVIDET formed in March 2007. It is a federation of 23 associations and organises 
meetings of up to 100 victims associations. FAVIDET has a central committee of four 
people. They also have two doctors and two lawyers, as well as members responsible 
for security and communications; all staff members are volunteers. They do not have an 
accurate number of victim members and are “surveying the issue”,322 with a view to 
having an accurate number available within six months. The stated objectives of the 
federation are to gather the associations of victims, the identification of all the victims 
of the toxic waste, the compensation of all the victims and the provision of health care 
to the victims. When asked whether there were any other similar organisations, the 
president said that some federations have been created but he refused to name them.
323
 
FAVIDET was originally a local district specific victim support group and claim to 
have been legally founded with the help of LIDHO. Then, at the President of Ivory 
Coast’s request, they organised as a federation, again with the help of LIDHO who sent 
PhD students to assist them. FAVIDET say that they have absolutely no resources, and 
100 million CFA promised to them by the state, after the government had reached a 
settlement with Trafigura, has never materialised. FAVIDET claim that they were also 
involved (as did CNVDT) with the class action of Leigh Day, and assisted in compiling 
details of victims, as did other associations.
324
 The interview took place at a conference 
venue, during an event organised by this federation to roll out their new registration 
identification cards (see Appendix B for a sample that was provided for the purposes of 
this thesis). These ‘victim cards’ were part of the paraphernalia of the federation and its 
members, and they appeared to be produced to give the federation an impression of 
legitimacy in order to entice victims to join them. 




 “at the invitation of the head of 
state” after attending the presidential palace on 7th December 2006. FENAVIDET 
claims that the president stated he would take “important measures to find a solution to 










 Interview, Abidjan, September 2010 (FENAVIDET) and http://www.fenavidet-
ci.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=68:declaration&catid=1:latest-
news&Itemid=76 
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the problem”326 and that “private organisations such as theirs should take important 
measures to defend the victim’s rights for the benefit of justice for all”.327 It appears that 
the state is deferring to the victims organisations and “for that reason, the president 
offered 40,000,000 CFA and suggested that they create well organised federations to 
best fight for their objectives”.328 FENAVIDET claim that their organisation “has been 
created, by all the organisations that the president welcomed at that time”.329 This claim 
again echoes the claims of other groups to be the only official victims organisation. 
FENAVIDET claim to have about 15 permanent, paid members of staff: “[the] majority 
are volunteer workers except that they receive compensation just to encourage them to 
work”,330 “it is not a salary as such … they are all volunteers but receive compensation 
regularly”.331 From May to September 2010, FENAVIDET claims they were also 
paying about 45 computer ‘scientists’.332 These ‘scientists’ were hired to design and 
administer the organisation’s database of victims. In the Ivory Coast such a grand 
mobilisation of computer ‘scientists’ is quite an unusual and doubtful achievement. It is 
made all the more dubious by the fact that the office only contained about ten 
computers, while the database itself would in all likeliness require no more than two or 
three IT specialists.
333/334
 These dubious claims made by FENAVIDET were part of a 
broader theatrical production that was designed to entice victims. When I entered their 
office they showed me computers and an array of one-metre-high stacks of documents 
purported to be registrations of victims. Another theatrical prop employed by 
FENAVIDET are membership cards, which were also handed out by other groups. 
When asked how many victims they represent, FENAVIDET claim that “it is 
impossible to give a precise number of victims”,335 and that “they cannot answer 
because they need to be careful”.336 FENAVIDET’s stated mission is to (1) “1st and 
foremost is the decontamination of the Abidjan environment”, (2) medical assistance to 
all the victims, and (3) reparations from Trafigura – “Trafigura need to compensate all 
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the victims.”337 FENAVIDET claim that they are not financed by any external 
organisation and that this “is one of the biggest problems that we are facing”.338 
FENAVIDET claim that it is for this reason that they charge membership fees.
339
 They 
would not reveal how many members they have, or how much the membership fee is. 
When asked who is responsible for the dumping, FENAVIDET stated: “There is only 
one responsible – one that is believed to be the most powerful, the richest able to 
corrupt everybody and even violate international conventions and to commit crimes of 
such dimensions – it is Trafigura.”340 This statement in indicative of the general 
approach the victims organisations take to Trafigura; elevating the company to the 
status of an all-powerful demon, which only they can defend against. 
It was apparent to the author, following the interviews with the victim organisations, 
that many of their claims were incredible. Indeed, unlike domestic human rights NGOs, 
these organisations claim to be mobilising significant technical and human resources, in 
an extremely challenging and competitive environment. Moreover, they also appeared 
to have extensive links with the class action in the UK and the Ivorian President. All of 
these claims were supported by office props that would lend credibility to their claims. 
However, the spectacular claims did not end here, as will be seen. 
Funding, Legitimacy and Capacity to Represent Victims 
UVDTAB say that they are funded in various ways: donations from individuals from 
NGOs and individuals in Switzerland and France, and from partnerships with TV and 
radio channels such as BBC, Al Jazeera, CNN and other press organisations and 
journalists.
341
 It seems unlikely that this organisation receives financial support from 
international press organisations and the whole operation appeared underfunded and 
seemed to be just a one-man operation
342
 (despite the claims of having 560 volunteers 
mentioned above). During interview, it became clear that while the leader of the 
organisation had a strong and apparently energetic, passionate personality, the facilities 
of the organisation were lacking. The interview took place in a room with wooden 
benches along the walls, separated by a curtain from seamstresses busily working 
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away
343
 in a sowing shop. Another office across the road had no furniture but was 




The president referred often to the organisation’s legal initiatives but there is little 
evidence of the capacity of UVDTAB to carry out their objectives using the law. The 
president mentioned working with barristers and solicitors on an ongoing civil case at 
the High Court of Justice in London. There is, however, no record of this case. It may 
be they were referring to the settled case with Trafigura run by Leigh Day & Co but the 
only ongoing issue in that case is a disagreement regarding the £105 million legal costs 
bill filed by Leigh Day & Co in 2010 (Dowell 2010). The president also discussed his 
organisation’s intervention in a case in Ivory Coast in September 2008 but there is 
currently no civil or criminal case pending in Ivory Coast. UVDTAB are preoccupied 
with their legal legitimacy as outlined by one
345
 of five booklets handed over during the 
interview. These booklets – with titles/subjects ranging from legal capacity, mission to 
Europe 2010, press book, Universal Periodic Review and stories of victims – give a 
valuable insight into the priorities of the organisation. 
The ‘legal capacity’ booklet contains a copy of meeting minutes establishing the 
organisation on 26
th
 September 2006 complete with official judicial stamps. It also 
contains a copy of the official receipt for filing the legally required incorporation 
documents for the organisation, exactly a year later in September 2007 and another 
similar receipt in August 2008, both issued by the Ministry of Interior. The booklet also 
contains a copy an official journal extract, which the president claimed shows that his 
organisation is the only officially recognised victims organisation in Ivory Coast.
346
 
This is similar to statements by RENADVIDET: “It is the only organization accredited 
by the Ivorian state for this mission” (RENADVIDET 2010). The UVDTAB entry in 
Journal Officiel de la Republique de Côte d’Ivoire347 is brief and states that the 
organisation’s aims are to assist in a complete identification of victims and to ensure 
support for patients, but makes no reference to the Probo Koala. 






 UVDTAB: Capacité Juridique, undated (copy with author). 
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The ‘mission to Europe 2010’ booklet is a catalogue of 14 photographs of the president 
with individuals, or outside offices of organisations around Europe. The booklet 
contains only pictures and does not have any text, other than captions to the 
photographs). The president also pointed out a number of photographs of people on his 
‘office’ wall which he claimed to be supporters. He insisted that a photograph be taken 
of our meeting, which will undoubtedly end up on the wall with the rest of his 
‘supporters’; thereby using King’s College London as a medium for the organisation’s 
legitimacy. The ‘press book’ included clippings from French and Dutch newspapers that 
incorporated a photograph of the president as well as more photographs of the president 
with journalists from around the world and a BBC lawyer. 
UVDTAB also claim that they are the only group recognised by the UN, and refer to a 
report submitted by them
348
 to the UN’s Universal Periodic Review in 2009. However, 
this only shows that the UN recognises their existence and does not imply that they are 
the only legitimate victims organisation. They are also listed on the UN civil society 
database,
349
 but again this does not amount to recognition and simply requires the 
organisation to fill out a short online form. The president also produced a letter from the 
UN in Geneva claiming that it was an invitation to attend the UN buildings, but the 
letter (which was in English) appeared only to outline general security arrangements at 
the UN buildings in Geneva.  
These booklets are only concerned with the legitimacy of UVDTAB to represent 
victims, and all the energies of the organisation are focused towards promoting this 
impression. The final booklet, ‘stories of victims’, is the only one that is dedicated to 
the mission of the organisation and profiles alleged victims of the toxic waste along 
with pictures and text describing their experiences. Some of the injuries sustained by the 
victims profiled, such as amputated limbs, do not match with the medical evidence 
presented by studies in Abidjan (see Chapter 5). 
FENAVIDET’s office had a long queue of victims waiting to register when visited for 
the interview and the door entrance was blocked by two large men who appeared to be 
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acting as security guards.
350
 The interviewees expressed that they were upset that they 
weren’t the first victims organisation that was visited to participate in this research 
because they felt that they were the most legitimate organisation
351
 and it was only after 
profuse apologies and an explanation that any research project requires meticulous 
planning to ensure that it achieves its objectives that the interview was allowed to 
proceed. The organisation had been created in 2007 at the invitation of the head of state: 
“All those associations that were spontaneously formed to defend victim rights have 
been invited by the Republic on December 7
th
 2006 to attend the presidential palace.”352 
According to FENAVIDET, the President (at this meeting) declared he would take 
measures to find a solution to the problem. For that reason, the President offered 40 
million CFA (about €60,000), “to create well organised federations”.353 FENAVIDET 
claim that the federation was created by all the organisations that the President 
welcomed. This is very similar to the stated circumstances around the founding of 
CNVDT and FAVIDET. At the end of the interview, FENAVIDET admitted that they 
didn’t have any ideas on how to proceed with compensation claims, despite the fact that 
they were busily registering victims in the next room, and asked me if any ideas or 
assistance could be provided to them.
354
 This would suggest that the organisation is 
more interested in obtaining fees from victims, while little or no consideration has been 
given to the pursuit of justice. 
CNVDT claim that, in December 2006, they met state officials and all the victims 
organisations with the president of CNVDT as the spokesman and received a one-off 
payment of about 40 million CFA (about €60,000) to get organised – this is the same 
sum reported by FENAVIDET. Apart from this funding, CNVDT claim that they 
receive funding and material support primarily from private individuals.
355
 They do not 
have a legal department but claim to have lawyers. CNVDT have not taken legal actions 
at the domestic level but stated that they have taken legal action against Trafigura: “So 
it’s now in the London tribunal, through the cabinet called Leigh Day & Co.”356 
CNVDT had claimed in 2009 that they have a mandate from all claimants to receive and 
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distribute the compensation from this case. However, Leigh Day & Co denied that this 
is the case (Leigh Day & Co 2009). 
FENAVIDET claim that they have an “international judiciary action”357 in process but 
could not give details.
358
 There is no evidence of any such action and the claim has not 
been verified. FENAVIDET say that they are ‘pre-occupied’ with civil action against 
Trafigura. They admit that the action was criminal but only civil actions are ‘profitable’ 
“and will provide tangible results, to decontaminate all the sites that are still 
contaminated in Abidjan”.359 FAVIDET launched its identification process in 
September 2010. It included the issuing of an identification card, with photo, name, date 
of birth and residential area for each of the victims. FAVIDET reportedly claim that the 
cards will “help every victim of toxic waste to be recognized as such” (Dao 2010). And 
in order to achieve this legitimacy, they sent letters to the Ivorian institutions and the 
United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) to ask that they recognise the card. 
They state that every victim will be considered if new compensation is forthcoming. 
They also claim that victims’ descendants would also benefit from health care, “if by 
chance there is evidence that their illness is related to toxic waste” (Dao 2010). Each 
victim must pay 5,000 CFA (about €8) for the cards (Assi 2010; Dao 2010). 
FAVIDET claimed an intention to launch a civil action against Trafigura once they have 




It is apparent from the interviews with victim organisations that their stated source of 
funding is dubious at best. Adding to the doubt is the modest offices these organisations 
possess, with the notable exception of CNVDT. Nevertheless, what is apparent is that 
the victim organisations all claim to be undertaking or preparing to undertake legal 
actions, sometimes falsely reporting their role with the class action in the UK. This is 
despite the fact that the organisations in general suffer from a distinct lack of expertise 
and were not able to provide any details of the pending or planned cases.  
These claims, it would appear, are part of a broader theatre that these organisations use 
to lure in victims or people wishing to obtain the status of victimhood. In an almost 
                                                 
357






 Interview, Abidjan, September 2010 (FAVIDET). 
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cultist fashion, these organisations offer people the promise of extensive payouts in 
return for a subscription fee. The proof they offer is the successful Leigh Day action that 
continues to pay out via CNVDT. These promises are bulwarked by a series of props 
designed to impress in the mass scramble for victims. This is a competitive process, 
each victim group must essentially outdo the other, in an effort to secure a larger share 
of the victim market. By victim market, I mean people who are prepared to subscribe to 
these organisations, through some form of payment, in the hope of gaining a share of 
promised compensation payments. As a result of this process, local Ivorian television 
proclaims that “the associations of victims of toxic waste grow each day like 
mushrooms since the disaster”.361 It is to this process that we will now turn.  
UVDTAB are convinced that Trafigura is responsible for what happened to the victims: 
“It’s Trafigura and Trafigura and Trafigura.”362 After four years of involvement with the 
issue, CNVDT concluded that the crime is the result of a vast international conspiracy, 
involving “Trafigura and all the harbour authorities of the Occident to Africa”. The 
president initially refused to elaborate on the details – “I say it in my book. I won’t say 
it now” – but did go on to accuse the board of Trafigura and the authorities of the UK 
and Switzerland, for not controlling the corporation after previous crimes; “it’s not 
Trafigura’s first ‘blunder’ with this kind of disaster in the world” and the UK and 
Switzerland still allow the company’s headquarters to be based on their territory. 
CNVDT also believe that Trafigura’s blaming of the company Tommy is “a way of 
escaping. It’s shocking and scandalous for us.”363 When asked who was responsible for 
what happened, FAVIDET replied: “Oh, but it’s Trafigura. For us it’s not the society 
Tommy.”364 FAVIDET state that the best outcome for them would be free medical care 
for the victims.
365
 While the victims organisations have missions that require some sort 
of legal or advocacy action against Trafigura and/or the Ivorian state, none have such an 
action in place. The only activity observed is that of registering and charging fees to the 
victims of the dumping, thereby profiting from their victimhood without providing 
concrete proposals for obtaining justice (by way of compensation or otherwise) for 
those who have suffered at the hands of the state-corporate crime. 
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The Scramble for Victims 
Since its founding FENAVIDET claims that the organisation has been working to 
identify all the victims of the dumping for an international legal action against the 
‘polluter’ but also states that one of the organisation’s major objectives is to 
differentiate between their group and “arnaqueurs … adventurias … et … 
opportunistes” or “scammers … adventurers … and … opportunists”.366 FENAVIDET 
claims that others have forged their victim registration documents in order to “rip off 
the poor people seeking compensation”.367 In 2010, the FENAVIDET website 
announced that a senior member of the group “has defected”368 and is no longer 
associated with FENAVIDET. This former member of FENAVIDET has since set up 
Victimes Unies Contre les Catastrophes Humaines (VUCAH), another victims 
organisation, and claims to have 24,000 members (Tape 2010). This defection and 
setting up of a ‘competing’ organisation is an indication of the struggle between victims 
organisations. 
In July 2011, RENADVIDET organised a sit-in outside the offices of the Ministry of 
Justice protesting the suspension by CNVDT of the compensation process since July 
2010. They allege that the money has been embezzled: “CNVDT has diverted the 
funds” (Cheikna 2011) (discussed below). RENADVIDET argue that this is facilitated 
by and is a direct result of the secret agreement between Leigh Day and CNVDT (MTT 
2011). 
The conflict between some victims organisations is not limited to words, and the 
RENADVIDET president claims he was physically assaulted by CNVDT strongmen in 
February 2011 and that court security staff intervened on his behalf and locked him 
inside the office of the prefect for his own safety. Later in February 2011, about 200 
people claiming to be victims of toxic waste and represented by RENADVIDET went to 
the offices of the prefect of Abidjan to demand their compensation from CNVDT before 
the second round of presidential elections; RENADVIDET stated that “we are tired and 
we need this money to be returned before the second round of the presidential election”. 
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According to RENADVIDET, this action was the culmination of a month-long protest 
movement. There have also been legal battles between the groups, and RENADVIDET 
argue that an ‘executive order’ warrant against their president for the defamation of 
CNVDT was arbitrarily taken out (Yelly 2011). 
There were gendarmerie police officers, armed with automatic weapons and displaying 
UN security guard badges on their uniform, stationed outside the front of the CNVDT 
building when visited for interview. When asked about their presence, the president 
answered: “Because the organisation is in charge of the compensation; the accounting 
database needs to be protected so it’s just for the security of the building.” However, 
accounting databases can be encrypted and the guards had not been present on an earlier 




Tigana (2010) reports on “a battle between the presidents of associations” and the vice-
president of a new federation, Collectif des Présidents des Associations des Victimes 
des Déchets Toxiques (CPAVNDT) claiming that FENAVIDET made the unilateral 
decision to take 15% of the government compensation due to be paid to victims and that 
the president of FENAVIDET refuses to hold elections after his two-year term expired. 
CPAVNDT is composed of 15 presidents of victims organisations formerly associated 
with FENAVIDET (Tigana 2010). CPAVNDT claims that it is negotiating with 
Trafigura on behalf of its 42,000 (APA 2010) victim members (Coulibaly 2010). 
VUCAH also claims to be in negotiations with Trafigura who are “willing to pay” 
(Tape 2010). When asked about how confident he was of further compensation, the 
president of VUCAH stated: “I'm sure as a victim first and a child of God, I do not pose 
without the advice of the Lord. The victims will be compensated” (Tape 2010). Like 
other groups, there is here a lack of detail on how compensation is due to be obtained 
for members and this research project has not uncovered any viable route to 
compensation of victims of the dumping by any victims organisation. 
The Extortion of Compensation 
By the middle of 2008, the Ivorian government had paid out about 16 billion CFA 
(about €25 million) in relation to the dumping: 10 billion CFA was reportedly 
distributed to about 50% of the 100,000 victims recognised by the government, 1.5 
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billion CFA to families of 15 people killed, 1.75 billion CFA to ‘economic victims’ 
(mainly small business) and about 2 billion on ten clean-up projects. The Treasury of 
Abidjan claimed that they have a further 9 billion CFA to hand out to victims but have 
not accounted for the remainder of funds paid by Trafigura for immunity from 
prosecution, which is about 75 billion CFA (about €110 million) (AFP 2008). Gonto 
reports on the “extensive fraud committed in the compensation of victims” (Gonto 
2010): 
The FCFA 100 billion, disbursed by Trafigura under an agreement with the State 
of Côte d’Ivoire, has been squandered already. The dumping sites have not been 
rehabilitated. No monitoring is done on the use of this fund. (Gonto 2010) 
In September 2009, Trafigura paid about €34 million into a Leigh Day account in 
Abidjan as compensation for the dumping. In early 2010, before the money could be 
paid to victims, the Court of Appeal in Abidjan – in what Leigh Day called “a terrible 
judgment” (Leigh Day 2010) – ordered the money to be transferred to the bank account 
of CNVDT. CNVDT attempted to draw down the funds but was prevented from doing 
so as a result of “police and political intervention” (Leigh Day 2010). The case was due 
to be heard in the Supreme Court but Leigh Day was not prepared to let it go that far in 
fear of a similar result: 
… the forces in Abidjan that had persuaded the Court of Appeal to make their 
decision in [CNVDT’s] favour seemed likely to also prevail in the Supreme 
Court. As a result Leigh Day has felt it has had no alternative but to enter into 
talks with the CNVDT lawyers to see if there is a way of trying to ensure as 
much of the compensation as possible ends up in the pockets of the claimants 
rather than in the CNVDT bank account. (Leigh Day 2010) 
It is clear from this statement that the British law firm had lost confidence in the Ivorian 
judiciary and allude to a lack of judicial independence. It also seems that the firm has 
given up on the possibility of ‘all’ the compensation reaching the indented recipients, 
which seems prophetic. According to RENADVIDET, of the approximately 30,000 
victims involved in the UK class action, more than 15,000 victims have yet to be 
compensated by CNVDT (Salif 2011). 
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By the end of 2011, the situation in Abidjan with regard to these victims organisations 
remained unchanged. The Amsterdam Public Prosecutor is seeking a fine of €2 million 
to be applied to Trafigura for forgery, illegal carrying of waste and the concealment of 
the hazardous nature of the waste.
370
 This case does not include provision for 
compensations for victims of the dumping. However, the victims organisations are 
taking the opportunity to ‘sell’ this case to the public: “Some of these NGOs are making 
the most of the current appeals court process in Holland to say – look, we are bringing 
Trafigura to court – give us money quick so we can give you your membership card!”371 
Conclusion  
The actors at the centre of the deviant behaviour detailed in this chapter are the Ivorian 
State and the newly formed victims’ organisations. As the perpetrators of an 
organisational crime, they are two actors in one interrelationship.  The rules that have 
been violated include domestic law and the dictates of social morality as judged from 
the point of view of the relevant social audience (and see Chapter 4). Potentially 
significant sanctions range from legal punishments (e.g. fines, revocation of licence to 
operate, conviction of members of staff), censure by the public and the press (both 
national and international) and resistance in the form of protest by the state’s own 
population. The social audience is civil society – represented by international NGOs, 
local human rights NGOs and victims’ organisations – which, in the Gramscian sense, is 
the space, “occupied in particular by organisations such as pressure groups, voluntary 
associations, religious bodies, the mass media and academic institutions, to the extent 
that they enjoy real independence from the state” (Green and Ward 2004: 4). 
As has been seen, the victims’ organisations activities can be understood as an 
organised crime. The assumption that those censuring state-corporate crime are 
necessarily a force for ‘good’ has been fundamentally questioned by the chapter, and 
civil society actors are commodifying victims and getting them to pay for membership 
cards and fees for the chance to be compensated by non-existing class actions in foreign 
courts. 
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It is argued here that civil society has been hijacked by state-organised crime and the 
opportunity to do this is as a direct result of the dumping and of Trafigura’s continuing 
impunity. The dumping of toxic waste created the victims in question. And the impunity 
afforded to Trafigura has meant that the company has not been compelled to admit 
liability and compensate the victims, nor has the corporation been formally required to 
clean up the waste sites. 
 The implications of the issues raised by the data analysed by this Chapter are far-
reaching. In examining the role of civil society in labelling and sanctioning state and 
state corporate crime it should be borne in mind that common assumptions made of 
NGOs and victims’ organisations as a force for good are misplaced. Civil society is 
more usefully conceptualised as a Gramscian space in which members of civil society 
vie for position (Gramsci 1971). In Ivory Coast, victims’ organisations have been set up 
with dubious goals and assisted by the state have successfully taken advantage of 
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Chapter 8 – Cover-up and Denial: the Battle of Britain 
Introduction 
This chapter applies Cohen’s (1993) three forms of denial to an analysis of cover up: (1) 
‘denial of the past’, (2) ‘literal denial’, and (3) ‘implicatory denial’ (Cohen 1993: 108-
110). These categorisations assist in unravelling the tactics employed by Trafigura in a 
cover-up of the dumping. ‘Denial of the past’ at an organisational level involves “the 
organised attempts to cover up the record of past atrocities” (Cohen 1993: 108). ‘Literal 
denial’ can also be revealed by organised cover-ups and involves “the simple lie or 
fraud where facts are accessible but lead to a conclusion which is knowingly evaded” 
(Cohen 1993: 109). ‘Implicatory denials’, “seek to negotiate or impose a different 
construction of the event from what might appear the case”, one of the most common 
forms of which is ‘denial of responsibility’ (Cohen 1993: 110). Cohen’s (1993) study 
was one of states and denial, and this thesis adopts the framework for the study of denial 
by corporations. Nothing in Cohen’s work suggests a prohibition of the use of his ideas 
in a corporate setting. Cohen uses a comparison between states and corporations when 
outlining the counter-arguments to objections to the inclusion of state crime as a 
genuine criminological endeavour and argues that a state can commit crime and engage 
in denial despite its organisational nature – just as the corporation can. 
The crime was directed from London (Leigh 2009a) and executed in Ivory Coast. The 
lack of response from the local NGOs prompted a field trip to Ivory Coast to survey the 
capacity of civil society, as represented by human rights NGOs, to struggle against the 
dominance of the market and state actors who perpetrated the state-corporate crime. 
Such a survey of the vast number of civil society actors in London (NGOs, unions, 
religious organisations, and media – traditional and ‘new’) was beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but the actions of a selection of civil society members gives an insight into the 
Gramscian struggle. Since “we can approach the process of denial through its opposite: 
the attempt to recover or uncover the past” (Cohen 1993: 109), the two responses of 
international civil society analysed by this chapter are a civil legal case against the 
corporation and a struggle for and against a cover-up. The relative power of the key 
actors within the arena of struggle (Gramsci 1971) was a determining factor in the 
success of goal attainment.  
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International NGOs and specialist law firms have made attempts to hold the corporation 
to account for the dumping. A network of civil society actors launched a coordinated 
attempt at labelling the corporation’s actions as deviant. This group included: 
Greenpeace Nederland, BBC’s Newsnight, de Volkskrant, the Norwegian Broadcasting 
Corporation (NRK), the Guardian, Al Jazeera and Amnesty International.
372
 These 
organisations formed a strategic issue-based alliance, centred on the dumping. The law 
firms that associated with this network include Sherpa and Leigh Day & Co solicitors 
(Leigh Day). Sherpa is a Paris-based civil rights law association, who specialise in 
corruption in former French colonies (Neuberger 2011). Lasslett argues that for any 
resistance movement, the institutions it is able to work through ‘… in a specific 
conjuncture is a vital determinate of its strength” (Lasslett 2012: 4). The international 
NGOs along with their media partners shared information and strategised against the 
ongoing impunity enjoyed by the company to such an extent that a director of Trafigura 
implied that his organisation had been ‘attacked’ by this group: 
It’s an organised campaign by Greenpeace. We don’t know why they are 
attacking us on this subject. (McElroy 2009) 
Here we witness what Cohen refers to as an element of ‘pure denial’, as opposed to a 
‘pure justification’ – the other typical tactic employed, according to Cohen (1993), by 
‘the official state discourse’. Here, just as a state may exclaim that the international 
community of states is “picking on us” (Cohen 1993: 104), the Trafigura director 
bemoans attention being drawn to the dumping by a community of international civil 
society organisations. 
Throughout this chapter it will be seen that agents of Trafigura, in particular Carter-
Ruck (media law firm) and Bell Pottinger (reputation managers), were deployed to great 
effect by the corporation. David Hooper, a former partner at the law firm Carter-Ruck, 
claimed that the firm’s founder, Peter Carter-Ruck, “created the modern libel industry, 
was a dedicated liar and a reactionary with a lust for cash … [and] … he did for 
freedom of speech what the Boston Strangler did for door-to-door salesmen” (Hooper 
2003). Bell Pottinger executives claim to have access to government, including the 
British Prime Minister, as well his chief of staff and closest advisor, and the British 
Foreign Secretary and that it is “possible to use MPs known to be critical of 
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investigative programmes to attack their reporting for minor errors” (Newman and 
Wright 2011). Both firms, therefore, provide Trafigura with potential access to 
institutions of government and law through Carter-Ruck’s experience and expertise in 
the judicial realm and Bell Pottinger’s claimed access to sources of legislative and 
executive power (Newman and Wright 2011). 
Approaching the concept of denial, as Cohen (1993) suggests, through its opposites of 
censure and public shaming, this chapter will look firstly at efforts to label the 
corporation as deviant; and secondly, at attempts that were made to sanction Trafigura. 
Have the Company’s Actions Been Labelled Deviant by International Civil Society 
Organisations? 
The reaction of national Ivorian civil society organisations is detailed in Chapters 6 and 
7, but, as we saw, various local human rights NGOs labelled the dumping as a deviant 
action by Trafigura. And the National Inquiry could be seen to have carried out a civil 
society function when it investigated and reported that “the Trafigura group, through the 
behaviour of its employees … infringed the Marpol and the Basel Convention”.373 
Trafigura’s actions have also been labelled as deviant by international civil society 
organisations, especially by international press organisations. Gramsci included the 
press and media, albeit in ambiguous terms, when he outlined the institutions of civil 
society (Gramsci 1971) and “some institutions like the media, while essentially based 
on market organisations, nonetheless have significant civil society elements” (Anheier 
and Carlson, undated). The Guardian, BBC’s Newsnight, the NRK and de Volkskrant 
shared the Daniel Pearl Award for Outstanding International Investigative Reporting
374
 
for exposing Trafigura’s dumping of toxic waste in Ivory Coast.375 By way of contrast, 
the Ivorian press does not enjoy the same freedom as its European counterparts and 
there is a lack of independence of the media, with “many newspapers in Abidjan … 
affiliated with a political party” (ICG 2004), as well as state repression of journalists 
critical of government (Gonto 2008). 
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International civil society that responded critically to the dumping with statements or 
reports included the European Union (Dimas 2006) and the United Nations (UNHRC 
2009: 10). European Commissioner Stavos Dimas described the dumping as “not only 
unethical in the most profound sense of the word, but … criminal” (Dimas 2006) and he 
planned “to put forward a proposal to criminalise certain environmentally damaging 
practices such as the one perpetrated” (Dimas 2006). The European Parliament 
resolution made since the dumping states that: 
… the toxic waste was dumped by a Greek-owned, Panamanian-flagged tanker 
leased by Trafigura Beheer B.V., a Netherlands-based company; whereas such 
sharing of responsibilities creates a systematic and unacceptable problem with 
regard to the enforcement of Community legislation.
376
 
The UN Special Rapporteur concluded that “there seems to be strong prima facie 
evidence that the reported deaths and adverse health consequences are related to the 
dumping of the waste from the Probo Koala” (UNHRC 2009: 10). Bell Pottinger, acting 
for Trafigura, responded that the UN report was “inaccurate” and “potentially 
damaging” (quoted in Independent 2009). This is a form of implicatory denial, and by 
challenging the accuracy or the UN report Trafigura tried to construct a different 
version of events to that observed by the UN investigators. In early September 2006, the 
World Health Organization (WHO) sent a team “to support the Ministry of Health in 
dealing with an environmental health emergency caused by toxic waste” and “to 
determine the extent and severity of poisoning” (WHO 2006). This team included a 
clinical toxicologist, an environmental health specialist and a ‘further’ technical 
specialist (WHO 2006). The WHO is the largest international organisation involved 
with the incident, but they have yet to produce any report on the health consequences of 
the dumping and a search of the WHO website for ‘Trafigura’ reveals no results.377 The 
WHO would have been in an excellent position to dispel the myths propagated by 
Trafigura in relation to the nature of the waste and its effects on the local population, 
and their failure to report on the matter requires further explanation.
378
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The BBC’s defence to the May 2009 libel action by Trafigura against Newsnight’s 
feature on the dumping stated that: 
It is admitted that the programme [Newsnight] alleged that Trafigura was 
culpably responsible for causing or permitting the unlawful dumping of highly 
toxic waste with an obvious potential to cause serious harm to the public as in 
fact it did. It is further admitted that the actual consequences alleged in the 
programme included miscarriages and injury to health of tens of thousands of 
people including sixteen deaths.
379
 
However, despite being one of the loudest voices of censure, the BBC has succumbed to 
Trafigura’s legal challenge. In December 2009 they settled the case, apologised for the 
allegations and paid Trafigura £25,000 in damages. This is more an indication of the 
power the oil trader is able to wield relative to that of the BBC than evidence of 
Trafigura’s innocence. Pressure from Trafigura and its legal team led by Carter-Ruck 
appears to have been too much for the broadcaster to bear. In this situation, one can only 
speculate that the BBC’s legal team made a cost-benefit analysis between the censuring 
of Trafigura and the potential costs of a libel claim by Trafigura against the BBC. The 
pressure applied by Trafigura was part of an orchestrated attempt to deny the past, and 
cover up (or neutralise) the public record of the dumping event. 
When asked about its recidivist history by journalists, Bell Pottinger, acting for 
Trafigura, reported that “Trafigura has always done its business in an ethical and 
transparent manner” (Leigh 2009b). But the reality appears to be that the actions of 
Trafigura are frequently labelled as deviant (see Chapter 4) and very often opaque. 
Following the dumping, Trafigura instigated, as shall be seen, a cover-up operation 
which had both great successes and calamitous failures from the corporation’s point of 
view. The next section reveals how Trafigura and its agents, including law firm Carter-
Ruck and public relations consultants Bell Pottinger, constrained the activities of large 
sections of civil society through a wide-scale and systematic operation of all three forms 
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of Cohen’s (1993) denial that spanned a number of years. The section provides an 
overview of the tactics employed by Trafigura and reveals how over-zealousness in 
covering up the dumping actually precipitated wide-scale censure by the British public. 
On the 6
th
 of November 2006, Trafigura had hired Lord Fraser (at the recommendation 
of Lord Strathclyde, Leader of the House of Lords and former Trafigura director) to 
conduct an independent inquiry into the dumping incident, but he is not expected to 
publish any conclusions “in the near future” (Guardian 2009). The use by Trafigura of 
an ‘independent’ inquirer with strong links to the energy and commodities industry380 
and the subsequent extended delay in publication of any report can be seen as an 
attempt to literally deny the dumping by evading conclusions based on the available 
facts. In May 2007, de Volkskrant reported that the press officer of Trafigura, operating 
under the username ‘Press Office T NL’, thrice attempted to alter the Dutch Wikipedia 
article about the Probo Koala, “with intent to clear the company’s name” (Trommelen 
2007a). This is denial of the past with an attempt to remove details of the dumping from 
the public record. But Wikipedia has proven itself a site of resistance and fought back 
against this attempted airbrushing of the past, with administrators locking the user’s 
account. The ‘Press Office T NL’ Wikipedia profile now contains the following 
‘warning’ message: “if you use an account only for vandalism it can be blocked for an 
indefinite period of time”.381 Bell Pottinger claim to have “all sorts of dark arts” at their 
disposal, including teams that can manipulate Google results to “drown” out negative 
coverage of corporate human rights violations and “sort” negative Wikipedia coverage 
of clients and their activities (Newman and Wright 2011). This policy of altering public 
record and public perception involves all three forms of Cohen’s (1993) denial: records 
are erased or suppressed, conclusions (or ‘negative coverage’) are evaded and a 
different construction of events is proposed. In August 2009, de Volkskrant reported 
that Trafigura had filed a case against the Dutch government in an attempt to keep 
secret the report of the Netherlands Forensics Institute (NFI) on the dumping that had 
been handed over to Leigh Day (Trommelen 2007b). The use of the legal system to 
implement Trafigura’s policy of denial is detailed in the next section. 
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As well as the unforthcoming independent inquiry by Lord Fraser, Trafigura also 
suppressed its own commissioned research into the cause of the deaths and illness 
reported in Abidjan. John Minton of Trafigura’s scientific consultants Minton, Treharne 
& Davies, reported initially on the serious toxic consequences of the dumping. After the 
Minton Report was leaked by the Guardian (Leigh 2009), Minton became engaged in 
the whitewash of his own research and released a statement denying its findings: “I had 
no information on the quantity, composition or concentration of the chemicals 
involved” (Minton 2009: 1). This, however, was a literal denial of the initial Minton 
Report which clearly stated at the outset that “the combined slops from these washing 




 treated naphtha and free 
water and 24kg ARI-100 EXL catalyst” (Minton 2006: 1). The report claimed that the 
waste was capable of causing the reported “severe human health effects” including 
death (Minton 2007: 7). The suppression of the report, as we will now see, was just one 
attempt by Trafigura to silence its critics. 
British Media Silenced 
Further to the activities of suppression applied to the leaked report, there were efforts to 
use the British legal system to limit the freedoms usually enjoyed by the mainstream 
media. In this section, all three forms of Cohen’s (1993) denial can be observed in an 
analysis of the cover-up.  
In September 2009, the Guardian leaked the internal emails which showed that 
Trafigura was aware of the hazardous nature of the waste in advance of the dumping 
(Leigh 2009c). This was the first sign that civil society organisations were gaining 
traction in the struggle to censure Trafigura and the denial and systematic attempts at 
concealment were beginning to be revealed. The emails had been handed over to the 
Guardian by an anonymous London NGO
382
 and highlighted the importance of the 
networks that the civil society actors are able to employ. Once in the hands of the 
media, the documents could potentially be used to censure the corporation much more 
effectively than had they remained with the NGO alone. The documents were further 
shared between other civil society and media organisations (such as Amnesty 
International, Al Jazeera, NRK),
383
 and soon thereafter Newsnight reported again on the 
dumping, based on these newly revealed documents. The report evoked the following 
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response from Trafigura (through its legal team at Carter-Ruck): “Trafigura is 
concerned to note that the BBC is proposing to revisit these matters bearing in mind that 
they are, as you know, the subject of ongoing libel proceedings” (BBC 2009). They 
continued: “it is Trafigura’s position that insofar as it is suggested that these individuals 
died as a result of hydrogen sulphide exposure, that hydrogen sulphide cannot have 
come from or been generated or caused by the Probo Koala slops” (BBC 2009). The 
continued denial of responsibility, even in the face of documentary evidence, is 
testament to the legal power that the corporation were confident in deploying and on 
12
th
 December 2009 that confidence was given a further boost when the BBC deleted an 
online video of the Newsnight report as well as an associated BBC News online article. 
Angry bloggers, however, resisted the cover up and responded by reposting the video on 
YouTube (Eaton 2009).  
By the end of 2009, national newspapers – a source of the public record – that had 
originally reported on Trafigura’s role in the dumping started to alter that record with 
corrections and apologies, despite a wealth of available evidence outlining Trafigura’s 
role (as seen in Chapter 5). This resulted in a bolstering of the discourse of Trafigura’s 
denial and the company have placed online copies of corrections and apologies from the 
Times, Times Online and the Guardian newspapers.
384
 The Times (2009) correction, on 
Monday 7
th
 September 2009, states that “the dumping was carried out illegally without 
Trafigura’s knowledge by an independent local contractor. Trafigura have always 
disputed that the dumping caused, or could have caused, the deaths and serious injuries 
referred to in the article …” and adds “We are happy to put the record straight”. The 
Times Online (2010) correction, on Friday 30
th
 April 2010, states: 
We wish to make clear that the dumping was not carried out by Trafigura as the 
article may have suggested but by an independent local contractor without 
Trafigura’s authority or knowledge … Furthermore, in September 2009 lawyers 
for Ivorians who were suing Trafigura over injuries allegedly caused by the 
dumping acknowledged that at worst the waste could only have caused flulike 
symptoms. … We apologise for these errors. 
In May 2009, the following statement appeared in print and on the Guardian website: 
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Our item headlined Success for the Guardian (26 April, page 2) erroneously 
linked the dumping of toxic waste in Ivory Coast from a vessel chartered by 
Trafigura with the deaths of a number of West Africans … We apologise for our 
error. (Guardian 2010) 
And the cover-up extended to other national publications in the UK. The Independent 
initially reported that the dumping “… caused at least 100,000 residents from … 
Abidjan to flood into hospitals and clinics complaining of … nausea, breathlessness, 
headaches, skin reactions and a range of ear, nose, throat and pulmonary problems [and] 
miscarriages, still births and birth defects” (Independent 2009). They concluded that it 
was “one of the worst pollution incidents in decades” (Independent 2009). These were 
very strong censuring statements but all have now been deleted from archives by the 
Independent.  
The reasons behind these apologies, corrections, clarifications and deletions from the 
public record are obvious to some, and Monbiot argues that: 
This could be one of the worst cases of corporate killing and injury since the 
Bhopal disaster, but much of the media wouldn’t touch it with a bargepole. The 
reason isn’t hard to divine: Trafigura has been throwing legal threats around like 
confetti. (Monbiot 2009) 
The use of libel laws and aggressive lawyers has been a success for Trafigura in 
suppressing information about the dumping that may have an effect on public opinion, 
and this effect persists to the present. Caroline Lucas, the first Green Party member to 
be elected to the UK parliament, in her first speech to parliament, took the opportunity 
to raise the case and noted the continuing media ‘blackout’ on the dumping: 
Last year, hon. Members from both sides helped to shine a light on the actions of 
… Trafigura, and the shipping of hazardous waste to the Ivory Coast. There was 
particular concern that the media in this country were prevented from reporting 
the issues fully and fairly. That remains the case, for new legal actions 
concerning Trafigura have been launched in the Dutch courts and are being 
reported widely in other countries but not here. (Caroline Lucas 2010) 
The event that allowed members of parliament to ‘shine a light’ on the dumping was in  
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fact a tactical error by Trafigura, the kind of error on the part of state or corporate agents 
that Lasslett argues might “… open up a horizon of opportunities for resistance 
movements” (Lasslett 2012a). Trafigura’s decision to take out a super-injunction is an 
example of a ‘fundamental miscalculation’ that opened the way for civil society to 
censure the actions of Trafigura, on this occasion not through the mainstream media, but 




 October 2009, Trafigura’s legal firm Carter-Ruck in furtherance of the policy of 
cover-up applied to the court for an injunction to prevent the Guardian newspaper from 
reporting on or about a parliamentary question by Paul Farrelly
386
 (see below) (Leigh 
2009c). The injunction further stipulated that the Guardian could not report on the 
question’s existence. This extreme form of censorship has led such injunctions to be 
known as super-injunctions (Steyn 2010). Alan Rusbridger, the editor of the Guardian, 
expressed surprise at the fact that his newspaper might be in contempt of court for 
releasing the document: “we had never encountered a situation when we had been 
forbidden for reporting on parliament” (Rusbridger 2009). 
The super-injunction was a turning point in the struggle over corporate censure, and was 
ultimately unsuccessful as a tactic of denial. The Guido Fawkes political blog identified 
Paul Farrelly’s written question as likely to be linked to the super-injunction: 
To ask the Secretary of State for Justice, what assessment he has made of the 
effectiveness of legislation to protect (a) whistleblowers and (b) press freedom 
following the injunctions obtained in the High Court by (i) Barclays and 
Freshfields solicitors on 19 March 2009 on the publication of internal Barclays 
reports documenting alleged tax avoidance schemes and (ii) Trafigura and 
Carter-Ruck solicitors on 11 September 2009 on the publication of the Minton 
report on the alleged dumping of toxic waste in the Ivory Coast, commissioned 
by Trafigura. (Guido Fawkes 2009) 
In a letter to the Speaker of the House of the House of Commons, Alan Rusbridger 
stated that: 
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[Carter-Ruck] asserted that the Guardian would be in contempt of Court and 
sought an immediate undertaking that we would not publish. The letter also 
stated that Carter-Ruck did not even accept that the publication by Parliament of 




Rusbridger argued that the development was a regression of free speech versus 
censorship: “in some ways we’re going backwards, I think after Thalidomide, after the 
Pentagon papers, we thought that the notion of prior constraint was gone” (Rusbridger 
2009). 
At around noon on 13
th
 October 2009, the day after the injunction was obtained, 
Trafigura (via Carter-Ruck) withdrew its claim that the Guardian reporting on the 
parliamentary debate that revealed the injunction’s existence would be contempt of 
court (Leigh 2009d). This climb-down was as a result of Farrelly’s question having 
been released into the public domain by bloggers, who are not subject to the same 
restrictions as mainstream media (BBC 2011). The Guardian claims that the super-
injunction was neutralised by “a combination of legal sense and digital 
communications” (Reidy 2010). Wikileaks had previously released the Minton report 
into the public domain (Smith 2010) but the online response to the super-injunction 
raised both the report’s and Trafigura’s profile. Rusbridger recalls the flurry of activity: 
“The blogosphere just went berserk; I mean, I’ve never seen anything like it. Over the 
last sixteen hours, I’ve never seen this amount of activity on Twitter, of people really 
upset by it” (Rusbridger 2009). One tweet at the time read: “The Twitterverse is going 
mental for #trafigura” (Massie 2009), referring to the hashtag, ‘#trafigura’. The 
application for the super-injunction and the subsequent reaction was “a fantastic PR 
own goal” (Rusbridger 2009) for the company, and raised their profile in the public eye 
overnight: “… I think most people, yesterday wouldn’t have heard of this company, 
Trafigura” (Rusbridger 2009). Matthiesson (2010) argues that the ‘spectacular public 
relations fallout’ from the Trafigura case (and another case involving a soccer player) 
may force media lawyers to “reconsider whether super-injunctions are the most 
advisable method to protect their client's interests in the first place” (Matthiesson 2010: 
153). 
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The reaction of the UK state to the super-injunction contrasts to apparent inaction in the 
previous years to Trafigura’s aggressive use of libel laws to suppress journalistic 
reports. This may have been a direct result of the publicity and public outrage displayed 
online. Alternatively, an apparent reason is that the injunction was not an attack on civil 
society – as the libel campaign had been – but an attack on parliament, an institution of 
the state. David Heath
388
 argued in the House of Commons that: 
A fundamental principle of this House is now being threatened by the legal 
proceedings for an injunction and the consequent proceedings for contempt of 
court in respect of injuncted material. As you know, we have enjoyed in this 
House since 1688 the privilege of being able to speak freely. (Hansard 2009c) 
Lord Judge
389
 reiterated the fact, couching the injunctions in terms of the power struggle 
between the judiciary and parliament: “I should need some very powerful persuasion 
indeed that it would be constitutionally proper for a court to make an order to limit 
discussions in parliament” (Rogerson and Dean 2009). Within a matter of months, in 
April 2010, a judicial committee headed by Lord Neuberger was set up in order to 
examine super-injunctions and in May 2010 reported back that the law and judiciary 
functions as it should (Neuberger 2010). Rusbridger argued that the use of the super-
injunction was about cover-up activities: 
This is really just about embarrassment, there’s no great legal principle here. The 
company didn’t want the world to know that they were clamping down on 
newspapers, it was embarrassing for them, but the courts shouldn’t be so 
spineless as to agree to these super-injunctions. (Rusbridger 2009) 
Moore (2009) reported how Twitter users claimed that Trafigura’s prompt withdrawal 
of the injunction was a victory for press liberty, and quotes a ‘typical’ tweet: “Hurrah 
for free speech and freedom of information … don’t mess with the people” (quoted in 
Moore 2009). Another read: “The Twitterati and the Blogosphere have prevailed in the 
great Battle of Trafigura” (Massie 2009). Lord Neuberger, the most senior civil judge in 
England and Wales, took a different view and claimed that these types of online 
technology are “totally out of control” (BBC 2011). However, if the online community 
of civil society actors were under the stronger control of the state, and under the same 
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restrictions as the mainstream media, this injunction may not have come to light and a 
chance to censure Trafigura may have been missed. 
The struggle to label Trafigura’s actions as deviant was only successful after elements 
of civil society capitalised on a miscalculation by the corporation. However, the censure 
focused on an attempt by the corporation to ‘gag’ the British press from reporting on 
parliament. The subject matter of the injunctions, the damning report on the dangers of 
the waste dumped in Abidjan, received less attention. 
Have These Organisations Attempted to Institute Sanctions Against the Company? 
In Ivory Coast, as argued in Chapter 6, there were no reported attempts by the domestic 
NGOs to seek sanctions against Trafigura through the courts. However, international 
NGOs have made repeated attempts to engage the legal systems of Europe (specifically 
the Netherlands, France and the UK). 
Greenpeace Nederland reported the dumping to the Dutch public prosecutor who 
claimed to lack jurisdiction (Day 2010), a problem of jurisdiction as discussed in 
Chapter 1. Greenpeace Nederland thereafter filed a complaint,
390
 as an interested 
party,
391
 against Dutch prosecutors for failing to prosecute Trafigura, its CEO and Puma 
for their role in the dumping. The charges sought included murder, gross maltreatment, 
manslaughter, grievous bodily harm and work- or profession-related criminal offences, 
forgery and membership of a criminal organisation
392
 (Böhler 2009). On the criminal 
liability of Trafigura as subject of the criminal justice system, Greenpeace Nederland 
argued that “this legal person can and must be called to account for the offences” 
(Böhler 2009: 15). This statement tried to pre-empt an argument against the legal 
individual-organisational problem discussed in Chapter 1.  
The law association NGO, Sherpa, pressed for a criminal prosecution in France, but 
were unsuccessful. According to Day, “The French authorities said, look, we’ve got no 
jurisdiction in the Ivory Coast. We cannot realistically send across examining 
magistrates … to Abidjan” (Day 2010). This failure to prosecute, for whatever reason, 
is a failure of the operationality of control on an institutional level (Kauzlarich and 
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Kramer 1998) and as Welch maintains, “state-corporate crime persists because it is 
afforded impunity against prosecution” (2009: 352). 
However, the Dutch public prosecutor pursued Trafigura for crimes
393
 committed in 
Amsterdam port before the dumping (see also Chapter 5), namely, failing to inform the 
Dutch authorities of the nature and origin of the waste and forgery of documents 
designed for that purpose, and exporting hazardous waste.
394
 In 2010, the company was 
convicted and fined €1 million by a Dutch judge, and cleared of a forgery charge. The 
captain of the Probo Koala was sentenced to a five months (suspended) prison term for 
forgery (Greenpeace 2011). 
Greenpeace Nederland also lodged a complaint with the Dutch advertising authority for 
advertisements released by Trafigura that suggested that the High Court in London had 
ruled that the toxic waste from the Probo Koala could not cause any fatal or otherwise 
serious health conditions. Greenpeace argued that “Trafigura attempted to falsely create 
the impression that a judgement had been made in favour of the company” (Greenpeace 
International 2010). The advertisements were an attempt by the corporation at 
implicatory denial which seeks “to negotiate or impose a different construction of the 
event” (Cohen 1993: 110), by claiming that an agreement in the Motto case (see below) 
between the parties was actually the finding of a British judge. 
All of the above cases took place in the Netherlands and the consequences were the 
application of sanctions to Trafigura for deviant behaviour. None, however, were 
concerned with the toxic waste dumping in Abidjan. A civil case in the UK looked more 
promising. 
Motto & Ors v Trafigura 
In October 2006, Greenpeace asked Leigh Day to provide legal assistance to victims 
who had contacted them (Neuberger 2011). This is an illustration of the value of the 
networks that the international NGOs were able to employ and which Ivory Coast 
NGOs were isolated from. Leigh Day were also approached directly by Chief Motto, 
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Chief of Djibi Village (Neuberger 2011), who told the BBC that all two thousand 
villagers became ill, and three people had died
395
. 
Leigh Day originally had 12 Ivorian clients and by early 2007 they were forecasting that 
there would be between 3,000 and 5,000 claimants. The final figure in the case of Motto 
& Ors v Trafigura
396
 of 29,614 claimants was, however, to dwarf those early 
predictions (Neuberger 2011). By the time the claim form was filed it was the largest 
collective action personal injury claim ever filed in England and Wales (Dunt 2009). In 
October 2008, Trafigura agreed to no longer defend its actions with regard to the 
dumping (Dunt 2009). Leigh Day called the decision a ‘climb-down’, and Martyn Day 
reported: 
I am pleased that Trafigura have seen sense and accepted that the game is up. 
For the last two years they have tried to pull the wool over the eyes of the world, 
in terms of their actions. (Day 2008) 
The extended campaign of implicatory denial described by Day is part of the overall 
cover-up discussed above but this statement too has now been deleted from the Leigh 
Day website. An international media correspondent based in West Africa was told by 
Day that Trafigura conceded that they had a duty of care to the victims and had 
breached that duty and were likely to settle of court in the spring of 2009.
397
 Leigh Day 
explained that: 
In early September [2008] we served them a whole host of documents and with 
a dossier of requests regarding their defence, which I think were unanswerable 
… They realised the game was up. (Dunt 2009) 
Day argues that Trafigura was “forced into taking that step in the face of overwhelming 
evidence against it” (Day 2008). In September 2009, Trafigura reached a settlement 
agreement which included payment to 30,000 victims and their families of about £1,000 
each (Leigh 2009c; Moore 2009). The judge ordered that the £30 million settlement 
(Neuberger 2011) be held in trust by Leigh Day, “exclusively and solely for the 
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claimants” (quoted in Verkaik 2009). Trafigura paid £30 million into a bank account in 
Abidjan on 23
rd
 September 2009 but an injunction granted by an Ivorian court in favour 
of victims organisation CNVDT has diverted this money (see Chapter 7 for details). 
This unexpected intervention meant that the distribution was severely delayed and 
“even now it has not been completed” (Neuberger 2011). As well as the problems with 
the injunction granted by the Ivorian judiciary, the case posed other serious difficulties. 
The cost of running such a case is prohibitive; Leigh Day served a bill of costs on 
Trafigura of £104,707,772.72, including an insurance premium of over £9 million 
(Neuberger 2011). It is interesting to note that this level of legal costs would have been 
enough to compensate another 10,000 victims had Trafigura not prolonged the case.  
As an act of censure, the Motto case was generally unsuccessful and has in fact further 
bolstered Trafigura’s denial of the toxic waste dumping. As it was settled out of court 
and that settlement contained a confidentiality clause, documents held by the law firm 
after extensive investigations and Trafigura’s defence have not become public record 
and could not be used as data for this study. Furthermore, the ‘global’ settlement “will 
mean that claims of more serious injuries caused by the waste – including miscarriages, 
still births and birth defects – will now not be tested” (Milmo 2009). The author asked 
Martyn Day about this settlement agreement in 2010 and his response is quoted in full 
for what it reveals about the capacity of a powerful corporation to silence critics even as 
it admits guilt: 
Thomas MacManus:  
When talking to victims they would say: “Why has ‘Mr Martin’ signed an 
agreement with Trafigura to say that Trafigura had nothing to do with it? Why 




Martin Day, partner at Leigh Day:  
I can’t talk massively about it, as I say due to the confidentiality agreements. But 
the primary issue here, and it’s a great difficulty when you’ve got a … big group 
claim. Acting for 30,000 people when we entered into negotiations with 
Trafigura, part of what they wanted was confidentiality. And we then had to 
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 Question asked by the author at Symposium on Business and Human Rights – University of Essex, 
17
th
 September 2010. 
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work out, well was this a decent deal for them taking everything on board and 
we had to feel in the end it was. We went out to Abidjan in September 2009 and 
we managed to meet with 25,000 of our clients in two weeks. We gave them all 
the opportunity to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to the agreement knowing of the 
confidentiality, knowing of the position. Every single one, bar none, signed the 
deal: that they wanted to have the money in their pocket rather than some of the 
concerns that have now been raised. It’s difficult. I hate confidentiality 
agreements. I think in the end it’s important that society learns from what has 
happened and that everything is open book, everything is transparent but where 
a defendant comes to you as a lawyer and says look we are offering you ‘X’ but 
a part of the deal is that it’s confidential, you have to put that deal to the client, 
you can’t say well sorry, we don’t like the deal, we’re not going to agree to it. 
… 
As I say for me, if we had this situation in the [United] States [of America] you 
can’t actually sign something in these sorts of deals as you can in the UK and I 
would feel much more easy if the Law Society was to ban, for example, that you 
cannot. Again one of the parts of the deal is we can’t continue acting for 
anybody else in the Ivory Coast, that was part of the deal we had to sign. In the 
States that’s simply not allowed, as a part of any deal. I think that would be a 
massively useful thing if the Law Society was to say, as a solicitor you simply 
can’t enter that deal. Well, that would be great because it would then cut off the 
area that is such a major part of what happened and I think it’s a retrograde step 
for our society because it means that we don’t learn all the lessons of what has 
happened. 
The agreement contained the following phrase: “the claimants now acknowledge that 
the fumes could, at worst, have caused only a range of short term relatively low level 
flu-like symptoms and anxiety” (Neuberger 2011). Here, from an implicatory denial 
point of view, we are presented with a ‘denial of responsibility’ and a “different 
construction of the event from what might appear the case” (Cohen 1993: 110). 
Furthermore, the agreement precludes Leigh Day from representing any more clients on 
the issue. Both are factors that block future compensation claims by the victims in 
Abidjan that were not part of this case. 
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As a legal sanction, the case is therefore also a failure: Trafigura can still claim to be 
without liability for the dumping. The settlement was part of the larger scheme of denial 
and ensured that the actions of Trafigura would not be considered by a law court in this 
case, with all the media attention that entails (Dunt 2009). 
Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the reaction of international civil society actors to the dumping 
and sought to assess the capacity of these actors to label the corporation as criminal and 
to sanction the state-corporate crime that took place in Abidjan. The chapter examined 
two events: the first, the attempt by mainstream British media to censure Trafigura for 
the dumping; and the second, a 30,000-claimant personal injury case filed against the 
corporation in London. Both events were major attempts at censure or sanction, and the 
analysis reveals the power struggle between the corporation engaged in denial and civil 
society organisations trying to censure and sanction the company is played out using the 
apparatuses of the state and primarily the civil legal system. 
By employing all three forms of Cohen’s (1993) theory of denial – (1) ‘denial of the 
past’, (2) ‘literal denial’, and (3) ‘implicatory denial’ – the cover-up (and especially the 
subsequent ‘silencing’ of media voices) is analysed. The 2007 attempt by Trafigura to 
alter the Dutch Wikipedia article about the Probo Koala and the 2009 case against the 
Dutch government to suppress an NFI report on the dumping are clear attempts to erase 
the dumping from the public record. When the record cannot be suppressed, the 
corporation has resorted to aggressively initiating libel legal threats through a British 
law firm including the 2009 libel action against Newsnight, which was settled for 
£25,000 along with an apology to Trafigura. The corporation even tried to suppress its 
own commissioned research using a super-injunction. They also employed firms like 
Bell Pottinger who claim to employ ‘dark arts’ to protect reputations, and Bell Pottinger 
insisted that the 2009 UN report (UNHRC 2009) was “inaccurate” (Independent 2009). 
We can see that the discourse presented by Trafigura follows what Cohen (1993) calls 
‘a complete spiral of denial’: 
First you try ‘it didn’t happen’. There was no massacre, no one was tortured. But 
then the media, human rights organisations and victims show that it does 
happen: here are the graves; we have the photos; look at the autopsy reports. So 
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you have to say that what happened was not what it looks to be but really 
something else. (Cohen 1993: 102) 
Thereafter, the audience is subjected to the next stage of the spiral: “if it did happen, ‘it’ 
is something else” (Cohen 1993: 103). The final stage of the spiral of denial is 
‘justification’. Eric de Turckheim, a Trafigura director, was interviewed by Jeremy 
Paxman on the BBC’s Newsnight programme on 16th August 2007,399 and de Turckheim 
appeared to be applying Cohen’s first stage of denial, arguing that “this [waste] material 
was not dangerous for human being [sic]; smelly, but not dangerous”. Trafigura later 
argued that the dumping was carried out illegally and without its knowledge by an 
independent local contractor (Milmo 2009), thereby denying the company’s 
responsibility but suggesting that even ‘if’ the waste were dangerous it was not in fact 
dumped by Trafigura. De Turckheim’s 2007 television appearance also reveals 
Trafigura’s attempts at the ‘justification’ stage of Cohen’s spiral model when he argued 
that “[t]he discharge of slops is a routine operation that is carried out worldwide, and 
Abidjan is a sophisticated port fully equipped to handle such waste” (Newsnight 2007). 
This commercially orientated justification for the discharge of the waste in Ivory Coast 
conflicts with the report of the National Inquiry which insists that the lack of port 
facilities available at Abidjan would have been discovered by minimal due diligence.
400
 
Opposing the denial of Trafigura are NGOs, members of civil society that act as a social 
audience. As with this thesis, Cohen focuses on observer groups who are ‘ideologically 
predisposed’ to human suffering: “my concern is not the actor but rather (back, in a 
curious way, to labelling theory!) the audience” (Cohen 1993: 104) and researches 
human rights organisations (national and international) to explore how they overcome 
what he calls “barriers of denial”. One of the major advantages available to international 
NGOs is their capacity to access international networks of civil society actors (including 
socially orientated law firms, journalists and other NGOs) which ultimately strengthens 
their capacity to label actions as deviant or criminal. Domestic Ivorian NGOs assume 
the role of a social audience that could interpret the legality, criminality and human 
rights impact of the dumping and to apply relevant sanctions to the criminal actors. 
However, as seen in Chapter 6, the failure of domestic NGOs to mount a comprehensive 
resistance was the result of a combination of internal and external factors. Internally, a 
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lack of institutional funding, resources and quality personnel was reported during 
interviews. Scarcity of resources limits the amount of time, money or effort that an 
NGO can dedicate to any project, and a lack of funding dedicated to enhancing capacity 
(as most funding is project based; see discussion in Chapter 6) ensures that the effects of 
resource limitations are propagated. Externally, an improved ability to collaborate with, 
and pool resources and expertise with, other domestic NGOs as well as maintaining a 
working relationship with elements of the state might have aided resistance to the 
dumping by providing a platform to overcome the barriers to denial and sanction the 
corporation through NGO action and/or through mechanisms of the state. By contrast, 
international NGOs are generally well funded and resourced and attract high-quality 
personnel. Furthermore, they displayed a capacity to form networks with other civil 
society actors across national boundaries and enjoyed access to the sanctioning 
mechanisms of the state, and most importantly various domestic legal systems. 
International civil society organisations, especially Greenpeace (who initially became 
concerned with this case because of the resultant environmental damage), were 
successful in publishing reports and mounting legal cases in the Netherlands as part of 
their censuring campaigns against the corporation. However, as this chapter has 
demonstrated, even after a network of civil society actors formed a strategic issue-based 
alliance and launched a coordinated campaign in the UK to label the corporation’s 
actions as deviant, the ‘barriers of denial’ that are provided by the current configuration 
of the UK legal system are formidable. 
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Chapter 9 – Conclusion 
This thesis has documented the intersection of crimes perpetrated by three sectors of 
society (state, corporate and civil society) in the case of Trafigura’s dumping of toxic 
waste in Abidjan, Ivory Coast in August 2006. It is an exploration of criminogenic 
relationship between the state and corporations, and the state and civil society. The 
thesis argues that the role of the Ivorian state was instrumental to the dumping crime, 
the impunity afforded Trafigura and the subsequent ‘criminalisation’401 of a section of 
civil society. One important finding of this thesis is the conclusion that a criminal state 
can act as a nexus for crimes by all three sectors of society; facilitating crime by actors 
in both the market (state-corporate) and third (commodification of victimhood) spheres 
of society. Gramsci’s notion of civil society provided the theoretical framework through 
which to understand the relationship between civil society, the Ivorian state and 
Trafigura and, importantly, the relationship between competing organisations within 
civil society. 
Research undertaken in London and Abidjan revealed the impunity that was enjoyed by 
the Ivory Coast government (and its agencies) and Trafigura for this state-corporate 
crime. This impunity was underpinned by the power of the corporation and by failures 
of both domestic and international legal regimes as well as civil society organisations 
that might have been expected to have labelled and challenged the crimes. This thesis 
set out to investigate the reasons for the apparent impunity afforded to Trafigura up to 
six years after the dumping of toxic waste in Abidjan in August 2006. At the time, UN 
Special Rapporteur on Toxic Waste, Okechukwu Ibeanu, took the commonly held view 
that civil society was well placed to assist the Ivorian state with the consequence of the 
dumping: “I would like to call on the Government to include civil society and victim 
associations in the follow-up of this crisis” (Ibeanu 2008). To some extent this 
corresponds with Green and Ward’s (2004) approach, namely that civil society can play 
a significant role in applying censure and sanction to state-corporate crime. However, 
research for this thesis found that the same victims’ organisations that Ibeanu was 
calling upon had in fact become engaged in forms of organisational crime, facilitated by 
a criminal state. These victims organisations were engaged in a process described in this 
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behaviours and individuals are transformed into crime and criminals through the application of labels but 
rather the process by which organised state-crime insinuated itself in a realm of civil society and engaged 
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thesis as ‘commodifying victimhood’ – specifically, charging victims of the dumping a 
fee in return for a promise of participation in some notional future legal compensation 
claim. In so doing these civil society organisations contributed in significant measure to 
the mechanisms of impunity which surrounded Trafigura’s crime, and to the victims’ 
suffering. 
This research originally aimed to survey human rights NGOs in Ivory Coast in order to 
determine the factors that may inform their reaction to large scale corporate crime. The 
data gathered during field work in Ivory Coast revealed that these organisations were 
severely limited by both internal and external factors, by the disproportionate power of 
the corporate entity and by organisational crime perpetrated by groups masquerading as 
members of civil society. In addition the economic and political environment in which 
the NGOs found themselves, a lack of intuitional funding, no access to skilled personal 
and a criminal state precluded domestic NGOs from carrying out potential sanctions. A 
further surprising feature was the isolationist stance of the NGOs; and, as the local 
victims organisation Club UA have reported, Ivorian NGOs do not have a record of 
collectively resisting objectionable government
402
 policies. However, and perhaps most 
significantly, mainstream Ivory Coast NGOs deliberately chose not to engage with the 
struggle of victims of the dumping in order to avoid an association with the 
government-backed victims organisations who were taking advantage of the general 
impunity afforded to Trafigura and the Ivorian state. 
Responsibility for impunity, however, did not rest with the Ivory Coast state alone, nor 
with its apathetic and criminally organised sector of domestic civil society. It is also 
argued in this thesis, as the discussion in Chapter 8 revealed, that one of the primary 
reasons for a lack of censure by civil society of Trafigura in the UK was a fear of the 
corporation’s legal and financial might (in the context of the UK’s libel laws). As 
British political commentator George Monbiot noted, “The law of defamation ... 
discourages people from investigating abuses of power” (Monbiot 2009). The 
Gramscian conception of ‘struggle’ was a common theme and was employed by various 
actors when referring to the battle for censure that raged in the UK in the face of a cover 
up, which one commentator dubbed “the great Battle of Trafigura” (Massie 2009). But 
it is not simply Trafigura’s financial and legal prowess that inhibits actions against the 
corporation. There are, at least perceptually, more sinister factors in play. When I 
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proposed the idea of a private criminal prosecution in the UK against Trafigura for its 
role in the dumping, a senior executive at a very influential international NGO reported; 
“I've dealt with that company. If you do that, I will look out for you floating in the 
Thames.”403 It is therefore likely that Trafigura’s aggressive reputation has had a 
cooling effect on academics and other commentators, similar to that observed in relation 
to the UK press. 
In the six years that followed the dumping, a limited academic literature has focused on 
the crime. Scientific articles of particular interest include Bohand et al’s (2007) 
empirical study of the medical evidence, which argues – rather uncontroversially – that 
the export of industrial waste may result in public health consequences. Goode’s (2010) 
presentation at the British Criminology Conference – entitled Is my Cousin a Mass 
Murderer? – sought to gauge the reaction of family members of a Trafigura executive to 
the news that he was involved in the deaths of Ivoirians. The paper provides a useful 
insight into these types of crime on the individual level of analysis. White’s (2008) 
Toxic cities: globalizing the problem of waste sought to raise the profile of the dumping 
but ultimately does not provide any analysis of the factors contributing to the disaster.  
Legal academics have published on the super-injunction in the UK and the breach of 
environmental law that occurred in the Netherlands, using the dumping as a practical 
example. Matthiesson’s (2010) media law analysis argues that super-injunction 
gagging-orders are, “unwieldy, draconian and disproportionate” (Matthiesson’s 2010: 
153). Carney (2010) too examines the super-injunction but his research is primarily a 
public law examination of parliamentary privilege. Legal critiques of the international 
waste control regime, and the Basel convention in particular, were authored by Eze 
(2008), Cox (2010) and Pratt (2010). And Sachs (2008) examines the limited (as 
discussed in Chapter 8) possibilities for a tort remedy to crimes similar to the dumping. 
Dutch court cases concerning Trafigura’s breach of environmental law at Amsterdam 
Port have received some attention from Verschuuren (2010) and Jesse and Verschuuren 
(2011). More ambitious is Manirabona’s (2011) article (in French), which argues that 
these types of environmental crimes may be better conceptualised as international crime 
(and specifically crimes against humanity). 
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The thesis also contributes to the literature on African civil society, and Ivorian civil 
society in particular (see Chapter 4), on which there is very little literature available. 
The finding presented here temper arguments made by Shastri (2008) and Lawrence and 
Nezhad (2009) as to the particular strengths which NGOs in Africa display. The data 
collected confirms arguments made by Hearn (2007), namely that the African NGO 
sector is characterised by external financial dependence and an external orientation. 
Outside academia, two popular books have also been written. The first, published in 
French by Dussol and Nithart (2010), recalls the voyage of the Probo Koala and 
circumstances surrounding the dumping and is written in a distinctly journalistic 
manner. The book reads like a thriller novel, and provides little academic analysis. The 
second, a Dutch language publication by Vink (2011), proposed, contrary to the 
available evidence presented above, the theory that the dumping was not harmful, did 
not cause any deaths and any reported symptoms were psychosomatic. 
Two other major publications by NGOs worth making reference to include Amnesty 
International & Greenpeace’s (2012) report, The Toxic Truth: 
A three-year investigation by Amnesty International and Greenpeace has 
uncovered the central reason for the tragedy that unfolded in Abidjan: in the 
absence of effective law enforcement, one company acted to secure corporate 
profit without regard for the human and environmental costs. That company was 
Trafigura. (Amnesty International and Greenpeace 2012: 3) 
And the Paris-based association of NGOs, FIDH
404
, published report (in French) of 
April 2011, which outlines how this crime was dealt with by the domestic and 
international justice systems. While rigorously researched, neither NGO publication 
provides a comprehensive or analytical view of the dumping. 
In the absence of any robust alternatives, this thesis provides a criminological case 
study that can be added to a growing library of corporate crime and state-corporate 
crime case studies. The thesis thus contributes to the empirical literature on state and 
state-corporate crime, and modestly develops our understanding of the means by which 
powerful entities are able to avoid censure and punishment. 
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As discuss in Chapter 1, the literature on state-corporate has grown apace in recent 
years (Tombs and Whyte 2002; Kauzlarich et al 2003; Kramer and Michalowski 2005; 
Lasslett 2010b) but few scholars have detailed the censure and sanctions applied to 
corporations after a criminal event. Instead, empirical studies have been preoccupied 
with explaining the factors that resulted in the crimes. One criticism which might be 
levelled at an approach focusing on sanctions and censure, rather than on the failure of a 
control regime (Kramer et al 2002), is that it is primarily backward looking and does not 
seek to prevent crime. However, the impunity effectively granted to Trafigura through 
its cover-up campaign has permitted the corporation to walk away from its victims. 
There was no requirement for Trafigura to clean up the dump sites, provide health care 
for the victims or compensate the victims or families of the dead. Furthermore, the 
impunity from prosecution ensured that the corporation’s criminal behaviour persisted 
(Welsh 2009). A more recent example of Trafigura’s behaviour highlights both the 
effect of its continued impunity as well as the potential of civil society organisations to 
resist corporate power. After leaving Abidjan in August 2006, the Probo Koala sailed to 
Estonia. The ship was boarded by environmental officials upon arrival at Paldiski and it 
passed inspection. On 25th September, Greenpeace activists blockaded the ship with an 
icebreaker and rubber rafts and issued demands to the Estonian authorities to 
immobilise the Probo Koala. The following day the Probo Koala unloaded waste that 
was found to contain the same substances that had been dumped in Ivory Coast the 
previous month (Helsingin Sanomat 2009). There were also preliminary reports of high 
levels of toxins found in blood samples taken from crew members (New Europe 2006), 
up to sixty times the normal level according to Dimas (Helsingin Sanomat 2009). The 
police impounded the ship and a criminal investigation was initiated. This incident is 
indicative of the systemic recidivist nature of the Trafigura corporation. A month after 
dumping in Ivory Coast with injurious effects, the corporation again attempted to 
deviantly offload toxic waste – concealing the true nature of the waste from an 
unsuspecting port authority. Estonia's Minister of the Environment (Villu Reiljan) 
reported that he was, “convinced that the ship tried to take advantage of the lack of 
experience of the new EU member state, and to leave its bilge and waste water, which 
contained toxic substances, in Paldiski” (Helsingin Sanomat 2009). EU Commissioner 
for the Environment, Stavros Dimas, visited the “toxic crime scene” to give his, “full 
support to the efforts of the Estonian authorities in their quest to prosecute the criminals 
who perpetrated this crime” (Dimas 2006). Dimas responded to Greenpeace’s actions 
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with: “let me extend my thanks to Greenpeace which took a decisive step by preventing 
the departure of the Probo Koala” adding, that this kind of activity, “is exactly the kind 
of role we expect from civil society” (Dimas 2006). 
The findings presented here suggest that scholars of state crime should adopt a more 
cautionary approach to civil society’s capacity to label, censure and sanction than that 
suggested by Green and Ward (2004). Moreover this thesis reveals that in the case of 
this particular example of state-corporate crime, civil society as an agency of censure 
and sanction played a distinctly retrogressive role. Here, in fact, state crime facilitated 
organised crime’s insertion into civil society through a process I define as ‘the 
commodification of victimhood’ and, as a result, ensured that impunity was virtually 
guaranteed for corporation and government. The implications of the findings of this 
thesis suggest new directions of research for criminology, in particular a more 
penetrating study of the concept of civil society.  
This thesis is not proposing that civil society should be abandoned as a mechanism for 
the sanction of corporate and state criminality, rather it argues for a more nuanced and 
more critical approach to civil society actors. As Grugel has argued: “NGOs are not 
‘perfect’ organizations always on the side of poor or marginal groups; nor are they 
always effective instruments of change” (Grugel 2000: 103). Civil society organisations 
– whether in Ivory Coast, Africa or elsewhere – can be an important challenge to the 
power wielded by large, powerful and potentially dangerous corporations (as well as the 
states they negotiate with). This will be especially true in the case of state-corporate 
crime, if as Day claims “governments have, in the end, little power when it comes to the 
operations of multinationals primarily in the developing world” (Day 2010). 
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Appendix A - Semi-Structured Interview Questions 
What is the state and city in which your organisation is located? 
What is your position within the organisation? 
How long has your organisation been in existence? 
Does your organisation have a website or brochure available? 
What are the key elements of your organisation’s mission? 
What projects are you currently working on? 
Who decides what development projects to work on? 
Approximately how many clients do you currently serve? 
How do you assess or evaluate projects? 
What are your primary funding sources? (international, domestic, government) 
What percent of funds are allocated to direct development projects (not salaries)? What 
is the average project budget? 
What systems, if any, does your organisation have in place to ensure that funding meets 
its intended recipients (that is, accounting, social audits, client evaluation)? 
Have there been any internal or external audits of your organisation’s financial 
information? 
How many other NGO’s operate in your current project areas? 
Have any governments encouraged you to take a more active role in certain sectors? 
If yes, do your activities substitute the government’s work or compliment it? 
What responsibilities have you been given that government would normally cover? Do 
you expect the government to eventually re-enter this area? 
Has the government impeded your work? 
What other problems have you faced during your activities? From which source? 
What is the biggest problem currently facing INGO’s in this topic area? 
Do you have a legal department? 
Do you have any legal officers? 
Have you ever considered legal action against a corporation? 
Have you ever considered legal action against a government? 
Have you ever considered criminal legal action against any person or body? 
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Appendix B – Victim Card (issued by FAVIDET) 
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